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THESIS SUMMARY 
 
 
This dissertation assesses the rationale and interests behind regional 
alliance formation in the age of globalization as they pertain to the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). In essence, this analysis attempts to highlight the 
common theoretical assumptions and approaches often used to explain the 
cooperative interests of states within the context of regional and international 
discourse. Using these assumptions, it highlights potential motives, incentives, 
costs, and constraints that states may consider when determining the relative 
value of engaging in formally defined cooperative relationships with other states.  
 
This work demonstrates how historical, demographic, political, economic, 
and geographic factors all determine the political character of both regimes and 
states in shaping how they view themselves in relation to their regional 
neighbours and other international powers. Specifically, it argues that states seek 
to formulate policies based upon these factors, effectively prioritizing their own 
interests and security with the objectives of self-preservation and maximization of 
prosperity within a global environment of competing states and regimes that 
essentially pursue the same objectives.     
 
The following chapters of this analysis are specifically concerned with the 
rationale behind the inter-GCC relationship, how it is defined, why the member 
states choose to cooperate, and what motivates them to cooperate under the 
guise of the GCC. Such an analysis is beneficial in assessing the evolution of the 
 ii 
cooperative relationship of the GCC, providing meaningful insight into the 
progress of the alliance, its growth, its progress or lack thereof in promoting 
interests, and the role that it may play in the era of globalization. This analysis 
seeks to promote and substantiate the argument that the cooperative relationship 
upon which the GCC is based is essentially driven or motivated by security 
interests. In other words, it argues that the Security, sovereignty, stability, 
legitimacy, and welfare of GCC member states are the paramount interests of the 
regimes and frame their fundamental security ideals for the preservation and 
sustainability of their systems. What I mean by security above is not just the 
traditionalist views of security, which is the military, but security in its wider 
perspective that includes environmental, economic and social sectors at a local, 
regional and global level.  
 
The ‗wide‘ versus ‗narrow‘ debate grew out of dissatisfaction with the 
intense narrowing of the field of security studies imposed by the military 
and nuclear obsessions of the cold war.1 
 
With this understanding, it theorizes that member states decide whether to 
cooperate after conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the conditions that may 
warrant coordination and whether the pursuit of cooperation will truly facilitate or 
complement their political, defensive, economic, and internal / external security. 
As such, it seeks to address and analyse the following research questions: As a 
                                                 
1 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 1998), p.2 
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conglomeration of monarchies, did the member states choose to establish an 
alliance based on their common political systems or out of a sense of 
vulnerability and necessity because they face common or collective threat(s) to 
themselves or their systems? If they face such threats, are they primarily internal, 
for example, (press freedom, environment, health, employment, gender equality 
…etc) external, political, ideological, or economic?  
 
Much of the writing of this work is based on primary research (books, 
articles and the Internet) as the attempts to use questionnaires and interviews 
failed due to the lack of willingness and fear from those concerned to answer a 
set of questions objectively, as well as the fact that those who accepted to be 
interviewed sought it to be anonymous as they feared loosing their jobs, but as it 
is impossible not to mention sources in this work, I decided to not to use 
questionnaires and interviews.  
 
Most of the theoretical and security issues In the Middle East are 
essentially between the U.S. vs. Middle East.  A good example would be NATO 
quoted below: 
 
The GCC already has a military agreement amongst its members, the Gulf 
Shield Defence Force, and individual bilateral security agreements with 
the U.S. and Britain. NATO has been in dialogue with Qatar, Kuwait, and 
the other members of the GCC in pursuit of establishing a more formal 
NATO presence in the Persian Gulf and a new security arrangement 
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against Iran…….. This new regional balance in the Persian Gulf is part of 
a broader alliance in the Middle East that is linked to NATO. Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, Egypt, Israel, the United States, Britain, and NATO, besides the 
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) are all part of this coalition in the Middle 
East. [5] This military alliance or coalition essentially represents an 
eastern extension of NATO‘s ―Mediterranean Dialogue.‖ The Middle 
Eastern members of this coalition, including Israel and Saudi Arabia, are 
labelled the ―Coalition of the Moderate,‖ whereas Iran and Syria are said 
to lead a ―Coalition of Radicals/Extremists.‖………. Aside from the 
implications of a confrontation with Iran, this cooperation between the 
GCC and NATO confirms that NATO is preparing to become a global 
institution and military force. The Middle East is an important geo-strategic 
and energy-rich area of NATO expansion. The vanguards of NATO in the 
region are Turkey and Israel.2 
 
Chapter one explains the theoretical and security issues as well as the 
understanding of the cooperation in the GCC countries, chapter two deals with 
the history of the GCC States, chapter three deals with the external aspect and 
influence of the GCC States, chapter four deals with the internal aspect of the 
GCC states, Chapter five deals with general recommendations and finally 
chapter six deals with the GCC in a new world order. 
                                                 
2 http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5677 (May 18, 2007) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This dissertation assesses the rationale and interests behind regional 
alliance formation in the age of globalization as they pertain to the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). In essence, this analysis attempts to highlight the 
common theoretical assumptions and approaches often used to explain the 
cooperative interests of states within the context of regional and international 
discourse. Using these assumptions, it highlights potential motives, incentives, 
costs, and constraints that states may consider when determining the relative 
value of engaging in formally defined cooperative relationships with other states.  
This work demonstrates how historical, demographic, political, economic, 
and geographic factors all determine the political character of both regimes and 
states in shaping how they view themselves in relation to their regional 
neighbours and other international powers. Specifically, it argues that states seek 
to formulate policies based upon these factors, effectively prioritizing their own 
interests and security with the objectives of self-preservation and maximization of 
prosperity within a global environment of competing states and regimes that 
essentially pursue the same objectives.     
 
The following chapters of this analysis are specifically concerned with the 
rationale behind the inter-GCC relationship, how it is defined, why the member 
states choose to cooperate, and what motivates them to cooperate under the 
guise of the GCC. Such an analysis is beneficial in assessing the evolution of the 
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cooperative relationship of the GCC, providing meaningful insight into the 
progress of the alliance, its growth, its progress or lack thereof in promoting 
interests, and the role that it may play in the era of globalization. This analysis 
seeks to promote and substantiate the argument that the cooperative relationship 
upon which the GCC is based is essentially driven or motivated by security 
interests. In other words, it argues that the Security, sovereignty, stability, 
legitimacy, and welfare of GCC member states are the paramount interests of the 
regimes and frame their fundamental security ideals for the preservation and 
sustainability of their systems. What I mean by security above is not just the 
traditionalist views of security, which is the military, but security in its wider 
perspective that includes environmental, economic and social sectors at a local, 
regional and global level.  
 
The ‗wide‘ versus ‗narrow‘ debate grew out of dissatisfaction with the 
intense narrowing of the field of security studies imposed by the military 
and nuclear obsessions of the cold war.3 
 
With this understanding, it theorizes that member states decide whether to 
cooperate after conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the conditions that may 
warrant coordination and whether the pursuit of cooperation will truly facilitate or 
complement their political, defensive, economic, and internal / external security. 
As such, it seeks to address and analyse the following research questions: As a 
                                                 
3 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 1998), p.2 
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conglomeration of monarchies, did the member states choose to establish an 
alliance based on their common political systems or out of a sense of 
vulnerability and necessity because they face common or collective threat(s) to 
themselves or their systems? If they face such threats, are they primarily internal, 
for example, (press freedom, environment, health, employment, gender equality 
…etc) external, political, ideological, or economic?  
Much of the writing of this work is based on primary research (books, 
articles and the Internet) as the attempts to use questionnaires and interviews 
failed due to the lack of willingness and fear from those concerned to answer a 
set of questions objectively, as well as the fact that those who accepted to be 
interviewed sought it to be anonymous as they feared loosing their jobs, but as it 
is impossible not to mention sources in this work, I decided to not to use 
questionnaires and interviews. The interview questions are stated below: 
 
 What is the status of the Arab democratic process and values?  
 
 How can the U.S. and Arab governments better link bi-lateral trade 
agreements to sustainable development and social equity? 
  
 How will the rising oil prices and the growing demand for energy from 
China impact the future of the U.S.-Arab energy relationship?  
 
 What growth opportunities must the Arab World invest their oil boom 
riches in to help create 80 million jobs by 2020? What policies have 
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helped nations‘ expand their capabilities and capacity for service and 
trade?  
 
 What role do Internet and Communication Technology (ICT) innovations 
play in the future of the international community and Arab relationship? 
Where does the private sector come in?  
 
 Can the media be a positive agent of change in U.S.-Arab relations?  
 
 How are women shaping the regional agenda? Where do they need 
assistance from the public, private, and non-profit communities?  
 How do we prepare the youth for a post oil world? What skill set, culture, 
and education is needed for the Arab youth to thrive in the new economy?  
 
 
 Can religious education advance the dialogue between the international 
community and Arab civilizations? What awareness raising campaigns are 
needed? 
 
 What are the key targets for providing greater transparency and people-
centred governance?  
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 How can governments improve the quality of regulation and the capacity 
of regulators to fund and implement strategic policies for risk reduction, 
development and sustainable growth? 
  
 What is the role of the U.S. government in helping the Arab World develop 
its open trade infrastructure?  
 
 What actions are needed to build a favourable environment for free and 
fair competition for Arab companies to do business with the U.S., Europe, 
Asia, South America…etc in the public/private sector?  
 
 What is the role of the people and civil society in demanding practical 
capacity building programs that enable knowledge development and 
dissemination? What are the top three initiatives that must be focused on 
at the international level, at the regional level, at the member economy 
level, and at the community level?  
 
 How can governments enhance the role of women to improve efficiency, 
competition and broaden participation by enterprises?  
 
 What are the strategic implications of developing the capacity of youth as 
an enabler to global competitiveness? 
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 How can the U.S. administration strike a strategic balance between ‗taking 
the fight to the enemy‘ and ‗addressing vulnerabilities at home‘? 
  
 How can the media be a force for greater understanding & economic 
prosperity? What has Aljazeera and other new news channel done so far? 
 
 What are the geopolitical trends that will affect the future of the World-
Arab energy relationship?  
 
 What impact has President Bush‘s goal of replacing more than 75% of oil 
imports from the Middle East have/has on the U.S.-Arab relationship in the 
short term? In the long term?  
 
 What should the U.S. government do to refocus its energy policy to 
address the President‘s goal and commit the resources to improve energy 
efficiency? Was the President‘s commitment to new technology enough? 
Is there enough financial support to achieve technological success? 
  
 To what extent has the Arab oil & gas income contributed to the 
development of well-functioning economies and the overall 
competitiveness of the Arab region?  
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 What types of strategic alliances between the U.S. and the Arab World 
must be in place to provide adequate production management, pricing, 
reinvestment, governance, & mark the future of economic competitiveness 
for both regions?  
 
 What steps can be taken by the international community and Arab world to 
effectively combine intellectual and financial resources to provide 
innovative energy solutions? 
 
 What policy obstacles do the international community and Arab World 
leaders need to overcome, to eliminate the strategic sources of threats to 
reform & security from international terrorists and paramilitary groups? 
 
 What are the key steps that U.S. and Arab World leaders need to 
undertake to extend the U.S.-Arab energy partnership into other growth 
sectors such as services?  
 
 What role should the information & communication technology private 
sector play to eliminate the divide between the U.S. and the Arab 
economies?  
 
 How can the Arab World preserve its cultural identity in a borderless world 
of knowledge and communications?  
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 What tools are necessary to encourage sustainable tourism? What are the 
key opportunities for implementing world-Arab tourism exchanges 
partnerships? Can such tourism exchanges play an important role in 
promoting understanding between the people of different nations?  
 
 What role do Arab Americas play in bridging the economic, political and 
social divide between the U.S. and the Arab World? 
 
 
Most of the theoretical and security issues In the Middle East are essentially 
between the U.S. vs. Middle East.  A good example would be NATO quoted 
below: 
 
The GCC already has a military agreement amongst its members, the Gulf 
Shield Defence Force, and individual bilateral security agreements with 
the U.S. and Britain. NATO has been in dialogue with Qatar, Kuwait, and 
the other members of the GCC in pursuit of establishing a more formal 
NATO presence in the Persian Gulf and a new security arrangement 
against Iran…….. This new regional balance in the Persian Gulf is part of 
a broader alliance in the Middle East that is linked to NATO. Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, Egypt, Israel, the United States, Britain, and NATO, besides the 
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) are all part of this coalition in the Middle 
East. [5] This military alliance or coalition essentially represents an 
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eastern extension of NATO‘s ―Mediterranean Dialogue.‖ The Middle 
Eastern members of this coalition, including Israel and Saudi Arabia, are 
labelled the ―Coalition of the Moderate,‖ whereas Iran and Syria are said 
to lead a ―Coalition of Radicals/Extremists.‖………. Aside from the 
implications of a confrontation with Iran, this cooperation between the 
GCC and NATO confirms that NATO is preparing to become a global 
institution and military force. The Middle East is an important geo-strategic 
and energy-rich area of NATO expansion. The vanguards of NATO in the 
region are Turkey and Israel.4 
 
Chapter one explains the theoretical and security issues as well as the 
understanding of the cooperation in the GCC countries, chapter two deals with 
the history of the GCC States, chapter three deals with the external aspect and 
influence of the GCC States, chapter four deals with the internal aspect of the 
GCC states, Chapter five deals with general recommendations and finally 
chapter six deals with the GCC in a new world order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5677 (May 18, 2007) 
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Chapter 1 
1.1 Interstate Cooperation and Perceived Threats  
Before beginning an examination of cooperation, one must gain 
understanding of the nature of this concept. What is cooperation? Is it a general 
relationship amongst friendly states, a specific discretionary alliance, an official 
agreement, or simply an unofficial understanding? Cooperation is of tantamount 
significance within the field of international relations because it serves as the 
framework by which states agree or disagree to relate to one another. However, 
the concept‘s simplistic appearance may prove deceptive for what is truly a 
complex behavioural trend, and the varying political motives that can be ascribed 
to the desire for cooperation make the concept difficult to explain. Indeed, simply 
identifying the means by which cooperative relationships are identified will 
require an examination of the various definitions of cooperation to distinguish 
between various kinds of interstate relationships and actual interstate 
cooperation. 
 
In essence, cooperation can be regarded as a form or type of relationship 
between two or more states. It can be argued that states will cooperate only to 
meet certain objectives, and that the motivation to cooperate is determined by 
certain circumstances or conditions that regimes or states may face concerning a 
number of policy issues pertaining to both internal and external factors. 
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According to this argument, cooperation is essentially pursued in order to help 
alleviate a given situation or environment and benefit the respective parties 
involved through the establishment of formally defined relationships.5 Such a 
situation or environment pertains to the political or geographic circumstances 
facing various states or regimes that may oblige them to cooperate on the 
grounds of mutual interest. The existence of a relationship between one or more 
state entities does not necessarily mean that cooperation exists among all the 
parties involved; yet cooperation can be defined as a type of political 
relationship.6   
 
Many interstate relationships can be framed within the context of the 
rational actor model of behaviour in which state actors pursue ―logical‖ courses of 
action seeking to maximize benefits to themselves at minimal cost or damage.7 In 
its approach to the mechanics of policymaking and the evaluation of decisions 
and relationships, game theory assumes that states and regimes only pursue 
policies beneficial to their own ends and interests based upon the assumption 
that as states exist within a state of ―anarchy‖, their primary interests are self-
preservation and security maximization. If game theory were assumed to be 
operative, decision-making would often take place in an environment of 
uncertainty and distrust amongst states that must determine the best course of 
action to take under a given set of options or alternatives. States would thus 
                                                 
5 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International 
Relations (New York: Longman, 1997), p. 419. 
6 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p. 418. 
7 Frank Zagare, Game Theory (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1984), p. 7.  
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pursue calculated tactical decisions based on an evaluation of certain underlying 
factors, such as domestic and regional political, economic, social, and security 
conditions; the availability of resources and leverage; the impact of policy 
decisions on other states and their potential responses; and the short and long-
term implications of certain actions. The relative distrust that exists within the 
international community and amongst states would force regimes to adopt self-
preservation measures because the intentions of other state actors may not 
always be evident. Engaging in cooperation as a form of formal relationship 
would allow states to derive the greatest benefit from any alliance whilst, 
remaining sceptical of the intentions of others, attempt to anticipate and calculate 
possible manoeuvres to avoid any damage or cost resulting from the policy 
decisions and actions of other states. 
 
The ―prisoner‘s dilemma‖ is a scenario often used to explain this state of 
relative distrust amongst and potential reasoning behind interstate relationships 
within a global climate of uncertainty. Imagine a setting where two actors or 
states are unaware of the true intentions of the other. Within these constraints, 
the two players will naturally attempt to pursue a course of action that maximizes 
their benefits at minimal cost. If, for example, the two players choose to 
cooperate on arms control, both will likely benefit from a situation of non-
confrontation if they abide by the agreement to neither produce nor sell arms, 
thereby maintaining a certain level of control and order within their environment 
to the security satisfaction of each other. However, if one side chooses to break 
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the arms control agreement by secretly or deceptively producing and selling 
arms, then this defector could gain an arms advantage over the other player to 
his clear benefit as long as the other player remains aware of his actions, thus 
making his own position more secure at the relative cost of the other. On the 
other hand, if the first state cooperates on the arms control agreement and the 
second state chooses to cheat, then the first player will be vulnerable and less 
secure due to the arms imbalance that would be created between himself and 
the other player. Nevertheless, if both players choose to defy the arms control 
agreement, then the agreement achieved nothing and they are both worse off 
because they have neither diminished the threat to themselves through the 
regulations of arms nor gained a relative advantage over the other.8   
 
As a tool for studying the decision-making behaviour of states within the 
international system, game theory is often regarded as a valuable approach to 
appreciating realism. The concept of self-interest is especially important when 
attempting to discuss interstate relationships and how trust plays a significant 
role in international political discourse. Realism assists in identifying the 
rationale, or more specifically the political forces, behind cooperation that 
determine the necessity of cooperation. Cooperation itself is not a mandatory 
condition in the political relationships amongst state actors but rather a 
negotiated means to achieving an end. Therefore, states could consider 
cooperation a non-optimal state preference because they must attempt to 
                                                 
8 Zagare, p. 51. 
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compromise and enter into cooperative agreements out of necessity or under the 
assumption that cooperation may bring long-term benefits. 
 
Keohane explained that states theoretically existing in an idealistic 
environment of ―harmony‖ do not necessarily need to cooperate under preferred 
circumstances because there is no corresponding benefit or need to compromise 
national interests under formally defined agreements in such a non-threatening 
climate.9 Because the existence of harmony is considered an ideal state, states 
must evaluate the costs and benefits of such political relationships based on the 
argument that they will only seek to cooperate with other states if the benefits of 
such cooperation outweigh the costs. This not only means that they should 
evaluate the costs and benefits of not cooperating but also the consequences of 
the cooperation itself and whether a relationship with another state may have 
indirect negative implications, such as political, economic, or security domination 
by another state. 
 
In this sense, realist approaches to understanding interstate cooperative 
behaviour assume that states are led by ―rational actors‖ who consider these 
various issues and contexts as a prerequisite to decision-making.10  Many social 
scientists, especially those within the fields of political science and economics, 
assume that all individuals act as rational actors, particularly those who lead 
                                                 
9 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 
   pp. 51-55. 
10 Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman, Comparative Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.19-21. 
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regimes. Presumably, all individuals seek to maximize their own benefits and 
achieve an ideal outcome thought the most cost-effective means after engaging 
in cost-benefit calculation. By evaluating several alternative means to achieving 
an end, actors assess which action would provide the greatest productive 
outcome or bring them closest to their optimal goal at the least cost, as do the 
actors in the prisoner‘s dilemma. Therefore, as states choose when and where to 
cooperate to effectively meet their defined interests under given conditions, 
states will not seek to pursue any form of action if it does not fulfil their needs, 
deviates from their optimal objectives, or causes them damage; thus, 
ideologically defined cooperation is always eclipsed by self-interest.11 Such a 
situation requires that states have well-defined interests in order to evaluate 
which alternative is their best ―rational‖ course of action in a given situation. 
 
It is important to emphasize that according to the rational actor model, 
states will not seek self-destruction or pursue policies that weaken their standing. 
However, states may pursue policies that assist in maintaining a certain status 
quo, particularly when maintaining this status is their optimal preference. 
Ambitious states, such as hegemonies, will attempt to broaden their preferences 
through the projection of their relative influence by taking more risks in their 
decision-making according to the expectation or objective of achieving a greater 
short- or long-term good. As such, all rationally acting states will seek to not only 
preserve themselves by avoiding self-inflicted harm but also avoiding harm by 
                                                 
11 Amilcar Barreto, The Politics of Language in Puerto Rico (Gainesville: University of 
Florida Press, 2001), pp. 81-85.  
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others by considering the role of stronger states that may have the ability to 
punish or reward other states for their behaviour.12 This means that initiated 
conflict is conditional and only favoured if the state in question expects to defeat 
the other side. In this sense, the highest priority of states within the realist 
rational-actor model is self-preservation, which means that states always seek to 
maintain their power, stability, and defence at all times in order to anticipate or 
offset potential aggression. State interests beyond these factors are defined by 
elites who, having their own interests within a government or society, may act on 
other politically defined motives.13  
 
Therefore, it is unlikely that established state governments will challenge 
or deny the right of another state to defend itself according to notions of territorial 
and governing sovereignty unless that state or regime is perceived as 
illegitimate. Such belief in the right of defence is due to the common expectation 
that the sovereignty of all recognized states must be respected, and thus 
represents an issue of compromise amongst several state actors that seek to 
benefit their own standing under such relative consensus. 
 
The realist approach to interstate relationships is also useful for gaining 
understanding of the establishment of alliances amongst states. Although states 
or regimes may seek to develop alliances with other states to further their various 
political, economic, ideological, security, or military interests, they may also do so 
                                                 
12 A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980), pp. 5-7.  
13 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
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to further one isolated realm of mutual interest. Historically, many direct 
cooperative relationships amongst states and empires throughout the world have 
been based on military grounds, primarily because most states sought interstate 
relationships to protect, defend, preserve, or expand their power within the 
international system based upon a less complex definition of security and a 
greater emphasis on sovereignty than territory.14 The basis for such cooperative 
relationships is somewhat different in the modern era, as the sovereignty of a 
state is now defined in much broader terms to protect the security rights of states 
in multiple areas, including their territorial, maritime, airspace, economic, and 
information realms, as well as their legal and governing systems. Therefore, in 
theory all states highly value the notion of sovereignty because it protects their 
right to exist and, more importantly, the right of its leaders or regimes to rule. 
Thus, states will attempt to guard or protect these rights by any means under the 
premise of national security. 
 
It could be argued that rather than establishing alliances with weaker 
states, it would be logical for states to ally themselves with stronger states as a 
means of gaining a relative advantage over other states and access to more 
political, economic, and military leverage through access to the resources and 
capacities of the more influential state. However, if they do so, these weaker 
states must attempt to ensure that the stronger state will not then seek to 
overthrow or dominate its regime and infringe upon its independent sovereign 
governing capacity. In this sense, it would be rational for states to ally 
                                                 
14 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 66-70. 
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themselves with the perceived stronger state that can best ensure their 
survival.15 However, any relationship with a stronger entity with greater resources 
will inevitably lead to considerations of coercion in the decision to cooperate. 
 
The scenario whereby weaker states ally themselves with a major 
international or regional power can be analogized to the phenomenon of 
bandwagoning, a type of the relationship between larger, potentially threatening 
states and smaller, threatened states. Stephen Walt and other realists interested 
in the reasoning behind alliance formation describe bandwagoning as an 
alignment with a source of danger or a stronger threat. Walt defined an alliance 
as ―a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or 
more sovereign states‖.16 By engaging in bandwagoning, states indicate that they 
wish to maintain their survival as viable political entities by establishing alliances 
with the state that they most fear.17 By allying themselves with a stronger state, 
the smaller state decreases the possibility of being threatened by the larger state 
and is thereby less likely to face political, military, or economic risk from the 
larger entity. In other words, by reluctantly rallying on the side of the stronger 
state, the smaller state will not be defined as a potential enemy or adversary, and 
is thus regarded as a target of protection rather than conquest. Needless to say, 
such cooperative alliances emphasize the hegemonic foreign policy desires of 
                                                 
15 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 441-442 
16 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), 
p.12. 
17 Ibid., pp. 17-19. 
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larger states to facilitate the coercion and manipulation of smaller states as a 
means of forging alliances.18   
 
Robert Keohane argues that hegemons may attempt to take advantage of 
their strength and position to coerce other states to cooperate as a means of 
maintaining a stable global system.19 His notion certainly emphasizes the 
previous assertion that states may be reluctant to cooperate under optimal non-
coerced conditions. As such, in order to force states to compromise and 
cooperate within this system, stronger states may manipulate their leverage with 
weaker states to attain their objectives and enforce institutional or international 
rules that enhance their own influence and capacities. This means that a 
hegemon characterized as the dominant unchallenged actor in a region will 
attempt to achieve its interests by coercing other states to pursue agreements 
that best benefit the hegemon or, in other words, agreements that present the 
most cost-effective solution to the hegemon when other states engage in 
bandwagoning. Because the cooperation that results from bandwagoning does 
not necessarily mean that states involved agree on all matters, it cannot be 
characterized as a relationship that provides equal consideration to the interests 
of all the states involved. In this sense, cooperative agreements that favour 
hegemons do not necessarily mean that the weaker states will cooperate 
                                                 
18 Walt, pp. 27-29. 
19 Keohane, pp. 45-46. 
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because, as mentioned earlier, cooperation is only maintained out of perceived 
or calculated necessity or coercion in the case of a present hegemon.20   
 
Analogies to colonialism and the Cold War best describe the practice of 
bandwagoning through the coercion of superpowers. Regarding the Cold War, 
the major powers of the US and the Soviet Union had a vested interest in 
maintaining and expanding their relative spheres of influence to gain extended 
strategic geopolitical, ideological, and political resources in relation to their rival.21 
Such a bipolar political order gave the impression that states had to side with one 
superpower over the other or avoid direct alliances with either side so as not to 
come under its dominating influence. In either case, smaller states could 
potentially be coerced by their larger neighbours to side with them, and may 
therefore could have had no choice but to seek the protection of the stronger 
entity under certain circumstances. This is clear when one considers that 
hegemons often covertly attempt to threaten or destabilize political regimes that 
are less sympathetic to them in favour of other groups who help them maintain 
an internal political balance that essentially benefits the power or side in 
question. However, certain states may view the protection of a certain hegemon 
as strategically advantageous to their security interests, allowing them to deter 
external threats from other small states and powers, and may thus regard 
relationships with hemegmons as less threatening than are the other security 
circumstances that they face. 
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However, Walt found that one of the primary risks of bandwagoning is that 
it requires smaller states to place considerable trust in the potentially threatening 
state with which they have sided.22 He explained that weaker states are the most 
likely to bandwagon, primarily because they are defensively weak; their limited 
capabilities make it less feasible for them to join a military coalition in terms of a 
collective shield because they lack the resources to contribute effectively to the 
alliance or serve any beneficial deterrent role unless they are in a geopolitically 
strategic location. Therefore, such weak states are more likely to engage in 
bandwagoning when confronted by a larger entity such as a regional or global 
hegemon.23 Eastern European states during the Cold War could be considered 
examples of weaker states that may have bandwagoned on the side of the Soviet 
Union as a means of deterring its potential political and military threats. However, 
whether this was the case is subject to interpretation; although the concept of 
bandwagoning is a means of explaining the rationale behind the establishment of 
alliances, it is consistent with realist views of self-interest and the existence of 
threats as important considerations in decision-making and state survival. 
 
Alliances are not only formed by smaller, weak states wishing to ally 
themselves with larger, potentially threatening states but also states that wish to 
deter military force or maintain a balance of power. Such alliances are usually 
explained by reference to the concept of balancing, which Walt describes as 
                                                 
22 Walt, p. 29. 
23 Ibid., p. 31. 
 22 
"states join[ing] alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose 
superior resources could pose a threat‖.24 Balancing is a particularly practical 
approach to evaluating interstate alliances because it emphasizes the realist 
perspective that states are primarily interested in their own survival or viability in 
the international system. Therefore, they will seek to maintain their existence in 
the face of external threats through such means as pooling their resources to 
establish interstate coalitions that collectively counter a potential threat posed by 
another large state or coalition of states. Walt explained that even when states 
engage in bandwagoning, a larger state may still pose risks to a smaller state 
because the smaller state may eventually come under the larger state‘s control 
and direct influence, as Lebanon has come under  Syria's dominance. 
Establishing a coalition or alliance with other states of similar strength could be 
considered a safer strategy in the pursuit of self-preservation and self-rule 
because the states involved would be sharing specific resource interests with 
regards to their mutual defence or security.25  
  
Maintaining collective security requires similar considerations as do those 
in maintaining balance amongst states or deterring other states. Although the 
premise of both balance and collective security is the existence of a potential 
aggressor, the two terms are described somewhat differently. Organski and 
Kugler describe the act of balancing or maintaining a balance of power as that 
engaged in when states seek to maximize their power in relation to an adversary, 
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whereas states seek collective security based on considerations of defence and 
national security to prevent aggression.26 In other words, the drive behind 
balancing is primarily directed towards power, whether political, economic, 
military, or geographic, as it relates to a threat, based on the assumption that 
increasing one‘s power to level one‘s capabilities with that of an adversary is a 
means of deterring its potentially aggressive behaviour. 
 
In this case study, balancing serves as an interesting and convincing 
realist approach to evaluating security coalitions or other coalitions within 
international relations, as it appears to explain behaviour and interests within the 
context of this analysis of the GCC. It appears logical that states with similar 
strengths or weaknesses may wish to establish a cooperative alliance as a 
means of balancing their collective strength with that of a foreign adversary. In 
this context, the Gulf states arguably chose to maintain their respective national 
security and limit their vulnerability by joining a collective political alliance under a 
given identity. It will be argued that there was no single determinant leading to 
the establishment of the GCC but rather a collective series of events that, 
compounding one after another, evoked a sense of regional anxiety 
subsequently exacerbated by the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the outbreak of 
the Iran-Iraq War. It is important to consider that balancing helps explain certain 
rationales behind the establishment of the GCC. 
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In essence, the Gulf region is composed of six relatively small states, with 
the exception of Saudi Arabia, that face significantly larger and potentially hostile 
neighbours with greater resources, primarily Iran to the east and Iraq to the north. 
Although one could argue that the inclusion of the geographically larger Saudi 
Arabia explains the formation of the GCC as an instance of bandwagoning, such 
an assessment would not necessarily be accurate. Although regionally large, 
Saudi Arabia is probably not regarded as a threatening neighbour by the other 
states but rather simply a state that shares the same defined security interests 
based on regional circumstances. The fact that the Gulf states are small entities 
with considerable political, economic, and military vulnerabilities in comparison to 
their larger neighbours can be a convincing rationale for arguing that the GCC is 
based on the concept of balancing. However, although collective security may be 
a factor in their cooperation, the fact that the Gulf states have chosen to 
cooperate not only in a military or security context but also in an economic, 
political, and cultural context indicates that they have broader security interests, 
as will be shown in this analysis. Such broader security interests may also be the 
basis of other regional organizations, such as the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Arab League, both of which seek to promote a 
collective vision for regional and national unity. 
 
Although balancing may appear superior to bandwagoning in addressing 
foreign threats, balancing and strengthening regional influence relative to one or 
more regional neighbours requires extensive political, economic, and military 
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resources and may result in unintended consequences. Mohammed Ayoob 
explained that the establishment of organizations such as the GCC and ASEAN 
could in fact exacerbate regional tensions rather then decrease them.27 For 
example, the establishment of the GCC may have fuelled rhetorical, political, and 
ideological hostility from Iran similar to those tensions that have been fuelled by 
the eastern expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), even 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By banding together under a new political 
umbrella, the Gulf States are inevitably perceived to pose a potential counter 
threat to Iran, and even Iraq, as a political-security bloc. The establishment of 
NATO and its subsequent expansion to the East served to not only enhance the 
Soviet Union‘s perception of a threat but also encouraged it to strengthen and 
expand its political and economic influence amongst the Eastern Bloc states. 
 
Most realists have explained the existence of interstate alliances and 
cooperation by recourse to the concepts of bandwagoning, balancing, and 
maintaining collective security, and some, including Steven David; have 
attempted to expand upon these notions. Although David‘s primary approach is 
to examine alliances within the balancing model, he emphasizes not only the role 
of the state in determining alliances, as does the balancing model, but also the 
role of elites within the state, as do Organski and Kugler,28 as part a new concept 
that he has termed omni balancing. Within the context of Third-World nations‘ 
alignment with superpowers, David explains, "Omni balancing argues that the 
                                                 
27 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament (London: Lynne Rienner, 
1995), p. 61.  
28 Organski and Kugler, pp. 22-24. 
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most powerful determinant of Third World alignment behaviour is the calculation 
of Third World leaders as to which outside state is most likely to do what is 
necessary to keep them in power‖.29 Such an understanding or perspective on 
interstate behaviour emphasizes the will of elites or leaders to maintain their 
authority and security as opposed to the security of the state as a whole.30 
Classical realism often considers state behaviour as being driven by the interests 
of the state as an entity rather than distinguishing or separating the notion of 
state interests from those of its leaders. David's approach introduces a new 
dynamic that, in seeking to serve as an alternative to the notion of balancing as 
described by Walt, essentially draws a distinction between elites and the state. 
 
In the context of this analysis and as emphasized by David, omni 
balancing is primarily useful in alliances with superpowers. Although one could 
attempt to justify the GCC alliance within the context of omni balancing, this 
would assume that the member states of the GCC have the ability, in both 
political and military terms, to help maintain the stability and security of member 
regimes if necessary. In this sense, the Gulf states may be regarded as 
influential regional actors due to their collective economic and financial capacities 
within their region, yet because they are neither superpowers nor militarily strong 
states, they have not had had the necessary resources to ensure the survival of 
fellow regimes, especially prior to the establishment of the GCC.31 Although their 
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alliance does not necessarily ensure or guarantee the survival of their regimes, 
having the mutual support of neighbouring states does enhance their strategic 
security.  
 
Omni balancing may explain the Gulf States‘ close relationship with the 
US and other Western regimes. In turn, the perceived strategic value of such 
alliances with foreign powers may explain why they have been slow to cooperate 
in the area of national defence but have successfully cooperated in other areas, 
such as internal security matters. In essence, the Gulf States may believe that 
allying themselves with foreign military powers likely to have the resources to aid 
their survival, such as the US, Britain, and France, is more advantageous than 
allying with each other, which may be perceived as a risk in the short term. An 
ideal example of such a belief can be related to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in 
which the international coalition led by the US not only ejected the Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait but also made way for the return and restoration of the Kuwaiti 
government. Within the context of omni balancing, it can be assumed that the 
Kuwaiti regime allied itself with the US in the post-war period after determining 
that the US had more resources than did the Gulf states for reinstating the 
Kuwaiti establishment, as was proven by the coalition liberation of the emirate. 
Therefore, although it could be argued that Gulf relations with superpowers is 
based on omni balancing, it may be difficult to argue that GCC cooperation is 
also based on omni balancing, or even argue that the concept remains relevant 
after the Iraqi invasion. 
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Many researchers of interstate alliances and cooperation place their 
arguments within the context of developing or Third World states. On one hand 
are authors such as Keohane (1984) and Walt (1987), who consider the state(s) 
the primary decision makers in terms of their general behaviour. On the other 
hand are authors such as David, who argue that the internal political dimensions 
and influences of a state are relevant factors in determining the alignment of 
leaders or elites within the international system.32 In this context, a focus on 
developing states is useful for discussing the GCC. Although the concept of 
balancing as described by Walt is preferred for its applicability to the GCC, 
David's focus on internal considerations may be of additional benefit because the 
interests of states and elites are also of relevance when examining a regime‘s 
rationale for GCC cooperation. In essence, this requires examining the needs of 
leaders and determining whether their interests are compatible with the interests 
of the state, with each other, and with the GCC as an organization. Differentiating 
between the interests of the leadership and those of the state may be a 
complicated task, considering that GCC leaders have managed to mould the 
identity of the state around themselves as a means of defining the political 
character of their states. However, as will be shown, the states essentially have 
general economic, political, and regional interests that fall under the guise of 
security and stability, and in turn reflect upon system and regime legitimacy. 
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The argument can be made that interstate cooperation occurs amongst 
developing nations primarily out of concern for stability. However, Ayoob 
distinguishes between traditional Western concepts of security versus today's 
Third World realities. Ayoob explained that previous assumptions regarding 
security have been ―one, that most threats to a state's security arise from outside 
its borders and, two, that these threats are primarily, if not exclusively, military in 
nature and usually require a military response if the security of the target state is 
to be preserved‖.33  
 
Ayoob elaborated, "Security-insecurity is defined in relation to 
vulnerabilities—both internal and external—that threaten or have the potential to 
bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and 
governing regimes.‖34 Ayoob's argument is an important pretext to this analysis 
of the GCC because it highlights Third World security interests and perceptions. 
In other words, the perception of threat and corresponding state behaviour as 
discussed in the context of actions such as balancing, bandwagoning, omni 
balancing, and maintaining collective security according to a realist perspective 
of international anarchy must be evaluated with regards to not only external but 
also internal threats. 
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In his analysis, Ayoob describes: 
 
1. The intermeshing of domestic insecurities with interstate 
antagonisms. 
2. The autonomous dynamic of regional conflict, often centred on the 
aspirations of pre-eminent regional powers, as the major sources of 
interstate tension.35 
 
Based on this description, he explains that the situation in the Gulf is a 
political situation in which there exist multiple power centres with exacerbated 
tensions due to differing or conflicting regional objectives or ideals, such as 
amongst the GCC, Iran, and Iraq. In his view, regional insecurity that reflects the 
internal stability within developing states can be of relevance in appreciating the 
nature of threats as they pertain to regimes. The GCC provides an ideal example 
of a situation in which regimes that have faced challenges with regards to 
competing regional powers and ideologies view cooperation as a means to 
achieving regional stability in accordance with Ayoob‘s analysis, this study 
supports the perspective that because the GCC states face common regional 
threats both internally and externally, they consider cooperation on matters of 
internal security and regional economic well-being a precondition for stability. 
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Cooperation in economic and security matters may be considered 
necessary to sustain regime stability as well as legitimacy within the rentier 
tradition. 
 
 Evaluating the function of an institution is important in assessing the role 
that it plays in either hindering or promoting interstate cooperation. Doing so 
assists in not only dissecting the role that an organization plays but also 
determining whether the goals of the organization are being met. Inis Claude 
argues that the recognition of legitimacy is important within any political entity 
because ―the urge to possess and exercise power is usually qualified by concern 
about the justification of such possession and exercise‖.36   In other words, states 
may use regional or international organizations as a means by which to acquire 
recognized political legitimacy. Claude describes such action of political 
institutions as an attempt to achieve collective legitimization with special regard 
to the political function of the UN. 
 
Collective legitimization is an approach to evaluating the rationale behind 
certain political institutions, such as the UN, in which states seek to cooperate 
with one another on the basis of a common need for legitimacy. In other words, 
states join institutional ―clubs‖ such as the UN as a means of supporting their 
own legitimacy. Claude explained, "The obverse of the legitimacy of power is the 
power of legitimacy; rulers seek legitimization not only to satisfy their conscience 
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but also to buttress their positions‖.37 To a realist, states or regimes that seek to 
use international organizations for recognition to maintain their authority and 
credibility within the international system may appear self-serving. Claude argues 
that regardless of the legal representations of political legitimacy and recognition 
based on international law, the process of collective legitimization has become 
inherently political, driven by political motives to achieve political ends. In 
essence, one could argue that from a collective legitimacy perspective, GCC 
political cooperation is based on nothing more than the pursuit of a political 
identity by gaining collective legitimacy and recognition of monarchical regimes. 
 
Although this argument may have some validity, it must be approached 
with caution, as accepting it could imply that the most significant function of the 
GCC is legitimizing the rule of monarchical regimes and systems by actively 
cooperating rather than pursuing other mutually defined interests such as 
security. To imply that regimes cooperate based on a common ideological 
conviction or governing system as the principal or primary motive is an 
oversimplification because it assumes the inherent willingness of states to 
cooperate, which contradicts the realties of the GCC.  
 
It must be recognized such an argument can be applied to not only 
authoritarian regimes but also democratic states. According to analysts such as 
Karen Remmer, studies evaluating interstate relations among several states in 
the Mercosur region of Latin America provide only limited support for the theory 
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that democracy fosters cooperation.38 In essence, the study indicates that 
democracies do not necessarily cooperate with other democracies simply 
because they share a relative ideological conviction and regime type. This clearly 
contradicts researchers, including Larry Diamond39 and Michael Mousseau,40 
who support the notion that democracies are more likely to cooperate because 
they desire to avoid conflict with other democracies. This approach to evaluating 
interstate cooperation has broad implications, as it de-emphasizes the relative 
importance of state interests in favour of a more idealistic emphasis on 
ideological solidarity, which may be deceptive and provide little to enhance 
understanding of the true nature of interstate relationships. 
 
Despite the fact that the GCC states are not Western-style democracies, 
understanding that states do not cooperate simply on the basis of common 
regime style highlights the realist emphasis on state self-interests and political 
survival. Although identities can be regarded as factors in a cooperative 
relationship, as noted by analysts including Stephen Walt41 and Edwin Fedder, 
they cannot be considered the conclusive rationale behind cooperation. 
Therefore, ideology may be regarded as a component of interstate relationships. 
Authors such as Benedict Anderson,42  Amilcar Antonio Barreto,43   and Jonathan 
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Mercer44   regard ideology as a fluid socio-political construct used to facilitate 
broader realist understandings of cooperation, such as balance, collective 
security, and legitimization. In this regard, the GCC alliance exemplifies a clear 
case of cooperation pursued out of a defined need and perception of common 
internal and external threats commonly and rhetorically portrayed by the 
leadership in the context of Arab and Islamic solidarity. For this reason, the 
presentation of prominent realist approaches and understandings provides broad 
insight into the rationale behind GCC cooperation and the possible applicability of 
theories such as bandwagoning, balancing, omni balancing, and game 
theoretical understandings. 
 
1.2 Cooperation as Defined Relationships 
Most theoretical approaches to cooperation explain the means by which 
states achieve their respective political ends or agendas by emphasizing their 
relative need to compromise. As such, cooperation can be considered a 
favourable political relationship between two or more states that seek to fulfil their 
needs by cooperating with others who share similar interests or concerns. Under 
such circumstances, states will compromise certain values and practices in order 
to accommodate a valued relationship with another party. Keohane explained, 
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"Cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or 
anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination‖.45   
 
Therefore, it can be argued that cooperation amongst states is a means to 
an end rather than an end in itself, as states must negotiate or compromise in 
order to reach a level of agreement suitable or appropriate for all the parties 
involved. As previously mentioned, this would mean that the optimal or most 
appropriate decision for states under stable and non-threatening circumstances 
would be to not cooperate if it was not necessary to their vital or long-term 
interests, as they would not want to voluntarily and unilaterally compromise any 
of their interests. According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, "Of central importance 
for a theory of cooperation is the extent to which the incentives for, or benefits 
from, cooperation can be seen to outweigh the incentives to act unilaterally."46 
States may not always be willing to cooperate because doing so eventually 
requires compromising some of their interests through negotiations for the 
purposes of cooperation.47  
 
Overlapping memberships in regional or international organizations often 
makes interstate interaction through indirect relationships inevitable. The Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in August 1991 clearly severed the relationship between the 
Gulf states and Iraq, primarily because the invasion represented a clear threat 
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with destabilizing regional security implications for the GCC.48 Following the 
expulsion of Iraqi military forces from Kuwait in 1991, the GCC cut almost all 
relations with the Iraqi regime to protest its invasion and violation of the territorial 
sovereignty of one of its member states. Yet despite the suspended and strained 
political relations between the GCC regimes and Iraq, they still maintained 
indirect diplomatic or institutional relationships. As members of organizations 
including the Arab League, the UN, and OPEC, these states could not avoid 
interacting with one another through the process of international discourse, 
especially over matters of regional significance or concern to the parties involved. 
For example, both the GCC and Iraq support the formation of a Palestinian state, 
and both may modify their regional policy strategies to achieve this end. 
However, this does not imply that the GCC and the Iraqi regime are actively 
cooperating, only that they have common views shared by all members of the 
Arab League. 
 
Furthermore, the argument can be made that simply because states share 
similar ideals or visions regarding an issue does not necessarily imply that they 
will consider cooperating with one another. For example, OPEC can be 
described as a conglomeration of oil-rich states that all seek to collectively 
benefit from setting a production quota that maximizes their profit while 
maintaining some sense of stability within the oil market. Although these states 
agree to production targets, individual states may not necessarily always conform 
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to the expectations of the other states—they may discretely or openly rebel from 
the organization's short-term quota agreements—because of  national interests 
and priorities that conflict with OPEC protocols in another manifestation of the 
prisoner's dilemma. 
 
In this regard, cooperation must be seen as an active form of exchange 
and compromise or negotiation between two or more parties. However, states 
may not always want to conform to the cooperative agreement if it does not 
conform to their immediate interests, and may therefore unofficially or covertly 
not cooperate for periods of time. Such circumstances may be more common 
when individual states have made long-term commitments but are confronted 
with immediate interests that can only be achieved by temporarily not conforming 
to the tenets of a cooperative agreement.49  
 
States sharing common ideals may not always want to cooperate unless it 
is in their immediate or long-term interests. These states must actively seek 
cooperation by negotiating agreements for the respective parties to follow. In 
conformance to Thomas Hobbes's interpretation of an anarchical international 
system, cooperation itself cannot be regarded as an expectation in international 
relations, and for that matter is unrealistic to assume, yet forming direct or 
indirect relationships may be unavoidable in the modern world.50   
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Isolationist or pacifist arguments for state behaviour, perceived as difficult 
to substantiate in the modern era, were once very feasible options in the not-too- 
distant past. States that actively attempt to avoid cooperation or even maintain 
the appearance of not cooperating often interact with one another in some type 
of forum, such as Iraq's participation in the Arab League and the UN. As such, it  
can be said that even as the GCC and the former Iraqi regimes actively seeked 
to avoid confrontation or direct cooperation with one another, they still maintain 
notions of solidarity within the Arab League on political grounds, which may have 
been interpreted by the international community as a sign of cooperation even if 
it is not.51  
 
This situation was exemplified by the imposition of UN sanctions on the 
Iraqi state following the conclusion of the 1991 war. The ineffectiveness of UN 
sanctions in countering the Saddam Hussein‘s hold on power, as well as the 
socioeconomic suffering that they caused for the Iraqi people, led to a significant 
decrease in support for the sanctions. In their pursuit of popular approval, the 
GCC regimes, including Kuwait to some extent, had been in favour of lifting 
sanctions to improve the economic condition of the Iraqi population.52 Of course, 
it could be argued that the Iraqi regime itself had been actively capitalizing on the 
suffering of the Iraqi population as grounds for proving the ineffectiveness—
indeed, the counter-productiveness—of the sanctions. Whilst most member 
states of the Arab League, including the GCC members, supported lifting the 
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sanctions, this in no means suggests that the GCC and the Iraqi regime actively 
cooperated with one another, as the Iraqi regime was still perceived as a clear 
threat to its Gulf neighbours.  
 
In essence, whilst the parties may have shared the same goal, their 
reasoning behind achieving the goal was different. The GCC and other members 
of the Arab League actively sought the lifting of the sanctions to improve the well-
being of the Iraqi people, a reason which in no way implied support for the Iraqi 
government. However, the reasoning behind their support was of no concern to 
the Iraqi regime; its only concern was the lifting of the sanctions, and if it had to 
achieve its desired end through exploitation and manipulation of sympathy for the 
Iraqi population, so be it.  
 
However, the Arab states‘ cooperation may have been misread by the 
international community, which may have believed that they cooperated in order 
to support the Iraqi regime, not only the Iraqi people. Thus, this example 
demonstrates the importance of clarifying and differentiating amongst notions of 
interstate relationships, cooperation, and ideology, as well as the manipulation of 
these relationships and identities by elites who, having self-preservation as their 
ultimate goal, may seek to either promote or discourage perceptions of 
cooperation that may not truly exist for political purposes.53  Of course , A U.S.-
led coalition removed the Ba'ath regime in March-April 2003, bringing an end to 
                                                 
53 Jonathan Mercer, pp. 229-233. 
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more than 12 years of Iraqi defiance of UN Security Council resolutions as well 
as the sanctions that are no longer in effect.  
 
1.3 Existing understandings of the Gulf States and the 
GCC 
 
 
Whilst these notions or references to the realist instincts of states within 
international relations clarify the possible rationales behind state behaviour, they 
can be argued either way. The complexities that exist with regards to any 
analysis of the GCC only serve to enhance the varying perspectives in which 
political scientists assess the true motivations of the organization. This is 
certainly evident when evaluating the literature. To a large extent, the 
predominant approach to analyzing the GCC or the Gulf states has been in terms 
of historical or factual indicators rather than theoretical vantages. When 
examining the existing GCC literature, one notices a lack of clear consensus 
regarding the true purpose and function of the GCC. Although certain common 
understandings are represented, many analysts of the region emphasize the 
differing factors that motivate the relationship. 
In general, most references to the region and GCC concern the two 
principal areas of interest security and economics, which should not be surprising 
as security and economic factors are the issues that most concern these states. 
Authors including Gregory Gause,54 Joseph Kechichian,55  Mazher Hameed,56 
                                                 
54 Gregory Gause, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf 
States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 
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and Anthony Cordesman57   have analyzed and emphasized the true importance 
of the security aspect of the Gulf states‘ behaviour because it reflects their 
priorities, policies, and justifications.  
 
Other authors, including Hossein Askari,58  Abbas Abdel Karim,59   Hazem 
Beblawi,60   and Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb,61   have tended to focus primarily upon the 
economic conditions and imperatives of the Gulf states as they pertain to 
economic viability and development. The works of these authors are 
complemented by literature devoted to political, social, religious, and identity 
influences in the states. However, many approaches in the literature consider the 
same factors as do these authors. In other words, whenever one attempts to 
analyze any one aspect of the Gulf states, whether it be the security, economic, 
political, or social aspect, one must also analyze the other aspects. These 
interrelated areas substantiate the view that as a collective, the Gulf states share 
numerous areas of interest that have evolved according to their common 
experiences and economic strategies and the security circumstances within the 
                                                                                                                                                 
55 Joseph A. Kechichian, Political Dynamics and Security in the Arabian Peninsula 
Through the 1990s (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993). 
56 Mazher A. Hameed, Arabia Imperilled: The Security Imperatives of the Arab Gulf 
States (Washington DC: Middle East Assessments Group, 1986). 
57 Anthony H. Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1997); Anthony H. Cordesman, Kuwait (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997). 
58 Hossein Askari, Vahid Nowshirvani and Mohamed Jaber, Economic Development in 
the GCC. (Greenwich, CT, Jai Press, 1997). 
59 Abbas Abdel Karim, Change and Development in the Gulf: An Overview of Major 
Issues, in Change and Development in the Gulf, ed. Abbas Abdel Karim (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1999). 
60 Hazem Beblawi, The Arab Economy in a Turbulent Age (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1984). 
61 Khaldoun Hasan, Al-Naqeeb. Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula 
(London: Routledge, 1990).  
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region. In other words, common interests amongst the states stem from common 
challenges that have created linkages amongst areas of interest.  
This analysis will support the arguments that: 
(1) Political stability cannot be achieved without economic growth. 
(2) Economic stability cannot be achieved without political and regional 
security. 
(3) Political security cannot be achieved without social harmony. 
(4) Social harmony cannot be achieved without economic growth. 
 
 Whilst these factors are of relevance to every state, their importance is 
most clearly demonstrated in the case of the Gulf States, a case in which 
domestic and regional priorities must be determined and policy interests must be 
balanced.  
 
As this analysis will show that security and stability are the primary 
concerns of the Gulf regimes, it is beneficial to elaborate upon the interpretation 
of security. Because the primary interest of the Gulf States is to maintain national 
security and long-term regime viability, any issue that may potentially undermine 
their survival can be considered a security risk. For example, economic growth 
and stability can be considered a security interest of the Gulf regimes due to its 
close correlation with social circumstances. This is especially true when one 
considers the rentier tradition of the Gulf States, which according to authors such 
as Hazem Beblawi, these rentier states are relatively socially and economically 
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dependent on their oil resources as service and benefit providers to their national 
populations.62 It is important to note Beblawi‘s suggestion of the four 
characteristics that would determine whether or not a state could be identified as 
―rentier‖: 
1. If rent situations predominate 
2. If the economy relies on a substantial external rent – and therefore does 
not require a strong domestic productive sector 
3. If only a small proportion of the working population is actually involved in 
the generation of the rent 
4. and perhaps most importantly, that the state‘s government is the principle 
recipient of the external rent. 
 
Ayoob explains that the development-security dynamic in oil-based economies, 
such as those of the GCC, arises from the fact that ―those vested with political 
power in the oil-rentier states tend to forget that oil revenue will inevitably decline 
in due course, and aim simply at achieving temporary prosperity‖. Such an aim 
leads those vested with political power to believe that ―security over the medium 
term affords a period of grace during which the complex tasks of economic 
development may be carried out with enhanced means‖.63  
 
Social stability can also be described as a security interest because its 
maintenance requires consideration of the ideological or religious forces in the 
                                                 
62 Hazem Beblawi, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo 
Luciani, The Rentier State (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 49-62.  
63Mohammed Ayoob. 
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region and their relative influence as they pertain to ―just‖ governance. Ayoob, 
Gause, and Liesl Graz,64 amongst others, have considered internal social and 
economic dynamics in their evaluations of security in Third World states within 
the context of the Gulf and the manner in which their regimes approach domestic 
economic and political policies aimed at stabilizing and controlling social forces.  
As such, these analysts have appropriately chosen to address many of these 
considerations as fundamental necessities to understanding the political security 
dynamics of the Gulf regimes.  
 
A related consideration is the function of the GCC in terms of fulfilling the 
interests of the Gulf States. The fact that the interests of the Gulf regimes are 
strongly linked has led to a relatively unclear perception of the role of the GCC. 
This issue has been of interest to Ajay Jha, who has attempted to address the 
GCC in terms of discerning whether the organization is an economic grouping or 
in fact a security alliance.65 Regarding this matter, Simon Koppers emphasizes 
the fact that although the GCC Charter defines the areas of economic and 
financial affairs, customs, legislation, industry, and agriculture as areas of 
cooperation, it refers to security only very little and does not refer to defence at 
all.66 Therefore, although the GCC appears to be, at least officially, primarily an 
economic body, there is much focus on attaining security objectives. 
                                                 
64 Liesl Graz, The Turbulent Gulf (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990). 
65 Ajay Jha, Gulf Co-operation Council: An Economic Grouping or Security Alliance? 
(asian research service, vol.14, no.4, August, 1986).  
66 Simon Koppers, Some Aspects of the Gulf Co-Operation Council's Relationship with 
LDACs, in The Least Developed and the Oil-Rich Arab Countries, ed. Kunibert Raffer 
and M. A. Mohamed Salih (London: Macmillan Press, 1992), pp. 32-33.  
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Other authors have focused on other issue areas as they pertain to the 
GCC. A number of analysts, including Rosemarie Said Zahlan, who have 
addressed the role of Saudi Arabia within the organization have assessed 
whether the GCC is in fact an organization based on Saudi Arabia's influence 
and possible hegemonic ambitions in the region as opposed to an organization 
based on voluntary memberships formed out of perceived necessity and 
common security interests. Assuming that the member states joined the GCC 
due to political pressure from Saudi Arabia would lead to clear theoretical 
implications.67 Although such an assumption may appear to imply that the 
formation of the GCC was an example of bandwagoning, such an argument 
would be difficult to make; it would imply that the other states only reluctantly 
joined the GCC due to Saudi pressure when in fact it can argued that the smaller 
Gulf regimes had more to gain from GCC membership. Graz explained, ―The 
existence of the GCC is in itself reassuring to the smaller members. There they 
are fully-fledged members of an organization whose scale is such that their 
voices count and their influence is multiplied by the skeins of family and historical 
ties that criss-cross the Gulf‖.68 He argues that because the kingdom has 
appeared reluctant to exert forceful pressure on the other regimes to 
accommodate its own needs, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia has hegemonic 
ambitions over the organization and subsequently the other Gulf emirates.69   
                                                 
67 Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
68 Liesl Graz, p. 238 
69 Ibid., pp. 236-237. 
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As Graz emphasizes, one must make a distinction between influence and 
an attack on sovereignty.70 Saudi Arabia is clearly the most politically and 
economically powerful member of the GCC not only because of its size but also 
because it is the only GCC state that borders every other member state, thereby 
giving the kingdom a central leadership role. However, despite its power, Saudi 
Arabia's policies have not been directed at coercing its neighbours. In addition, 
despite the fact that the GCC headquarters are based in the Saudi capital of 
Riyadh, all GCC members have equal membership within the organization, and 
the collective influence of the smaller states could offset that of Saudi Arabia. 
 
Although these facts contradict any suspected Saudi ―hegemony‖, Saudi 
Arabia‘s greater power remains an expected compromise within the relationship. 
It is clear that Saudi Arabia's membership in the GCC is of clear value and 
significant interest to the kingdom because it allows other member states to 
serve as buffer entities that contribute to Saudi security. However, enacting such 
a security strategy essentially depends on the ability of Saudi Arabia to gain the 
confidence of the smaller states by acting as a partner. On the other hand, the 
smaller emirates also gain by having a larger protector, which, by enhancing the 
strategic strength of the GCC as a whole, makes it of high relative value to all 
members. 
 
                                                 
70 Ibid., pp. 238. 
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Many of those who have argued that the GCC was primarily established 
as a regional response to surrounding threats, including Joseph Kechichian, 
Mahnaz Zehra lspahan, and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, have emphasized specific 
perceived threats in the region, such as those posed by the Iranian revolution 
and the subsequent Iran-Iraq War. Simon Koppers describes the formation of the 
GCC as a result of increasing political pressure from three fundamental events in 
the region: the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution, the 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, and the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980.71 
  
Viewing the establishment of the GCC as a response to such events 
implies that the Gulf regimes came to a consensus regarding a common 
perceived threat that posed a potential political security risk. After identifying a 
common vulnerability, the regimes may have seen it necessary to counter the 
threat through collective political and security action. This argument implies that 
the GCC members‘ primary incentive to cooperate is to maintain political and 
national security rather than support an ideology of national unity, an argument 
similar to the realist notion of balancing. The Gulf regimes considered their 
political establishments as vulnerable to Iran and Iraq, the two principal Gulf 
regional powers. In order to effectively deter or diminish this perceived 
vulnerability, the Gulf regimes sought to unify under a common political, 
economic, and security umbrella as a means of presenting a unified front against 
any potential external threat.  
 
                                                 
71 Simon Koppers, p 31. 
 48 
Contrary to this rationale, one of the primary functions of the GCC, as 
described by analysts such as Mansoor Kundi, has been internal security 
cooperation, which has been the unofficial guiding principle of the organization 
(Kundi 1989). In other words, GCC cooperation and the development of the 
organization as a political body has been defined in terms of security interests as 
they pertain to regime stability. As such, the GCC members have agreed to 
cooperate not simply to advance a pan-Arab or Gulf-Arab ideological cause, nor 
have they invested in economic integration for the purpose of economic 
development per se. Instead, they have pursued these actions to achieve their 
broader interest of security, which implies that they may view policy goals or 
objectives that do not enhance security as less appealing. 
 
Other researchers who have focused on the social and cultural 
characteristics of the Gulf states, including David Long,72 Jill Crystal,73 and 
Gause,74  have also seen it necessary to examine the political characteristics of 
each state. Their examination has generally included discussion of ―tribal‖ 
traditions and, more recently, religious identities within the region as they pertain 
to historical linkages and relations in the Gulf and understanding of the domestic 
politics of the Gulf regimes. Their discussion includes elaboration of the various 
historical tribal and religious differences along the peninsula that have 
                                                 
72David E. Long. A Dialogue: Saudi Arabia (SAIS Review - Volume 22, Number 2, 
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determined the political nature of modern relations. Although tribalism is an 
important factor in the region‘s political culture, its examination does not lead to 
the identification of a specific behavioural pattern. In fact, gaining understanding 
of tribalism as it has existed in the Gulf requires gaining understanding of 
classical realism, as tribalism is based on the perception of threats to survival 
and the understanding that reactions may lead to either cooperation or conflict. 
 
Understanding tribalism as a factor in the region rather than a behaviour is 
to appreciate the complexities of inter-Gulf cooperation and relations as well as 
the political constraints of individual regimes that must effectively manage tribal 
and sectarian differences within their respective territories. Thus, tribalism is an 
important consideration because it highlights the importance of domestic political 
considerations as they pertain to regime security and stability. 
 
Although tribalism is a factor in the history of the Gulf, it is important not to 
overemphasize the impact of tribal differences in modern assessments of the 
region. It can be argued that Gulf societies and their regimes have essentially 
developed into urbanized entities that, exhibiting fewer tribal characteristics than 
they had in the past, are more concerned with religious or nationalist than tribal 
identities, particularly as many of their modern difficulties and complexities 
pertain to maintaining legitimacy, security, and stability when confronted by 
external ideologies. As previously described, the most significant of these 
ideologies have been Pan-Arab nationalism, Cold-War communism and 
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capitalism, and the Islamic revolutionary ideals of Iran, all of which have had 
broad social implications for the Gulf states and Arab societies in general.75 As 
such, the manipulation of these ideological factors in relation to domestic 
grievances has been a challenge to Gulf regimes that must attempt to balance 
their support for certain political stances as a means of maintaining legitimacy 
and security. 
 
1.4 Implications of Analysis 
Discerning the motivations behind GCC cooperation from a realist 
understanding not only provides a clearer interpretation of GCC collective 
behaviour but also a better vantage from which to assess the successes and 
failures of the organization within the context of its ideals or goals. As such, 
examining the security motives of the member states will help explain why 
cooperation is pursued in some areas but not in others. Despite the fact that the 
Gulf states appear interested in economic cooperation, pan-Arab nationalism, 
Islamic solidarity, and a Gulf identity, such ideals can be regarded as decorative 
justifications for a security relationship. This is not to suggest that the GCC 
regimes are not truly interested in economic development or Islamic and Arab 
ideals, but rather that these factors are defined and pursued within the context of 
security. 
 
                                                 
75 Riad N. El-Rayyes, ―Arab Nationalism and the Gulf‖, Journal of Arab Affairs 6, no. 2 
(1989), pp. 109-118.  
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The realist views of authors such as Keohane (1984), Walt (1987), and 
David (1991) help one dissect the intentions behind policy decisions in terms of 
state or regime behaviour. By gaining understanding of their perspectives, one 
can discern whether the GCC has fulfilled its needs and objectives and whether 
the behaviour of its members is rational in their search for security. By doing so, 
one can highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the organization through 
identification of the role that it plays in the Gulf region. Certain authors and 
analysts, including Abd Al-Hadi Khalaf,76 view GCC collective security and 
cooperation as somewhat of a failure due to the fact that the sceptical 
relationship amongst the member states promotes a relative degree of distrust; 
enhances a lack of solidarity in terms of foreign policy, especially with regards to 
regional issues; and fosters territorial disputes amongst member states that have 
hindered cooperative progress.77   
 
Focusing on the same issues as Khalaf but using a different approach, 
Koppers argues that the GCC is not a failed model but rather a model for 
successful cooperation.78 He points out that the demographic and cultural factors 
that permitted relatively easy integration of Gulf State interests, especially in 
terms of economic and social coordination, have allowed the GCC to serve as a 
stabilizing factor in the region because of the member states‘ ability to pursue 
similar although not identical foreign policies. Koppers also describes how the 
                                                 
76 Abd Al-Hadi Khalaf, ―The Elusive Quest for Gulf Security‖, Middle East Report (1987), 
pp.19-22.  
77 Hazem Beblawi, pp. 14-17. 
78 Simon Koppers, pp. 33-34. 
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organization‘s moderate persona and established mechanisms aid it in resolving 
disputes and avoiding conflict, pointing out that in general, GCC members have 
tended to cooperate more greatly during periods of conflict.79 
 
Both perceptions of the GCC can be regarded as somewhat accurate. 
Despite their differing approaches, they both view security and stability as the 
underlying factors driving or hindering GCC cooperation. Khalaf‘s assertion that 
distrust exists amongst member regimes only serves to emphasize the realist 
notion that states exist within an anarchical environment with no guarantee of 
security. The fact that territorial disputes may be regarded as issues  that hinder 
GCC cooperation highlights the perception that the states themselves act on the 
basis of national self-interest as opposed to collective action under the GCC. On 
the other hand, Koppers‘ perspective that the GCC states have been willing to 
compromise on policy decisions as a means of bolstering cooperation 
exemplifies the linkage between cooperation and stability, in so far as the GCC, 
representing a stabilizing organization within an unstable and unpredictable 
region, requires its members to maintain a certain amount of flexibility and 
solidarity. 
 
If the Gulf States have tended to cooperate or develop closer linkages 
during periods of tension and conflict, as Koppers suggests, such action would 
indicate that the true driving force behind the GCC is maintaining security by 
responding to perceived threats. Such an understanding is important when 
                                                 
79 Ibid, pp. 33-36. 
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viewing the GCC through a realist lens, as it indicates that theoretically, the GCC 
has been successful in achieving a certain level of security despite its probable 
lack of total self-sufficiency as a collective entity. This is supported by the fact 
that GCC security cooperation has been most effective for internal matters—the 
maintenance of relative stability within the states—rather than defence matters, 
as shown when the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait highlighted the strategic external 
vulnerabilities of the GCC members. 
 
Therefore, evaluating the interests of GCC members as they pertain to the 
organization itself requires consideration of interest compatibility. In other words, 
one must consider whether the continued existence of the GCC can be justified if 
the threats to security upon which its formation was based no longer exist. It 
must be emphasized that GCC members cooperate when there is a consensus 
amongst them concerning responses to threats and cooperative initiatives that 
bolster or complement the security of the member states. However, the GCC 
must decide how it will address new threats; although Arab nationalism, Iranian 
revolutionary rhetoric, and Iraqi ambitions in the region are no longer the strong 
threats that they once were, other Islamist movements and the politics of 
defensive reliance on the West in the Gulf, especially following the 1991 and 
2003 invasions of Iraq, continue to be security concerns. 
 
Due to the interrelatedness of foreign and internal security issues, reliance 
on the role, availability, and deterrent capacities of foreign powers has arguably 
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become a security liability to the GCC states rather than a domestic security 
guarantee. As such, it has undermined the effectiveness of the regimes to secure 
domestic political confidence in state foreign policy decisions and has certain 
implications for their legitimacy. This analysis argues that rather than decreasing 
or increasing over time, the threats faced by the Gulf states and their 
corresponding security dimensions have evolved. In this sense, justifications for 
GCC cooperation are now based on areas of interest that have security 
implications beyond those pertaining to traditionally defined security needs. In the 
past, the regimes maintained their survival  through control of the predominantly 
external ideological opposition forces within their societies. The Gulf regimes now 
see that it is necessary to achieve domestic legitimacy through further economic, 
social, and political developments to achieve their long-term objectives. This 
analysis examines the evolution of the GCC states from a political and economic 
standpoint and the means by which the regimes have either accommodated 
reform based on the evolving nature of regional issues or have maintained the 
status quo as a means of prioritizing traditionally held notions of security. 
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Chapter 2 
2. Overview of the GCC States  - History 
 
Generally, the term the Gulf region encompasses the Kingdoms of Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar; the Sultanate of Oman; and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), the six oil monarchies in the region. Many international bodies and 
governments erroneously include other countries, including Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, 
and, to a lesser extent, Iran, within this umbrella term for the region, most likely 
because these countries share borders and are intimate neighbours of the six 
states. The media also play a large role in promoting this confusion. For example, 
media sources commonly uses the term the Gulf Wars when referring to the Iran-
Iraq War as well as the recent wars between Iraq and the US and its allies. In the 
region, the local majority understand that the term Gulf States refers to only the six 
monarchies listed above and illustrated in the map below Figure 2.1. 
 
 So, according to the six gulf states the GCC, the first gulf war, also 
commonly called The Persian Gulf War, was the war between Iraq and Kuwait that 
began on the 2nd of  August 1990 and ended on the 28th  of February 1991.  And 
the second gulf war or commonly called the Iraq war, began on March 20, 2003 
until today with the invasion of Iraq by a multinational force led by and composed 
largely of United States and United Kingdom troops led by the U.N. 
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Figure 2.1 GCC countries map80 
 
 
As trading blocs develop across the globe, it is hardly surprising that groups 
of similar countries with similar political and economic interests should consider 
cooperating. Given the problems faced by the Gulf states, any economic bloc that 
they form should aim to develop market coherence by establishing mutually 
acceptable trade and tariff barriers where necessary; encouraging regional trade, 
development, and diversification; and providing the necessary bureaucratic 
infrastructure to further technical, military, educational, and social cooperation. 
                                                 
80 GCC countries map http://www.kingfahdbinabdulaziz.com/jpghi/f140.htm 
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However, these aims are far from being realized, mainly because the impetus 
behind the creation of the GCC is narrowly political rather than economic. 
 
The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, universally 
known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),81 was ostensibly formed due to 
Saudi fears of instability following the insurrection at Mecca in 1979 and the 
beginning of the Iran-Iraq conflict, both of which promised further destabilization 
the region. The GCC was established on 25 May 25 1981 when the heads of state 
of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar; Oman, and the UAE met in Abu Dhabi to 
sign the new organization‘s constitution. Their aim was to promote ―coordination, 
integration and cooperation . . . in all fields‖ to ―serve the higher goals of the Arab 
nation‖82 as well as form ―closer relations and stronger bonds‖ amongst all Arab 
states. Their overall aim, as stated in Article Four of the founding document, was 
the coordination of laws and operations in all fields of state activity, overseen by 
Supreme Council in which each member state has a single vote. Their underlying 
aims were settling irredentist disputes and coordinating internal security and arms 
procurement. Economic aims, although stated clearly in Article Four, have not 
figured highly in GCC operations until very recently, albeit at a fairly low level. 
 
Few of these aims had been realized by 2005-2006; territory disputes 
between Oman and the UAE and between Saudi Arabia and Qatar had erupted 
                                                 
81 The GCC consists of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the 
Sultanate of Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. Newly united Yemen has applied to 
join, but its application is still pending. 
82 Preamble to the founding articles of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the 
Gulf. 
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into a crisis in 1992, and the formation of a true customs union was still at the 
beginning stages. Joint military exercises, such as that conducted in October 1994, 
did not inspire confidence: in one incident, Omani officers refused to carry out the 
orders of Saudi commanders. The GCC deployed the Rapid Deployment Force, its 
armed wing, in the Kuwaiti War, but not at an impressive level; following domestic 
social habits, the GCC preferred to fund Egyptian and Syrian troop deployments.  
 
The major mover behind the GCC is the US, which desires the 
development of a stable economic and political structure that can oversee such a 
strategically vital region. Because the political motivation behind the GCC has not 
been entirely domestic, it has not acquired the sense of political or social urgency 
that organizations as the European Union (EU) have acquired. Moreover, despite 
their many similarities, rivalries continue to fester amongst the member states, 
exacerbated by a lack of national identity and economic specialization from state to 
state. Each produces much the same goods in much the same way and sends its 
produce to the same markets, a practice that promotes competition rather than 
cooperation. Cordesman explained, ―Whilst there is no question that the Gulf 
States have a common Arab and religious identity, their economic identity is tied 
largely to trade with developed oil importing states outside the Arab world‖.83 
Indeed, 85% of imports into the GCC are from outside the Arab world, mostly the 
US and the EU, and 80% of investment is into those same Western markets (see 
Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3) 
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Although it might be assumed that a lack of national identity amongst 
member states would ease the transition towards a unified GCC, such identity 
provides the mature political and social structures that promote the development of 
a new inter-governmental body. At present, disintegrative factors may well be 
stronger than are integrative factors amongst the member states; irredentist 
disputes, a lack of foreign policy coordination, and a significant divergence of 
views in relation to global bodies such as the UN (where some GCC countries vote 
differently from others) continue unabated. Indeed, ―GCC interstate relations are 
characterized by a division between the desire to strengthen cooperation to 
enhance their roles in a changing world and the desire to assert their national 
independence‖.84  
 
It is unfortunate that the GCC was founded at a time when many of its 
members were still in the process of nation building. Pursuing these actions 
simultaneously led to stress between internal and external coordination and 
between those nations that had already achieved a significant level of national 
identity, such as Oman, and those still developing their identity. Although most of 
the Gulf states have experienced similar historical development, with the 
involvement of the British until the 1960s or early 1970s and their replacement by 
the US, their shared history is not necessarily an important aspect of shared Gulf 
identity.  
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Most importantly, the history of the Gulf has been and continues to be 
defined by oil, its single most important export, which has changed the lives of the 
majority in the GCC states, in some cases radically. As much of the population left 
behind lives of Bedouin pastoralism to adopt lives of urban consumerism, often 
within a single generation, towns held together with mud and almost no 
infrastructure became significant centres of urban domestic, commercial, and 
industrial development almost overnight. At the same time, vast numbers of guest 
workers immigrated into the region to do the jobs that local people either could not 
or would rather not do. For the first time, the region gained an international voice to 
which larger, more developed states had no choice but to listen. 
 
2.1 Regional Analysis 
On the surface, there seem to be many reasons why the Gulf states of the 
Arabian Peninsula should form some kind of regional bloc. They face similar 
threats or potential threats from the two potentially large markets of  Iran and 
Iraq, the two largest states to their north. They also gain protection and security 
from a regional bloc if their current allies and protectors discontinue their roles if 
geo-political and economic interests shift. Sharing similar strategic geographies, 
they are all likely to benefit from proximity to growing shipping lanes. The most 
important local markets are within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region, especially that of Egypt,85 the Gulf states‘ largest trading partner in the 
                                                 
85 In Direction of Trade Statistics, the National Statistics Office of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF NSO) reported a marked variability in GCC exports and re-exports 
to Egypt, from a high of nearly US$900m in 1991-1992 to a low of US$150m in 1993-
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Arab world, followed by the markets of Sudan, Iran, the Indian sub-continent, and 
Asia. Their most crucial non-regional market is the EU, followed by the US and 
Japan. 
 
All the Gulf States have a similar hierarchy and social structure 
encompassing of five basic levels. At the top are the decision-making elites, for the 
most part linked to the ruling families, which tend to assume a similar structure 
amongst the Gulf states, with an inner circle or council advising the head of state, 
a secondary council of ministers, and a tertiary administrative level. Below this 
council lies upper social strata composed of those directly linked to the 
predominant economic wealth-creation factors, most frequently oil and its rents. 
Often, these two groups have more in common with Western elites than with their 
own populations.  
 
Below these two relatively small groups lies the growing middle classes, 
amongst which, although many are also driven by rent-seeking activities, some are 
involved in sectors indirectly linked to oil, such as the service or infrastructure 
industries, or work within sectors with no links to the oil economy. A significant 
number are state bureaucrats, many of whom, motivated by rent-seeking activities, 
                                                                                                                                                 
1994, and again a high of nearly US$900m in 1997-1998. The figure for 2000-2001 is 
about US$882m. Such variability is one of the problems faced by the GCC, as well as 
the fact that important neighbouring markets (Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Africa) are 
unstable and/or underdeveloped. Egypt‘s imports from the GCC may increase when the 
volume of re-export trade from Dubai and the Jebel Ali Free Zone are taken into 
account. According to the IMF NSO, in 1999 Dubai‘s re-exports to Egypt were worth 
US$95m, and exports and re-exports from Jebel Ali were worth US$121m, figures which 
indicate that customs liberalization has had a positive impact on the region. 
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are resistant to change, such as privatization, and therefore potentially the most 
difficult to convince of the need for change. Below these burgeoning middle 
classes lies the indigenous lower classes, primarily composed of  blue-collar and 
agricultural workers. The younger members of these lower classes often find 
themselves poorly educated and either underemployed or unemployed, which 
leaves them open to disaffection and the attractive philosophies of extreme 
religious and/or political groups.  
 
Of the common economic and demographic forces at work throughout the 
Gulf region, perhaps the most problematic is the 20% of the population currently 
under 15 years of age who will leave their families over the next 2 to 3 years. What 
jobs will be available to them? Even those with an education may suffer 
underemployment because ―no Gulf state has any prospect of creating more than 
a third of the real jobs required to employ its youth and correct the level of 
disguised unemployment that already exists‖.86 There is a very real danger of 
political unrest when previous generations‘ expectations are disappointed in the 
context of the younger (and less acquiescent and/or more politically naive) 
generations. 
 
 In terms of power and political, social, and cultural influence, the lowest 
social stratum is composed of non-indigenous guest workers, most of whom come 
from the Indian subcontinent, although many also come from the Philippines, 
                                                 
86 A.H. Cordesman, p. 6. 
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Indonesia, Egypt, Palestine, Russia, the EU, and the US.87 Although many of these 
workers may appear to be enjoying a wealthy and affluent lifestyle, and as such 
appear to be members of the middle class, they enjoy few, if any, social or political 
connections with their host society. For this reason, they cannot be considered part 
of the indigenous hierarchy. Moreover, their pay is frequently repatriated, leading 
them to develop a sense of insecurity. Al-Alkim warns, ‖Most Southern Gulf states 
have institutionalised another economic problem that threatens their social 
cohesion and cultural identity. All are . . . heavily dependent on foreign labour. All 
have failed to develop a work ethic and employment patterns that make adequate 
use of native talent‖.88 Such dependency on guest workers is an institutional 
weakness that has been and continues to be addressed by new initiatives such as 
Oman‘s ―Omanization‖ programme. 
 
The potentially most important strata of this hierarchy are the burgeoning 
middle classes; one has only to consider European development in the twentieth 
century or Turkish instability in the 1950s to understand that the middle classes 
hold the key to important (and often violent) changes. Whilst education is the vital 
component for endogenous growth, it can have ideological and thus political 
consequences; no educated, financially comfortable group is ever content with 
merely being comfortable and educated. 
The development of a comprador (this term was first used to define a native-
born agent in China and certain other Asian countries formerly employed by a 
                                                 
87 H.H. Al-Alkim, p. 156. 
88 A.H. Cordesman, p. 8. 
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foreign business to serve as a collaborator or intermediary in commercial 
transactions) element amongst the middle class in both economic and social terms 
is a destructive aspect of this social structure. Instead of pursuing internal 
investment activities, which are few in number, completely lacking, or difficult to 
negotiate due to financial and bureaucratic inadequacies, the local middle classes 
expatriate their capital into overseas investments, especially those based in the US 
and the EU, or concentrate on import-led activities, one of the symptoms of the 
Dutch Disease (which means the deindustrialization of a nation's economy that 
occurs when the discovery of a natural resource raises the value of that nation's 
currency, making manufactured goods less competitive with other nations, 
increasing imports and decreasing exports. The term originated in Holland after the 
discovery of North Sea gas). This action prevents the development of indigenous 
capital projects and orients the middle classes away from the assumption of any 
native identity.89 The increase in the availability and accessibility of modern global 
media in all its forms brought about by globalization has increased this orientation 
away from assumption of a national identity, particularly for the large demographic 
under 15 years of age, which tends to create a set of identities not particularly 
regional, Arab, or Muslim. Without an allegiance to a national identity, future 
generations of the Gulf middle classes will be unlikely to build social, political, and 
economic links within their own societies.90 Another social similarity amongst the 
GCC states due to their similar hierarchies is the manner in which their elites make 
                                                 
89 Gorm Rye Olsen, Political Power and Economic Change in the Arab World 
(Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research, 1995), p. 87. 
90 J. Waterbery, Political Economy of the Middle East, in International Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies 23 (1991), pp.1-17. 
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decisions with little or no consultation with non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), private institutions, pressure groups, religious groups, or private 
enterprises. With the exception of Oman and Bahrain where participation is 
actively being encouraged, the Gulf States‘ polity runs on lines of patrimony rather 
than participation.  
 
All the Gulf State governments maintain large bureaucracies. Therefore, 
when their regimes must decide whether to strengthen the political system or 
simply tinker with the existing bureaucracy, it naturally appears easier for them 
(and maybe preferable) to do the latter. Al-Omar elaborated, 
 
The development of bureaucracy in GCC countries reflects the shift in the 
role of government from maintaining order and security to producing a wide 
variety of social welfare services and economic development within a very 
short time. This has led to comprehensive differentiation and specialisation in 
the government organs . . . [and] the authoritarian style has invited 
authoritarianism and centralism and further increased the lack of control.91 
 
 Such bureaucracies are not efficient employers; indeed, ―at least two and 
sometimes four native males are unemployed in each government job for every 
                                                 
91 Faud Abdullah Al-Omar, Bureaucracy, State, and Development in Kuwait and Arab 
Gulf States (Lahore, Pakistan: Shirkat Press, 1997), pp. 161-162. 
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male that is needed to perform a real job. In most cases, there is also growing 
direct unemployment of native males‖.92 This inefficiency may be attributable to  
two phenomena. First, the bureaucratic administration has taken on too wide a 
range of activities, leading to the development of an excessively large bureaucracy 
that often performs tasks performed by the private sector in other states. Second, 
instead of acting as a check on the legislature (as is the case in Western states), 
the bureaucracy has become detached from it, leading to the exacerbation of the 
region‘s authoritarianism and centralism, which negatively affects prospects for the 
development of inter-state relations. Instead of maintaining a civil service 
addressing the minutiae of government and correcting its inadequacies, which 
could aid in the formation of a new GCC civil service, the regime bureaucracies 
maintain unfettered government power often insensitive to issues more complex 
than those which they are qualified to address. With such a situation, inter-state 
politics are more likely to lead to conflict when personality or tribal differences arise. 
 
Unfortunately for the development of the GCC, authoritarian centralism 
characterizes all of its member states, although most are attempting to change 
by creating new structures, such as majlis (consultative councils), widening the 
franchise, and promoting private enterprise. One must keep in mind that all the 
GCC states are new states, and one means of defining a state in its early years 
and ensuring that it functions adequately is creating and expanding a 
bureaucracy. Unfortunately, new states often believe that enlarging their nascent 
bureaucracies is a means of creating a national identity. Moreover, with no 
                                                 
92 A.H. Cordesman, p. 5. 
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history of civil service or state structure and little education, the quality of those 
drafted into the bureaucracies is not adequate for performing the tasks with 
which they are charged.  
 
As in-service training is almost unknown, it is likely that promotion is linked 
to corrupt rent-seeking activities or simply the result of the random shuffling of 
employees. Most importantly, such institutions cannot hope to work alongside, let 
alone compete with, efficient private sector companies, especially trans-national 
corporations, whose qualified and well-informed personnel are unlikely to be 
impressed by Gulf bureaucrats‘ lack of professionalism.93 Apart from oil but 
almost certainly because of it, a predilection for large bureaucracies appears to 
be the most significant similarity amongst the Gulf states, one that leads to 
similar political (and thus economic) deficits. 
 
 2.2 Economics 
It should not be surprising that the Gulf States of the GCC are very similar 
economically, with some variation in the degree of economic freedom offered in 
each state. As shown in Table 2.1, in 2006 Bahrain was the most open state, 
which is not surprising because, as its designation as the first post-oil GCC state 
indicates, it has done the most to develop its post-oil economy, whereas Qatar 
was the least open. Although this convergence brings economic advantages to 
                                                 
93 Alwai N. Abussund, ―Administrative Development and Planning in Saudi Arabia: The 
Process of Differentiation and Specialization‖ (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, 
1979). See pp. 1-24. 
 68 
the GCC, its members must do more to increase the conditions favourable for 
economic diversification and change the rent-seeking mentality that decreases 
economic freedom. 
 
Table 2.1  GCC Economic Freedom Ratings, 200694  
*Overall Rating: 
 Free (1 - 1.99) 
 Mostly free (2 – 2.99)  
 Mostly un-free (3 – 3.99)   
 Repressed (4 – 5) 
 
 
 
As Table 2.2 shows, the 2003 economic freedom ratings can be further broken 
down to show the areas that suffered from economic structural deficits in that 
year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94 Heritage Foundation at www.heritage.org (2006 Index of Economic Freedom). 
Countries 
 
 
GCC Rating Overall Rating* 
Bahrain 1 25 (2.23) 
Kuwait 2 50 (2.74) 
Saudi Arabia 3 62 (2.84) 
UAE 4 65 (2.93) 
Oman 5 74 (3.01) 
Qatar 6 78 (3.04) 
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Table 2.2 GCC Area Scores for Economic Freedom  200395 
Countries                                 Different area Scores 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Size of 
government 
(expenditure, 
taxes, and 
enterprises) 
Legal 
structure 
and 
property 
rights 
Access 
to 
sound 
money 
 
 
 
 
 
Freedom to 
trade 
internationally 
Regulation of 
credit, 
labour, and 
business 
Overall 
economic 
freedom 
score / 
rank 
Intra- regional 
trade/ 
Percentage of 
of total trade in 
the Middle East 
Bahrain 7.0 6.7 9.4 8.7 N/A N/A 1998 / 8.0 
Kuwait 9.2 7.8 9.1 8.0 8.2 7.9 / 3 1999 / 8.4 
Oman 6.2 8.1 9.7 8.4 7.8 8.1 / 1 2000 / 6.9 
UAE 8.0 7.5 9.3 8.1 6.7 7.9 / 3 2001 / 8.1 
Saudi 
Arabia 
6.3 8.2 9.5 8.0 7.0 7.8 / 5 2002 / 8.8 
Qatar N/A 7.5 9.7 9.2 N/A N/A 2003 / 8.2 
 
One can observe little difference amongst the GCC states in most areas, 
reflecting the fact that the structural problems facing the Gulf economies are very 
similar. Abassund (1979) has pointed out the considerable deficits in government 
structure that persist may be due to a top-heavy approach that needs to be 
                                                 
95 The Fraser Institute: Economic Freedom of the Arab World: (Report and index 2005), 
Salem Ben Nasser Al Ismaily, Amela Karabegovic and Fred McMahon at 
www.fraserinstitute.ca Scale: (0 = least free, 10 = most free). 
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modified. A heavy reliance on oil and its rents may slow this change, as much 
crucial decision-making is politicized by oil dominance. Furthermore, apart from 
the governments‘ monolithic structure, there are no counter-weights to offset or 
control centralized policy-making. The Gulf region as a whole suffers from a 
shortage of highly trained, well-motivated individuals for employment— 
individuals who do not seek rents for short-term gain and will serve as efficient 
and critical personnel. To address these challenges, accountability for micro-
economic decisions must be felt at every level, not shrugged off as the realm of 
an upper echelon of ministers and junior ministers. 
 
Educational policies play a large role in changing attitudes. In Oman, 
processes whereby native workers are chosen for jobs instead of guest workers 
(Omanization) might encourage the development of a more mature attitude 
toward employment. Qatar has developed a similar process it has termed 
Qatarization, but it applies only to the energy and industrial sectors. The most 
important trend in the Gulf at this time—one that has existed since the mid-
1990s—is privatization. Globalization has led to a considerable commitment to 
privatization, which is necessary for the GCC to transition from a group of oil- 
dependent states to a more diversified, integrated regional economic structure to 
any significant degree. Privatization can also help streamline bloated public 
sectors by removing unnecessary government involvement in the economy. 
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Increasing the role of the private sector itself can stimulate favourable 
structural changes, such as the development of a stronger, more transparent 
regulatory environment. This in turn lead to the more efficient use of scarce 
resources, including minerals, agricultural land, fisheries, and, most importantly, 
water, whilst reducing the government‘s budgetary burden. Privatization can 
create a property-owning structure that allows society to escape from a rent-
seeking cycle.  
 
Most importantly, privatization creates the conditions favourable to 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), which will lead the GCC states to 
become more active members in the global club. Privatization is thus the key by 
which the GCC states will develop economies based on oil wealth into 
economies based on sustainability. The Saudi, Omani, and Kuwaiti governments 
announced privatization plans in 1994. Oman‘s case is particularly interesting: 
the government  divested itself of holdings in key industries (e.g., Oman Cement 
and Oman Telecom) and allowed them to be floated on the newly emerging stock 
market in August 1994. 
 
The reason behind the existence of such large public sectors in the Gulf 
States is the displacement effect of the oil sector and the rapid rate at which their 
economies developed, leaving their private sectors weak and unattractive to 
many potential employees and investors. Further, Gulf governments retain the 
traditional notion they should act as the distributors of oil wealth in a process that 
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can be likened to reverse taxation rather than seek new ways of financing public 
spending. Gulf governments have been and remain closely involved in the 
markets, distorting market forces and undermining market discipline. 
 
 Privatization may be the only means of developing accountability at all 
levels and creating an atmosphere that encourages investment. Specifically, it 
leads to the development of more transparent methods of raising, distributing, 
and handling funds, a transparency that encourages more investment by freeing 
more funds for investment, which attracts FDI. Transparency in the disclosure of 
important economic and social indicators is vital to development and 
diversification. 
 
Although privatization is no cure-all for the Gulf region‘s economic woes, 
there are some clear reasons why the GCC states need to move further along 
this route. The two most important are the creation of greater efficiency by 
decreasing dependence on state-orientated monoliths that tend to emphasize 
rent-seeking activities and to end capital flight. According to Al-Omar, ―The Bank 
of International Settlement (BIS) estimated that Gulf states had deposits of over 
US$120bn internationally‖.96 These funds should be used to aid development 
and diversification—rather than merely create another rentier environment for a 
select few—and to boost the still relatively small private sectors in the Gulf, which 
in turn could generate greater efficiency in the use of scarce resources. 
                                                 
96 Faud Abdullah Al-Omar, p. 181. 
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Of course, there is danger if privatization is carried out without properly 
trained managers (due to the same restrictions on foreign ownership) and if 
newly privatized companies maintain very close relations to the state. If these 
conditions exist, privatization will not reduce the burden on the state treasury and 
may lead to the abuse of the monopoly granted. The fear is that privatization may 
create a private sector that depends on monopolies and subsidies, which can 
retard the efficiency and development of this sector.97 
 
The GCC should learn from what occurred when the Soviet states 
privatized their state industries. The slow development of the GCC could be seen 
in January 2002, when Saudi Arabia and Qatar started the implementation of an 
earlier decision taken by the GCC at the 22nd GCC Summit held in Muscat in 
2001 to establish a ―customs federation‖ to become effective in January 2003, It 
is troubling that the GCC had taken nearly twenty years to arrive at this basic 
step, where tariffs on non-Gulf goods (and other agreements with regards to non-
Gulf trading partners) should have been planned to be standardized and in place 
much earlier. Why is there no customs federation amongst the GCC member 
states? 
 
Despite all the rhetoric, establishing a united market based on collectively 
made decisions regarding international matters and proper guidelines remains 
difficult to achieve. H.E. Abdul Rahman Al-Attiyah, GCC Secretary General, 
reported in early March 2006 that the Gulf states were prepared to have a 
                                                 
97 Ibid., p. 184. 
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common market by 2007, as had been decided during the 24th Summit in 
December 2003. In January 2001, Bahrain became the first state to reduce its 
customs tariffs on all GCC commodities following the decision of the GCC 
Council at its 20th session in 1999. Clearly, this was an important decision, but 
the time lag between economic decision-making by the GCC Council and 
implementation by a single state—nearly two years—in an area of great 
importance to GCC development is symptomatic of the GCC‘s slow progress on 
important issues. 
 
Economically, the GCC‘s most important trading partners are the EU, the 
US, and Japan. Whereas the EU is the largest exporter to the GCC, the US, 
followed by Japan, are the largest importers of its goods. The GCC‘s relationship 
with the EU was marred during the first two quarters of 2001 by the GCC‘s 
complaint that the EU‘s tariff barriers were too high and that the EU should 
restructure its protectionist quotas. Clearly, the EU is the biggest beneficiary of 
trade between the two blocs, and the surplus shown in Table 2.3 has grown 
since 1999. 
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Table 2.3  EU-GCC Trade, 1985-1999 (Billions of British Pounds)98 
 Exports to 
CCG 
Imports from 
CCG 
EU 
Surplus 
1985 19.8 16.4 3.3 
1986 14.7 12.3 2.3 
1987 13.2 10.1 3.1 
1988 12.9 8.7 4.1 
1989 15.4 11.7 4.1 
1990 13.9 11.8 2.0 
1991 16.8 13.4 3.3 
1992 18.3 12.3 6.0 
1993 19.6 12.3 7.3 
1994 19.3 11.3 7.9 
1995 19.5 11.0 8.5 
1996  22.3  13.0  9.4  
1997  27.5  14.5  12.9  
1998 26.6 11.4 15.2 
1999 31.6 16.1 15.5 
 
                                                 
98 Source: European Commission. 
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The GCC is the fifth largest market for EU exports. In 1999, trade between the 
two blocs was €47.7 billion, and the EU‘s trade surplus with the GCC was €15.5b 
billion. GCC imports from the EU make up approximately 38% of its total imports. 
The EU depends on the GCC for 23% of its crude oil, representing nearly 75% of 
total GCC exports. 
 
 The EU is also the single most important foreign investor in the GCC, with 
the US the second and Japan the third most important. Although the EU and 
GCC signed a cooperation agreement in 1988, this agreement did not reduce EU 
taxes on GCC oil exports, which amount to approximately 14% annually. This is 
a cause of some discontent between the two blocs, as is the 6% tax on 
aluminium exports to the EU. The 1988 agreement provides for cooperation in 
areas as diverse as the financial, industrial, agricultural, energy, and scientific 
sectors, but the GCC believes that the EU could be more accommodating. 
Perhaps this is a reason for the GCC to have a more persuasive single voice. 
 
In 2007, a free trade agreement (FTA) between the GCC and EU was at 
the final stages of negotiation but ion the 23rd of December 2008, the GCC 
suspended EU free-trade talks. "We have informed the European side of the 
suspension of negotiations on a free-trade accord," said Abderrahman al-Attiyah, 
interviewed by telephone in Muscat, where he was preparing for the annual GCC 
summit.  Al-Attiyah reported that FTA negotiations have been conducted for the 
past seventeen years. The GCC member states are in the final stage to conclude 
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a series of FTAs with a number of countries, including India, China, and Turkey, 
soon, even though whilst speaking to reporters after addressing the Conference 
on Democracy and Free Trade on 13 April 2006, Al-Attiyah stated, "We are 
working towards setting up a common market by the 2007 deadline and confident 
of achieving the goal without delay‖. The goals have not been achieved until 
today.  
 
In political terms, the GCC‘s relationship with the US may be slightly more 
important that its relationship with the EU, at least at the present time. The US 
imports approximately 1.8 million barrels of Gulf crude per day from the GCC. 
Between 1995 and 2000, between 76% and 86% of GCC exports to the US were 
related to oil or oil products, and as the price of oil increased, so did the value of 
US imports from the GCC; from US$11.1 billion in 1999 to US$20.4billion in 
2000.99 As its domestic oil production has decreased, the US has become more 
dependent on GCC-produced oil. Although the US exports a variety of goods and 
services to the GCC, from computer software to cars to military equipment, the 
export of all US goods and services to the GCC has been slowly decreasing over 
the past two years. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 HSBC, Economic Bulletin (London, December 2000). 
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Table 2.4  Ranking of GCC Trading Partners for 1999100 
 Exports Imports 
$ mil rank $ mil rank 
World Total 103,050   79,198   
EU 7,034 4 19,710 1 
Japan  23,449 1 7,446 3 
United States  10,586 2 10,057 2 
Korea  8,496 3 2,615 9 
Singapore  5,867 5 1,253 16 
India  4,262 6 2,646 8 
China 2,525 7 4,083 4 
 
 
A significant consideration is that the Iranian market is expanding and increasing its 
trade with the GCC members, especially the UAE, which has long maintained 
contact with Iran. 
 
2.3 Intra-GCC Trade 
                                                 
100 International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics (Washington, DC, 
September 2000). 
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 GCC trade statistics indicate incremental (8.5%) growth in intra-regional 
trade has occurred since the mid-1990s, from US$130.3 billion in 1996 to US$143 
billion in 1997. This growth continued from 1997 to 2005, albeit at a slightly lower 
pace, suggesting successful efforts at economic integration. However, as 
development amongst GCC states is still highly dependent on foreign markets, 
more efforts must be directed toward increasing intra-regional trade. These efforts 
must include the abolition of custom duties that prevent the achievement of a single 
market in any meaningful sense. All traffic between GCC states should be freed of 
local bureaucratic hindrances, such as the need for local agents, and a GCC-wide 
infrastructure project that links all forms of transport throughout the Gulf region 
should be initiated to facilitate trade. Furthermore, to encourage entrepreneurial 
activity, all citizens of GCC states must be allowed to lawfully engage in business 
throughout the region on an equal basis, own property in other member states, and 
trade without restrictions. The GCC faces major challenges to its united efforts to 
expand trade as its member states approach the establishment of a full customs 
union in 2009. The full implementation of the GCC customs union will be achieved 
in 2009, the UAE daily Gulf News quoted a senior official as saying.101 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
101 http://www.arabianbusiness.com, (Middle East Business News Wednesday, 18 
February 2009) 
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Table 2.5 GCC Intra-Trade Exports and Imports (in Million US$)102 
Particulars 1995 1996 1997 
GCC total intra-trade  
11,634.4 
 
13,310.8 
 
14,333.4 
GCC total foreign trade  
133,837.2 
 
146,037.8 
 
152,267 
GCC intra-regional trade 
foreign trade ratio % 
 
8.7 
 
9.1 
 
9.4 
 
 
2.4 The Future 
 The next 15 to 20 years are by no means certain for the GCC. Approaching 
oil depletion dates for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, the largest oil producers, 
has added political and social pressure that may not encourage collaboration. 
Indeed, little if any real political and social, let alone economic, collaboration is 
currently occurring. Gulf rivalries are frequently expressed in the way media 
sources financed by different states pit one state against another.103 Oman has 
                                                 
102 Economic Bulletin, (the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 
Secretariat General, Volume XIV 1999). 
103 The big players are Saudi sponsored (as might be expected): Al-Hayat and Al-Sharq al-
Awsat; Al-Qabbis is Kuwaiti; Al-Itihad is backed by money from the UAE and Al Arab has 
Libyan backers. 
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seen little point to this, but Kuwait and Saudi Arabia continue to use the media for 
their own ends in a belligerent manner. Al-Alkim found that ―almost all the GCC 
states finance or bribe, in one way or another, the Arabic tabloid papers published 
in London and Paris in an attempt to buy their allegiance and use them against 
each other‖.104 These papers, which do not pursue national political programmes so 
much as localized vendettas, neither engage in debate for or against GCC 
integration, as does the European press, nor seem to express any unique local 
attributes. In such a manner, they indicate a lack of political development and 
national identities that may hinder rather than promote the GCC. 
 
 The stability of some Gulf states may also be in question (although in this 
Oman, with its representative government, is very different from its neighbours). 
Saudi Arabia has seen political discontent expressed through religious incidents at 
not only Mecca in 1979—an incident that prompted Saudi Arabia to seek local state 
cooperation as a way of offsetting internal problems—but also at Nejd, the political 
power base of the Al-Saud family.  The challenge may well be for the GCC states to 
follow Oman‘s example in moving away from autocracy towards some form of 
representative government, or at least towards a government that allows and 
encourages the debate so important for the establishment of an effective economy. 
They must also develop an economy that encourages privatization and the social 
and political changes that follow it. However, doing so may not be easy. As new 
states whose authoritarian governments and vast bureaucracies have simply 
overwritten older allegiances to local groups, it would take little disaffection at a 
                                                 
104 H.H. Al-Alkim, p. 158. 
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national level (e.g., economic stress) for a breakdown in the GCC states‘ imposed 
social order and a return to more ―natural‖ pre-existing systems.105 There is simply 
a lack of social consensus in these societies, much less a Gulf identity. 
 
 The development of a Gulf identity is not encouraged by the region‘s 
continued dependence on the West for its military capability and security. Al-Alkim 
described the situation as enforced dependency in which since 1990 ―as part of a 
subordinate system, the GCC states‘ foreign policy undertakings have become 
mainly reaction rather than action‖.106 The operation, maintenance, and updating of 
military equipment supplied by Western (mostly US, British, and French) suppliers 
requires continuous significant and costly aid from the West.  
 
 Since the outbreak of the 1991 Gulf War, a large contingent of US and 
British troops has been stationed in the Gulf, and all the region‘s satellite early- 
warning and navigation systems are operated by Western military intelligence. The 
costs of such dependency are huge.107 Joffe estimated that if the military budgets of 
the Gulf were the average for small-to-medium states, the Gulf States would have 
an extra $30 billion a year (at 1991 prices) that they could apply to development.108 
Unfortunately, this dependence is encouraged by the West, and unlikely to 
decrease in the short or medium term; indeed, the decrease in oil revenues may 
                                                 
105 Faud Abdullah Al-Omar, pp. 199-205 
106 H.H. Al-Alkim, pp. 16. 
107 Cordesman estimated that the GCC defence expenditure in 1992 was US$48bn, of 
which US$35bn came from Saudi Arabia. Since then military budgets have increased. 
108 George Joffe, Bankrupting the Gulf (London: Ernest Bevan Society, 1991). 
 83 
well attract or necessitate financing from the West for new industrial projects, and 
infrastructure projects may need to be backed by loans from Western banks. 
 
 Another developing challenge for the future is that of demography; 
specifically, that of an increasing population of which approximately 50% is under 
age 15. If future generations find it difficult to gain employment, they might translate 
their concomitant frustration into political activity or personal flight, either of which 
would have deleterious effects on Gulf economic development. Regardless of what 
occurs in terms of diversification and market harmonization, the post-oil period will 
be difficult. Cordesman lamented, 
 
Bahrain may be the first post-oil economy in the Gulf, but virtually all Gulf 
economies face a future where oil and gas cannot provide the present level of 
prosperity, and where no amount of diversification can provide a level of 
economic growth that can both sustain the present level of per capita wealth 
and the present level of dependence on foreign labour.109 
 
 Thus, the future is unlikely to be one of an easy transition from oil 
dependency towards greater diversification amongst and integration of the GCC 
economies. Unemployment will become a very real rather than disguised fact. 
Indeed, in the short term there may be decreases in living standards, which would 
likely be blamed on any GCC economic innovation. 
 
                                                 
109 A.H. Cordesman, p. 75. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 As discussed briefly earlier, with regards to Egypt, there are important 
regional linkages that require further development. For example, Egypt enjoys a 
high volume of trade with the GCC that includes a considerable tourist trade; 
indeed, it is the second most popular tourist destination for GCC nationals after 
Jordan. Each year the Egyptian economy benefits from receiving between 300,000 
and 350,000 visitors from the GCC, who spend an estimated US$350 million a 
year.110 Egyptian expatriate labour in the GCC exceeds 1.2 million individuals, of 
whom about 900,000 live and work in Saudi Arabia. The question this begs (and 
Egypt is only one example of an important local trading partner for the GCC) is 
whether expansion of the GCC to include other regional states does not make 
considerable economic sense. 
 
 Other areas need to be addressed, particularly the lack of inter-regional 
investment. Saudi Arabia has a total capital of foreign-owned companies 
estimated at only US$22 million. There is little investment by other regional 
states; for example, in the Jabel Ali Free Zone, out of 1,600 foreign investing 
companies, only nine are Egyptian. The GCC also needs to take advantage of its 
                                                 
110 World Tourism Organisation, Yearbook of Tourism Statistics (London, 2001). 
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members‘ geographical proximity and common language, both of which should 
ease and increase the rate of intra-regional investment. 
 
 The GCC is currently addressing the many challenges that it is facing. 
Since the mid-1990s, the GCC has initiated policies to increase foreign 
investment; specifically, it has relaxed controls on all foreign investment and the 
foreign ownership of businesses and property, and has either modified quotas or 
abandoned them altogether. Both Oman and the UAE, which now permit 
foreigner investors to sign property leases of up to 99 years, have been 
particularly active in modifying their policies. Bahrain has designated zones 
where foreigners may invest in property, an action that even Saudi Arabia is 
considering.111  
 
What is now required is more rapid dismantling of trade barriers, greater 
transparency of regulations, increased economic and business development, 
and, probably most importantly, effective marketing and promotion of business 
opportunities in the GCC and it neighbours, particularly Egypt. Fortunately, the 
ever-globalizing world may assist the GCC in this quest. With a combined 
domestic market of nearly 100 million people and an aggregate gross domestic 
product (GDP) of over US$300 billion, greater regional and international 
cooperation can bring great benefits to not only the Gulf region but the entire 
world. 
 
                                                 
111 HSBC, Economic Bulletin, (London, March 2001). 
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 All the Gulf States must take certain steps in order to promote positive 
economic change and offset any social and political problems that may arise. One 
step that they must certainly take is reducing the number of guest workers that they 
employ. Oman has already introduced measures to do so, and the other GCC 
states must follow suit. They must be prepared for the effects of this measure; they 
will experience shocks in the short term as native workers adjust to the need to 
perform jobs that they had never anticipated doing. The middle classes, used to 
employing non-Gulf citizens—indeed, preferring to do so as fellow citizens are too 
aware of their rights and are unlikely to accept long hours or low pay—may express 
great discontent. A positive effect of this measure will be that money that had been 
repatriated to guest workers‘ home states will now remain in the Gulf economies, 
where it can be used by banks and investment funds to increase diversification. A 
significant decrease in the number of guest workers will also encourage the 
development of national identities as more citizens, through their employment, gain 
understanding of the link between effort and living standards and are forced to pay 
taxes on their earnings.  
 
Although decreasing the number of guest workers will increase 
employment opportunities for the citizens of the GCC states, the increase in their 
population may still be too large to absorb all citizens seeking employment. As 
previously mentioned, Oman‘s population is currently increasing at 1.84% 
annually, and other GCC states are experiencing impressive increases in 
population. Decreasing birth rates would not only decrease the number of 
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unemployed and ease the strain of educating and caring for large numbers of 
unproductive young people but also free up more women for the non-domestic 
work force, part of the key to future economic prosperity. If the Gulf states‘ 
decrease their numbers of guest workers and birth rates, their educational 
systems must be modified to accommodate the consequences of doing so.  More 
focus should be placed on training people for the jobs that exist or will exist, such 
as those related to the burgeoning tourist trade in Oman, Dubai, and Yemen. 
 
These changes require creating a sense of fairness and involvement 
amongst the middle and lower classes, and as such, necessitate changes at the 
top of the social stratum. Elites should no longer be non-taxable beneficiaries of 
oil rents; the upper echelons of bureaucracies should be held accountable, as 
indeed should all governmental officials; and governments must streamline and 
increase the efficiency of their bureaucracies as well as end their distorting 
involvement in markets. Utilities should no longer be subsidized so that market 
prices reflect real costs. Incentives must be created for individuals and 
companies to invest locally rather than internationally. Most importantly, the GCC 
should act in a more planned and unified fashion in certain areas, including 
military procurement and activities, which should be harmonized to save money, 
and agricultural production, which should be varied to maximize trade amongst 
the GCC states. Moreover, the states need to impose certain selected tariff 
barriers to encourage local production and regional diversification. 
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The GCC is slowly realizing it needs to increase its economic and political 
harmonization. If it does not do so, it is very likely that the bloc will dissolve as 
rival countries seek to develop their relative advantages at home and within 
neighbouring markets. 
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Chapter 3 
 
3. Globalization in the GCC: Political and Economic    
    Analysis -The Political Aspect. 
 
 
The creation of the GCC was a direct result of regional political events 
occurring at the time of its formation. Since the early 1970s, the major 
independent Gulf states had been discussing the formation a union amongst 
themselves. Their negotiations intensified following the occurrence of four major 
events: 
 The outbreak of border disputes between Arab states and the royal 
families. 
 The Iranian revolution. 
 The war between Iran and Iraq. 
 The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. 
Apart from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states have relatively low populations, as 
shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 GCC Country populations112 
Country population 
In thousands 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Bahrain 
638 
 
655,000 672 689, 707 
Kuwait 
2,228 
 
2,243 2,363 2,484, 2,391 
Oman 
2,401 
 
2,478 2,538 2,341 2,416 
Qatar 
561 
 
597 618 724 756 
Saudi Arabia 
20,847 20,976 21,491 22,019 22,674 
United Arab Emirates 
3,247 3,488 3,754 4,041 4,320 
 
Regarding the first factor, before the formation of the GCC, the Arab ruling 
families had maintained close bonds with the families of other states that were 
not confined by borders. Therefore, the demarcation of new borders in the 
creation of Bahrain and Kuwait led to much disaffection amongst these families, 
and their strained relations were held together only by their common links, 
religion, and language. 113  
                                                 
112 Figure 1 source: GCC, Secretariat General, Information Centre-Statistical Department 
113 Béatrice Maalouf, The GCC: A Union to Be Reckoned With, 2006. (This paper was 
presented at the Congress of the Czech Political Science Society in Olomouc, Czech 
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Regarding the second factor, the states of the Arabian Peninsula felt 
protected from Iranian dominance as long as the Shah was in control because 
the US, an Arab ally, dictated Iranian policies during his rule. This situation 
changed after the Iranian Revolution, when religious leaders whose ideologies 
and religious beliefs ran counter to those of the Gulf states assumed power. In 
the face of Iran‘s regional military strength, the Gulf states recognized the need 
to present a united front.114  
 
Lastly, the invasion of Islamic Afghanistan by the atheist Soviet Union was 
viewed as a regional threat, particularly as Yemen was a socialist country at that 
time. The invasion was another source of insecurity in the region because the 
Arab states had supported the US in the Cold War, making them rivals of the 
Soviet Empire. Recognizing that the Soviet threat had to be faced collectively, 
the Arab states realized it was imperative that they unite. Their resolve to do so 
was strengthened by the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, which disrupted 
both Iraq‘s and Saudi Arabia‘s trade routes. Reacting rapidly to the war, the Gulf 
states united in the form of the GCC in 1981.115  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Republic. The paper deals with the basic aspects of the Gulf Coopera-tion Council 
(GCC), its rise on the Arab political map, its international aspects and future prospects. 
The purpose of the paper is to acquaint the readers with an economic-political union in 
the Arab World that is breaking new paths in regional and global politics.) 
114 Ibid,. 
115 Ibid,. 
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 Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman all signed the 
charter known as the Cooperation Council Charter, which listed the common 
cultural, social, political, economic, religious, and linguistic reasons behind the 
GCC. The articles in the charter described their need to develop independence 
and self-sustainability in political, economic, and financial affairs.116 The basic 
objectives of the Cooperation Council are the following: 
 
1. To increase coordination, integration, and inter-connections amongst the       
    member states in all fields in order to achieve unity.   
2. To deepen and strengthen relations, links, and areas of cooperation now  
    prevailing amongst their peoples in various fields.    
3. To formulate similar regulations in various fields, including the following: 
o Economic and financial affairs. 
o Commerce, customs, and communication. 
o Education and culture. 
o Social and health affairs. 
o Information and tourism. 
o Legislative and administrative affairs. 
4. To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the various 
industries and in mining, agriculture, water and animal resources; 
establish scientific research and joint ventures; and encourage 
cooperation by the private sector for the good of their peoples. 
 
                                                 
116 Ibid,. 
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Since the creation of the council, the GCC has tried to gradually install its 
authority in the region and work for change for the betterment of the states. The  
states have developed in the fields of media technology, developmental projects, 
financial institutions, and regional security at a remarkable pace.117  
 
The first visible impact of a unified GCC policy occurred during the 1990 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The GCC called for a meeting of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC), then requested and saw the passage of  UN Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 660, which, by providing for global assistance, 
made possible the liberation of Kuwait. Since 1990, the GCC has endeavoured to 
aid conflict resolution in many countries, including Somalia, Israel, the Palestinian 
territory, Lebanon, and Israel. The GCC is also in the forefront of providing 
economic aid to rebuild countries through donations.   
 
On a country-by-country basis, the GCC is negotiating FTAs with China, 
Pakistan, and India, and has already signed FTAs with Lebanon, Turkey, and 
Syria in the Gulf region and Japan in the East Asian region. The GCC has also 
signed pacts and agreements with regional organizations, including the EU, with 
which it has signed declarations of cooperation and is negotiating an FTA.118  
 
 
 
                                                 
117 Ibid,. 
118 Ibid,. 
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3.1 Non-Governmental, International, and Regional  
      Organizations. 
 
 
 The economic development transformation of the GCC states and  other 
Arab states in the region has been aided by assistance from international 
institutions and donor agencies. These agencies have been providing financial, 
technical, and organizational help to promote the formulation of better strategies 
for and the stable development of the Arab states specifically and the Gulf region 
in general. The UAE has received sufficient financial capital for funding the 
preparation of a national environmental strategy (NES) and national 
environmental action plan (NEAP). Other Gulf and Arab countries have been 
seeking and receiving technical help from international and regional 
organizations.  
 
Access to financial assistance is important in ensuring stable growth and 
development, especially for countries that are not oil exporters.119 Khordagui 
reported, ―International donor organizations working in the region include: 
 
 Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 
                                                 
119 Hosny Khordagui. Regional Workshop on National Sustainable Development 
Strategies and Indicators for Sustainable Development in the Arab Region, Cairo House, 
(Cairo, Egypt, December 2004), pp.12-14. 
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 Arab Fund for Economic and  social Development (AFESD) 
 Kuwaiti Fund for Development (KFD)‖.120 
Apart from the development of infrastructure, certain organizations have 
been providing the Gulf states with assistance for a wide range of activities, 
including capacity building, legislative drafting, and policy analysis. Most 
assistance concerning capacity building comes from regional organizations 
seeking regional benefits from national initiatives: 
 
 METAP, a cooperative initiative between the Commission, the European 
Investment Bank, UNDP (the Arab Bureau and the Capacity 21 Unit), and 
the WB, has provided capacity building assistance to the Mediterranean 
region for nearly the past decade. . . . Med-Policies Initiative, part of the 
METAP program, but funded by the WB (World Bank) in coordination with 
ESCWA (Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia), is building 
national capacity and regional awareness on economic and environmental 
policy-making. . . . [and] the Centre for Environment and Development in 
the Arab Region and Europe (CEDARE) is an independent, non-profit 
regional institution working to increase the capacity of national institution 
to enhance environmental management and SD. 121 
 
3.2 Social Developments and Civic Society 
                                                 
120 Ibid,.  
121 Ibid,. 
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 With the largest population and oil reserves, Saudi Arabia is the largest 
member of the GCC. As such, one would expect that the large capital inflow that 
Saudi Arabia receives would lead to political reforms and maturation of the state 
toward a free society. However, a monarchy continues to rule the state, which 
has no form of representative government or political parties, and until 2003 had 
no trade unions or voluntary associations. The Council of Chambers of 
Commerce is the sole liaison between the government and the society as a 
whole.122  
 
Political parties remain illegal in Saudi Arabia, and any individual or 
organization that tries to voice an opinion against the monarchy is quickly 
muzzled. When the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) and 
the Movement for Islamic Reform Activists (MIRA), two opposition movements 
now working outside of Saudi Arabia, attempted to demonstrate against the 
monarchy in a peaceful manner, its members were arrested and their activities 
deemed un-Islamic. 123 However, due to internal needs and external pressures, 
particularly the need to conform to world standards, the Saudi government 
initiated civil society reforms in 2003.  
 
                                                 
122 Young Leaders in Democratic Governance, Italy May 2008. A workshop titled “Young 
Leaders in Democratic Governance in the MENA region” was held in Venice, Italy from 
25 to 30 May 2008. This event was jointly organized by International IDEA and the 
European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratization (EIUC) with the 
support of the Al Kawakibi Centre for Democratic Reform, Jordan, and the Arab 
Democracy Foundation, Qatar. 
123 Ibid,. 
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 Unlike Saudi Arabia, the emirates comprising the UAE, which govern 
through both traditional as well as modern forms of government, are at advanced 
stages of institutionalizing their governmental departments. The UAE political 
system is considered sufficiently flexible to conform and adapt to democratic 
means of governance, which it must do because the UAE is fast becoming the 
economic hub of the GCC. Therefore, there needs to be civic reform and 
institutional development needs to be the foremost priority of the state. There can 
be no assembly of public nature without prior government approval. The first 
human rights organization was formed in the country in 2006. Its founding 
members include people of diverse professions from far corners of the society.124 
 
However, the UAE does not allow the existence of political parties per se, 
and the ruling elites and their positions in the government are still determined by 
their positions within their respective tribes and dynasties. In order to retain their 
authority and position, the rulers must ensure that they retain the people‘s loyalty. 
To do so, they must allow the people a means of voicing their opinions and 
grievances, which they can achieve through maintaining the tradition of holding 
citizen assemblies. The decisions made during these meetings sometimes even 
determine policy changes at the highest levels. Apart from the rulers, UAE 
modern institutions are capable of dealing with more complex and large-scale 
problems concerning the state. This dual mode of UAE governance has been 
                                                 
124 Ibid,. 
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modified over past decades to conform to the desires of the citizens as well as 
the state itself.125  
 
           Regarding the Saudi media, a media regulatory authority has been in 
place since 1982, and the government-owned Saudi Press Agency and Ministry 
of Information control the print and the broadcast media. Regarding freedom of 
the press, only one organization operates outside of governmental control. 
Founded to promote the interests of the nation‘s journalists, the Saudi 
Journalist‘s Association is an independent organization that functions without 
governmental interference. Even though print and the television media outlets 
are well developed and circulated within the Kingdom, most are regulated by the 
government. The Ministry of Information has the authority to appoint the editor in 
chief of all the circulating newspapers and can remove anyone that it feels does 
not conform to its standards.  
 
The National Society for Human Rights, an independent organization that 
investigates human rights abuses and records abuses related to employment, 
the judiciary, domestic violence, and the penal system, was established in 2004. 
The Gulf region has a history of human rights abuses related to non-payment of 
wages to and mistreatment and sexual harassment of guest workers. In 2005, 
the Ministry of Labour announced it would process complaints related to any of 
these offences and prosecute anyone it found guilty.126  
                                                 
125 Ibid,. 
126 Ibid,. 
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Unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE does not have any human rights groups, 
and still bans independent trade unions. The UAE Chamber of Commerce and 
the UAE Women‘s Federation are umbrella organizations with the responsibility 
of maintaining checks and balances in some manner. The latter is responsible for 
preparing the nation‘s women, which constitute the larger portion of the 
population, to face the challenges of the twenty-first century by training them to 
become active participants in society.127 
The Gulf states are using the revenue from high oil prices to develop both 
their respective states and the region in general. Local and international 
businesses that have established themselves within Gulf society must assume 
the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of participating in the social 
development of the region. CSR can be described as the commitment by the 
corporate sector to behave in an ethical manner and participate in economic 
development to provide a higher standard of living to the workforce, their families, 
and society as a whole.128 However, CSR initiatives in the region appear to be in 
short supply: 
 
In the GCC, although there are initiatives of corporate contribution to the 
society as a whole, there is still a greater need of formalizing it to ensure 
that the pace of development in the education, health, and housing and 
environment sectors is improved on sustainable grounds. A major factor in 
                                                 
127 Ibid,. 
128 Ibid,. 
 100 
CSR activities is the government's strategy. There are governments within 
the GCC region that feel that social sectors such as education, health, 
housing and environment are the sole responsibility of the governments or 
rulers, resulting in little effort by the corporate sector in these areas. A very 
relevant example of this is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the largest 
country within the GCC, where there are hardly any well-managed CSR 
initiatives. 129 
 
3.3 Political Reforms 
        The political systems of the Gulf states remain in their infancies. In a 2006 
seminar on political reform, Senior Analyst Neil Patrick noted a need to identify 
and treat all the GCC countries individually, particularly with regard to the 
maturation of their political structures. Kuwait, the first state to initiate political 
reforms, maintains a well-established working parliament. In contrast, the UAE 
has only recently begun considering the idea of electoral participation. Other 
countries, including Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain, have political councils, but their  
members are primarily sheikhs and members of the royal families, and the 
councils mostly function as advisory councils for a limited number of 
mandates.130  
                                                 
129 Giving Back: Corporate Social Responsibility in the GCC, 2007. 
http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidZAWYA20070509115334 
130 Political Reform in GCC countries, Seminar Report. (Wednesday, 5 April 2006), 
http://www.fpc.org.uk/fsblob/767.pdf 
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Historically, the GCC states have lacked the infrastructure and 
organization required for development and reform, and their royal families have 
been the only rulers. According to Neil Patrick, the monarchies and the 
sheikdoms operate in a manner that makes it difficult to tax their citizens. By 
using the earnings from oil profits to satisfy the civilian population and run the 
state, these rulers ensure that their rule will not be challenged, at least in the 
short term. However, as their citizens become more educated and their societies 
more open to the democratic world, they will feel more pressure to change or 
institute reforms.  
 
Over the past several decades, the younger generations have gained 
more awareness of their rights as members of society as they have become 
more educated. This passive but steady demand for reform and more freedom 
has put pressure on the ruling elites for change. This pressure is exacerbated by 
the opening of their countries to foreign investment and development, with  
democratic forces in the form of the US and the EU exerting pressure for 
democratization and liberalization in many areas, as ―globalization, and 
particularly economic globalization, intensifies pressures on rulers to be more 
transparent and accountable in the administration of state resources‖.131  
 
                                                 
131 Ibid,. 
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Over the past two decades, continued economic growth, increased wealth 
distribution, and the emergence of middle classes with a strong voice have been 
the primary factors in a gradual process of liberalization and reform: 
 
Economic change effectively creates alternative bases of power and 
constituencies that will contest the political status quo and claim a voice in 
the decision making process. It is therefore important to assess whether 
the distribution of rent in the Gulf states has led to an accumulation of 
wealth in a middle class with an interest in reform and enough power to 
begin making political demands.132 
 
 
3.4 Access to Information 
Over the past two decades, the international community has been 
promoting information and communication technology (ICT) as a means of 
increasing liberalization in the Gulf states. The international community believes 
that integrating ICT into developmental projects will break state monopolies on 
media and information markets. Although this goal has been realized to some 
extent, ICT integration has not had the influence that the West had anticipated. 
The spread of news channels such as Qatar‘s Al-Jazeera Network is a case in 
point. This network has clearly influenced Arab society by providing uncensored 
access to Arab perspectives.  
                                                 
132 Ibid,. 
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The West had hoped that access to media outlets such as Al-Jazeera  
would encourage liberalization and the opening of the Gulf in a manner that 
would enhance the West‘s reputation in the Arab world. However, the West‘s 
hopes have not been realized; although the opening of the media has lent a 
voice to civic society, this voice is often very critical of the West. Moreover, the 
Gulf State governments still have control over many information providers, 
particularly the Internet. Even though the states provide Internet access, it is 
limited and poorly distributed. On the pretext of conserving cultural and religious 
values, states including Saudi Arabia have been censoring media outlets through 
the use of filtering software that denies citizens access to any information that 
may be critical of their rulers. 
 
3.5 The Economic Aspect - Trade and Investment  
      liberalization. 
 
 It has been long claimed by various economists and reporters that the Gulf 
States heavily rely on revenues from oil production to support their governments 
and citizens, which was true in the past. Their average oil production in the 
1990s is shown in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 Average oil production in the 1990’s133 
Average Oil Production (Million B/D) 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
                                                 
133 Source: GCC, Secretariat General, Information Centre-Statistical Department. 
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Bahrain 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.037 
Kuwait 1.883 1.985 1.948 1.746 2.108 2.288 
Oman 0.904 0.955 0.956 0.897 0.820 0.780 
Qatar 0.904 0.689 0.682 0.564 0.721 0.754 
Saudi Arabia 7.700 8.100 7.997 7.483 8.410 8.900 
United Arab Emirates 2.049 2.175 2.114 2.208 2.243 2.360 
 
As globalization is fast becoming the new reality in the GCC countries, 
they are finding themselves treading into uncharted territory. Although 
globalization brings the promise of open markets and opportunities to the 
resources needed for development, it can also lead a country towards 
marginalization. Jiyad, a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
consultant in the Arab Gulf, explained the problematic relationship between 
globalization and development: 
 
 The relation between human development and globalization can be 
visualized in the following manner: the effects of globalization on a 
developing economy, such as the Arab Gulf countries, could be backwash 
effects or spread effects. The backwash effect means that globalization 
could contribute to and be the source of human deprivation through 
processes of marginalization (of the country) and social exclusion (of 
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individuals and groups based on social, ethnic, occupation/skill, age or 
gender grounds.134 
 
On the other hand, globalization can lead to multitude of benefits. By attracting 
increased FDI, it can lead to increased development, job creation, goods 
production, and consumer choice, all of which further enhance human 
development. 
 
 The steps towards globalization include the liberalization of local 
economies; the liberalization of state property ownership through privatization; 
and the development of regionalization, multilateralism, and ICT. Privatization 
policy became a national policy in Oman in 1996; it and the other Gulf states 
must enact ―policies [that] include provisions related to what to privatize first 
(productive service sector), partial privatizations, transparency, competition, FDI, 
protection of the environment, public relation, and privatization proceeds. The 
guidelines include provisions related to bids selection, public offering, taxes, 
loans, employees and management‖.135  
 
 Saudi Arabia had been considering privatization and privatization policy 
since the early 1990s. Its 1990-1995 development plan laid out plans for a 
                                                 
134  A.M. Jiyad, The fourth Nordic conference on Middle Eastern Studies: The Middle 
East in globalizing world (Oslo, August 1998), pp.13-16. 
http://www.hf.uib.no/smi/pao/jiyad.html 
 
135 Ibid,. 
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privatization process as well as a Saudi stock exchange, privately owned 
construction and development companies, and several banks. In 1997, the 
Ministry of Commerce decided to expand the role of private industry in the 
Kingdom‘s economy by privatizing and selling government-held assets worth 
more than US$7 billion. Saudi Arabia‘s main impetus behind privatization and 
liberalization is increasing private investment in the country‘s economy and 
providing opportunities for local as well as foreign companies to invest in 
domestic ventures. It also aims to create jobs for the ever-increasing number of 
youth entering the workforce, decrease the unemployment rate, broaden and 
diversify the economic base, and increase the competitiveness of its markets to 
meet WTO standards for membership.136  
 
Abu Dhabi and the UAE have highlighted the need to privatize 
approximately 40 industries. The World Bank (WB) recommended that Kuwait 
privatize at least seven small enterprises valued at more than US$3.6 billion. By 
1995, Bahrain had at least partially privatized its aluminium industry and the 
small enterprises comprising its food manufacturing industry. Industrial 
investment by the private sector into Bahrain was more than US$4.4 billion at the 
end of 1996.137 Their campaigns to privatize their institutions to make them more 
efficient and productive has increased FDI inflow into these countries. 
 
                                                 
136 Ibid,. 
137 Ibid,. 
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The GCC has succeeded in developing economic ties that bring it closer 
to achieving full economic integration and economic unity. During its annual 
meetings, the Supreme Council adopted several vital resolutions that 
represented great strides toward joint economic action. The most important 
resolutions relate to the GCC customs union and the common market. At its 22nd 
session, the Supreme Council decided that the customs union that would come 
into force in January 2003 would be characterized by the following: 
 
 
 
 
 A common external customs tariff.  
 Common customs regulations and procedures.  
 A single entry point where customs duties are collected. 
 The elimination of all tariff and non-tariff barriers whilst taking into 
consideration agricultural and veterinary quarantines as well as rules 
regarding prohibited and restricted goods. 
 The same treatment of all similar goods by any member state. 
 
At its 27th session, the Supreme Council decided that the common market that 
would come into force in January 2008 would have the aim of according citizens 
of any member state the same treatment regarding all economic activities without 
differentiation or discrimination, especially those activities pertaining to 
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movement and residence, private and governmental jobs, pension and social 
security, all professions and crafts, all economic investment and activities, real 
estate ownership, capital movement, taxes, stock ownership, corporation 
formation, education, and health and social services.   
 
 The GCC countries have experienced unprecedented growth as the cost 
of oil per barrel has risen from US$12 to US$100 and beyond over the past three 
decades. They have used their profits from this boom to modernize 
infrastructure, improve social indicators, develop infrastructure, and maintain 
foreign currency reserves whilst keeping external debt at a low level. More 
specifically,  
 
 Life expectancy in the GCC area increased by almost 10 years to 74 years 
during 1980-2000, and literacy rates increased by 20 percentage points to 
about 80 percent over the same period. Average per capita income in the 
GCC countries was estimated at about $12,000 in 2002, with their 
combined nominal GDP reaching close to $340 billion (more than half the 
GDP of all Middle Eastern countries).138 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 Fasano, U. and Z. Iqbal. GCC Countries: From Oil Dependence to 
Diversification. (Washington, DC: IMF, 2003). 
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The GDP per capita over these decades is shown in Figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1 GDP per capita from 1997 to 2002139 
                                                 
139 GCC Countries: Nominal GDP Per Capita, (National authorities and IMF staff 
estimates, 1987-2002) 
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Even though real economic growth in the GCC countries has only 
averaged 4% before 2002, the indicators have been increasing in tandem with 
successful efforts to diversify their markets. They have only achieved economic 
progress by opening their markets and trading systems to allow for ―liberal capital 
movement‖. The progress seen by the GCC countries in the twenty-first century 
is having a positive impact on the region as a whole. The positive indicators for 
2002 are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.3 positive GDP indicators for 2002140 
                                                 
140 ibid,. 
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Nominal 
GDP 
(Millions 
of US 
dollars 
Nominal 
GDP 
(Per 
capita  
in US 
dollars) 
Population 
(Millions) 
 
Overall 
Fiscal 
Balance 
(Percentage 
of GDP)
2 
Total 
Government 
Gross Debt 
(Percentage 
of GDP) 
Proven 
Oil 
Reserves 
(Years)
3 
Central 
Bank 
Foreign 
Assets 
(Months 
of 
Imports) 
Current 
Account 
Balance 
(Percentage 
of GDP 
Bahrain 8506 11619 0.7 0.8 30.3 15 2.7 0.3 
Kuwait 33215 15098 2.2 20.6 32.9 134 10.7 20.9 
Oman 20290 7515 2.7 3.7 16 16 4.8 10 
Qatar 17321 28362 0.6 5.1 58 15 2.7 13.8 
Saudi 
Arabia 
188960 8567 22.1 -5.3 93.8 85 12.9 4.7 
UAE 71187 19613 3.6 -9.3 4.5 124 4.7 5.5 
GCC 339479 11979 31.9 -2.7 66.6 83.7 7.6 6.9 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6 Globalization and Human Development. 
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Through the process of privatization, globalization leads to an increase in 
resource allotment and a focus on human development. Economic improvement 
and competition leads to increases in health and education standards. 
Privatization of the educational sector can lead to improvement if it is structurally 
transformed to cater to the needs of the market. Jiyad explained this process in 
more detail:  
 
 In other words, private involvement in education and health sectors could 
bring with it more investment, more competition, better service, and wider 
choices. Successful liberalization and privatization programs could also 
accelerate growth, boost domestic investment and attract foreign capital 
generate employment and increase (per capita) income. . . . The 
performances of the GCC countries towards human development have 
been weak in the past few decades. Great progression was seen in the 
early 1970s and 1980s but investment towards human development 
seems to have become stagnant in the 90s. A case in point is Saudi 
Arabia, which compared to the public spending of $81.4 billion in 1985, 
only spent $82.7 billion in 1995. This and other indicators like these 
demonstrate that investment in the future development of the people had 
been ignored in the decade of the 90s.141  
 
Another problem that the GCC must address is the increasing population 
in most of their member states. This population increase, along with the increase 
                                                 
141 A.M. Jiyad 
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of women in the workforce due to the opening of Gulf society, has increased 
unemployment. If the GCC workforce continues growing at a rate of 4% per year, 
unemployment rates will continue to increase. In reaction, the GCC countries 
have been trying to develop their non-oil industries to create jobs and sustain 
their economic growth rate, shown in Figure 2. Fasano and Iqbal explained the 
challenges faced by the GCC states: 
 
Government services in many GCC countries are provided free or at 
highly subsidized prices, particularly water and electricity, whilst non-oil 
taxation is low, consisting mainly of income tax on foreign corporations—
except in Oman, where local corporations are also taxed. Some of these 
countries have recorded overall fiscal deficits over the years, reflecting 
volatile global oil prices and relatively high levels of current expenditure. . . 
. All GCC countries share sound and well-supervised banking systems. 
Banks are well-capitalized and profitable. Their supervisory framework has 
been strengthened and is largely compliant with international standards 
and codes. Moreover, GCC countries have gradually taken a number of 
steps toward implementing a market-based monetary policy, though direct 
instruments (such as interest rate and credit ceilings) continue to play a 
role in a few of these countries.142 
Figure 3.2143 GCC Countries: Selected Indicators (average for 1998–2002) 
                                                 
142 Fasano and Iqbal. 
143 Sources: National authorities, IMF staff estimates; Fasano and Iqbal. 
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1. Including investment income on government foreign assets. 
2. Gross external and domestic debt at end of 2002 
 
3.7 Increasing Regional Economic Integration 
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 Even with their great visions of becoming sustainable non-oil based 
economic powerhouses, the GCC countries have fallen short of their aims for the 
past several decades. However, they can still achieve these goals through 
engaging in collective integration and regional advancement in accordance with 
World Trade Organization (WTO) policies and regulations. Because the GCC 
countries already have FTAs with each other, their next step is creating a 
customs union, which could be particularly beneficial when engaging in 
multilateral trade negotiations. Presenting a single regional front will unify tariff 
structures across the countries and allow them to engage in negotiations with the 
WTO regarding any matter collectively rather than individually.  
 
Strengthened ties will lead to a reduction in petty internal conflicts 
amongst the GCC states. Through integration and presentation of a unified front, 
smaller countries, such as Bahrain, can gain access to Western markets on 
behalf of larger countries, such as Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the states‘ integration 
into a regional bloc has already led to and will further increase access to each 
other‘s markets, and inter-GCC trade will allow local industries to provide 
employment opportunities for to local work forces in the human development 
sector. 
 
 
3.8 Millennium Goals Indirectly Leading to Economic   
      and Developmental Stability 
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As a bloc of wealthy countries on their way to regional integration and the 
provision of a unified front, the GCC should take advantage of its position to 
provide assistance to the less-developed Arab countries in the region, which are 
working toward the goals presented in the following sections at a steady pace. 
 
3.8.1 Eradicating Poverty  
The distribution of wealth in the Gulf region, even within the GCC states, is 
unequal. The Gulf countries are endeavouring to implement policies that ensure 
that all their citizens are provided with food and shelter. One means of doing so 
is creating jobs for them by broadening their industrial bases.  
 
3.8.2 Increasing Energy Accessibility and Efficiency 
According to the report ―Regional Progress towards the Millennium 
Development Goals in the Arab Region‖, 
 
Despite the vast energy resources of the region, in 2003 only 78.6% of the 
Arab population had access to electricity, ranging from almost 100% in the 
GCC countries to under 8% in Low Developed Countries (LDC). The region‘s 
overall energy efficiency (kilogram [kg] oil equivalent per $1,000 GDP [PPP]) 
has improved unevenly in the past decade. In 2002, the GCC countries 
reported the highest energy use (504 kg oil equivalent per $1,000 PPP), 
followed by those of the eastern Arab countries (262 kg oil equivalent per 
$1,000 PPP) and the western Arab countries (some 137 kg oil equivalent per 
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$1,000 PPP). Data available data on energy use in the Arab LDCs are 
inadequate.144  
 
3.8.3 Improving Education  
The literacy rate of the local population in some GCC countries remains 
quite low. In reaction, the countries are taking steps to ensure that their younger 
generations receive the education necessary to prepare them for employment 
and to serve as contributors to the development of their countries and the region 
as a whole.  
 
3.8.4. Increasing Gender Equality 
 The Arab countries in general have little gender equality and provide few 
opportunities to women. The GCC countries have made great strides over the 
past several decades, and female integration can now be seen in every aspect of 
their labour forces. However, few of the major multinational companies in the 
Gulf are owned and run by women and female literacy rates remain low. The Gulf 
governments‘ aim for the near future is ensuring that women become equal 
participants in the workforce, as they comprise around 50% of the total 
population. 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
                                                 
144 Regional Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals in the Arab Region, 
2006.  
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4. GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONALIZATION in the GCC 
    
4.1A The Social Aspect: Employment and Migration 
 
     Some of the largest labour markets for Arab and Asian job seekers are in the 
Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. Since 
the discovery of their vast oil reserves, these countries have largely depended on 
foreign labour for their development, as their citizens lack education and training 
to aid them in this endeavour.  
 
According to Kapiszewski, the migration of labour has had a significant 
impact on the economy, politics, and society of the GCC countries.145 This labour 
migration made possible their rapid development and involvement in foreign 
affairs, both of which have had negative impacts on their culture and socio-
economic conditions. Kapiszewski revealed that over the past 50 years, the 
population of the GCC countries increased by a factor of 10, from 4 million in 
1950 to 40 million in 2006, one of the greatest increases in the world. The influx 
of foreign workers is the main reason for this rise in population. In Europe, most 
foreign workers are employed for blue-collar occupations, whereas foreign 
                                                 
145 Andrzej Kapiszewski, Arab versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries, 
United Nations Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab 
Region (22 May 2006),     
http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/EGM_Ittmig_Arab/P02_Kapiszewski.pdf 
(accessed 3 September 2008); Andrzej Kapiszewski, Nationals and Expatriates: 
Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council States Reading 
(Ithaca Press and Garnet Publishing, 2001). 
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workers in GCC countries serve in important positions within the economy and 
government bureaucracy.  
 
According to Kapiszewski‘s 2004 study, the most recent survey of the 
expatriate population of the GCC countries, 12.5 million foreigners, a figure that 
represents 37% of the total population, were employed across the region in 2004. 
Over 80% of the population of the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait; approximately 20% of 
the population of Oman; and approximately 27% of the population of Saudi 
Arabia was foreign in 2004. Table 4.1 shows that Indians were the most 
dominant and Syrians the least dominant nationality in the UAE from 1995 to 
2002. 
Table 4.1. Foreign Populations of GCC Countries, 1995-2002146 
 Bahrain  
 
2004 
Kuwait 
 
2003 
Oman 
 
2003 
Qatar 
 
2002 
Saudi 
Arabia 
2004 
UAE 
 
2002 
Indians 120000 320000 330000 100000 1300000 1200000 
Pakistanis 50000 100000 70000 100000 900000 450000 
Egyptians 30000 260000 30000 35000 900000 140000 
Yemenis     800000 60000 
Bangladeshis  170000 110000  400000 100000 
Filipinos 25000 70000  50000 500000 120000 
Sudanese     250000 30000 
Sri Lankans  170000 30000 35000 350000 160000 
Jordanians/ 
Palestinians 
20000 50000  50000 260000 110000 
Indonesians  9000   250000  
Syrians  100000   100000  
Iranians 30000 80000  60000  40000 
Turks     80000  
Nepalese    70000   
Bidun  80000     
 
 
                                                 
146 Various sources from embassies 
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Kapiszewski argues that the influx of foreign workers is mutually profitable 
for both the source and the recipient countries. For the recipient countries, 
foreigners provide basic workforce skills and advanced knowledge, increase the 
rate of consumption through their purchasing of goods from local businesses, 
and boost local realty markets. However, foreign workers also impose costs; host 
countries must pay not only their salaries but also expenses related to their 
housing and invest in the expansion of the education, social, health care, 
communication, transportation, and other sectors needed to accommodate them. 
The GCC countries spend an average of US$27 billion annually on supporting 
their foreign workers, with US$16 billion coming from Saudi Arabia alone, 
undoubtedly a large proportion of its GDP.147  
 
Foreigner workers enjoy multiple benefits from their employment in GCC 
states: high paying jobs, higher standards of living, and career development 
within a short period are all possible. Many send part of their salaries back home 
to help develop the economy of their home countries. However, maintaining a 
large population of expatriates could be a major threat to the peace and stability 
of the GCC countries, as doing so may threaten established norms, significantly 
influence the structure of society, and have unintended effects on the countries‘ 
foreign policies. Moreover, large populations of foreign workers pose threats to 
the maintenance of social, cultural, and economic life. In reaction, GCC leaders 
                                                 
147 Abdul Rasool, Al-Moosa, and Keith McLachlan (1985, p.85) calculated that foreign 
workers in Kuwait are responsible for 26% of the GDP whilst the country spends 30% of 
the GDP to maintain the foreigners. 
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endeavour to prevent foreign influence on future generations that could lead to 
total loss of their indigenous cultures.  
 
In addition, there is popular sentiment throughout the GCC countries that 
foreigners should not become naturalized citizens. In line with this sentiment, a 
proposal was submitted limiting foreigner workers‘ stay in GCC countries to six 
years. It is important to note this proposal only applies to unskilled workers, as 
losing workers who have developed special skills needed within the GCC 
countries would impose costs related to their replacement on the GCC 
governments. Expatriates are often mistakenly regarded as being disloyal and 
having the potential to inject dangerous and hostile political ideas into the GCC 
societies. For this reason, in August 2005 Kuwait banned Iraqi, Iranian, and 
Syrian nationals from working within its borders. It is also for this reason that 
security clearance is needed before a foreigner can apply for residency in some 
GCC countries.  
 
Clearly, foreigner workers are of great importance in the GCC countries‘ 
management of foreign policy issues. Although they do not have formal political 
rights, foreigners can influence policymakers by voicing their concerns through 
the local media. Some government officials have declared, ―The expatriate 
community, though without citizenship . . . exerts more real political influence 
than most local citizens‖.148 In many ways, foreigners, as crucial actors in the 
                                                 
148―Arab migration in a globalized world‖, Arab Migration in a Globalized World by 
International Organization for Migration, League of Arab States published by 
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smooth operation of the political economy, can greatly influence their home 
countries‘ foreign policy towards the GCC.  
 
This is seen in the manner by which large groups of foreign workers can 
cause friction between the host country and the country of origin. In 1996, after 
accusing Egypt of its participation in a failed coup, Qatar repatriated close to 700 
Egyptian expatriates, especially those connected with the Ministry of the Interior. 
In a related incident in 1998, Qatar repatriated several hundred Egyptian workers 
due to tensions created by Cairo‘s criticisms of Doha-Israel relations. In 
December 1999, Saudi Arabia repatriated some 3,000 workers from Yemen due 
to boundary issues between the countries. In 1999, a riot between Egyptian and 
Kuwaiti workers in Kuwait resulted in the injury of 124 people and arrest of a 
number of Egyptians on charges of arson, private property damage, illegal 
gathering, and resisting arrest. The riot stemmed from complaints by illegal 
Egyptian workers, who could not be protected by the Kuwaiti or Egyptian 
governments. In 2005, Filipino workers staged noisy protests in the UAE, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, and Qatar over the issues of low and delayed salaries and lack of 
                                                                                                                                                 
International Org. for Migration, 2003. This publication contains papers presented at a 
regional conference on Arab migration, held in Cairo in September 2003. This 
conference was organised jointly by the League of Arab States and the International 
Organization for Migration, and brought together representatives of governments and 
international organisations, academics and practitioners to consider how migration 
affects, and is in turn affected by, the countries and peoples of the region. Issues 
discussed include: international migration and the challenges of globalisation; Arab 
migration patterns in the Mashreq, Maghreb and Gulf regions; sources of remittances; 
the exodus of skilled labour and its impact on development; a study of Egyptian return 
migrants; human rights and foreign contract labour; and the links of Arab 'diasporas' to 
their countries of origin. 
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human rights. In Dubai, the Filipinos protested by striking and going on 
destructive rampages.  
 
Foreigners, especially non-Gulf Arabs, often accuse GCC nationals of 
economic exploitation and cruelty, and fear the consequences of total 
dependence on GCC authorities due to a lack of laws protecting their basic 
human rights. Non-Gulf Arabs often feel that GCC nationals are prejudiced 
towards them, especially with regards to establishing businesses and purchasing 
real estate. They feel that the nationals treat them in a worse manner than they 
treat non-Arab and non-Muslim expatriates, and naturally expect better treatment 
than that accorded to Koreans and Indians. When their expectations are not met, 
foreigners often complain of the arrogance and greed of GCC nationals and GCC 
nationals‘ exploitation of and discrimination against foreigners.  
 
Indeed, the Foreign Minister of Kuwait lamented the fact that foreign 
workers, especially non-Gulf Arabs, are sometimes treated like slaves. In 2005, 
non-Arab workers, especially Asian women, complained about the sexual 
harassment of Filipino maids by GCC employers, which has since become a 
serious consideration. In reaction, the Philippine government no longer allows 
Filipino nationals under the age of 21 to work in GCC countries. In Indonesia, 
where sexual harassment by GCC employers is considered a national 
embarrassment, the government has proposed not allowing their nationals to 
work as maids in GCC countries. During the second Iraq War, the murder of 
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several Nepalese contract workers in mid-2004 by their hostage takers led to 
riots in Kathmandu that resulted in the burning of the Qatar Airways office. 
 
The presence of a large number of foreigners in the GCC countries has 
cultural and social implications. Expatriates can have negative influences on 
national cultures, values, and social structures. In particular, GCC countries 
worry about the influence of Asian babysitters and expatriate teachers, who form 
the majority of school staff, on local children, complaining that they do not give 
proper attention to Islamic and Arabic customs and traditions. They also worry 
about the increasing influence of the foreign media and inter-marriage between 
foreign women and male nationals.  
 
Regarding the future demand for foreign workers in GCC countries, it will 
depend on whether a sufficient number of educated and skilled nationals can be 
produced for the increasing labour market and whether the nationalization policy 
of the labour market remains largely under governmental control. It also depends 
on the innate need of the economy to create new jobs; the level of skills and 
qualifications of the national labour force in relation to employer needs; the 
willingness of nationals to take low-prestige jobs; and political, social, and 
security considerations that may lead to an increased demand for workers. The 
most important factor will most likely be the overall state of economy. The high oil 
prices at the beginning of the twenty-first century that increased GCC revenues 
allowed for rapid development of several GCC states and, in consequence, a 
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large growth in population, particularly the foreign population. The reality has 
greatly exceeded earlier predictions. In light of all these scenarios, the population 
of foreign workers will continue to increase and the GCC states will maintain the 
previous growth rate of another 10 million.  
 
Most of the new expatriates will be Asian workers, who are preferred by 
GCC employers over Arab workers due to their superior level of education and 
skills. However, the author asserted that some factors may slow the increase in 
and development of foreign labour. Due to the high rate of increase (3.5% on 
average) of foreign nationals seeking employment in GCC countries, more 
foreign nationals will be seeking jobs. As the number of nationals who are highly 
educated and skilled increases, they will compete for jobs against expatriates in 
the private sector.  
 
In Saudi Arabia, rising unemployment will force nationals to change their 
work ethics and become willing to take low-prestige jobs normally taken by 
foreign workers. As women in Saudi Arabia become more educated and skilled, 
they will naturally be absorbed into the workforce and compete with foreign 
professionals. The employment of national women rather than their foreign male 
counterparts in white-collar jobs is preferred by the government because it 
safeguards the Saudi culture from foreign influence. Coupled with the rising 
number of educated and skilled GCC nationals and the nationalization policy of 
the government, these factors will result in a greater preference for nationals. 
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Official sources revealed that in 2007, Saudi Arabia aimed for 70% of its 
workforce to be composed of Saudi nationals, and over the next 10 years aims to 
decrease the proportion of foreign nationals in the Kingdom to 20% of the entire 
population. Moreover, the government is aiming to impose a 10% per nationality 
cap over the next 10 years. This means in terms of the 2004 population of foreign 
nationals of 16.5 million, only 6.1 million foreign nationals will be allowed into the 
country in 2017. Furthermore, according to estimates this will require repatriating 
almost half of the expatriate population, decreasing the Indian population from 
1.3 million to about 300,000 and the Egyptian, Yemeni, and Pakistani population 
from 1 million each to 300,000 each. 
 
In October 2004, the Labour Minister of Saudi Arabia announced a plan to 
reduce the number of foreign workers by 100,000 yearly; in March 2005, the 
figure of 832,244 was reduced to 684,201. Only time will tell whether Saudi 
Arabia can transform its plans into reality. In 1990, a 22.6% reduction, equivalent 
to 600,000, had been planned, but the number of foreign workers actually 
increased by 200,000. The government of Kuwait has also been unsuccessful in 
reducing its expatriate population. In 1997, Kuwait decided to replace 10% of its 
expatriate population every year with young Kuwaitis. This action was taken for 2 
years only, as the ministry could not identify a sufficient number of qualified 
Kuwaitis to replace the foreign workers.  
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The author revealed that in the years ahead, the employment of foreign 
nationals and their associated labour migration to and from all of the GCC 
countries will remain a very sensitive political and social issue. As such, it will 
concern businesses and the private sector regarding profit and governments 
regarding indigenization, national security, and stability. Foreign labourers are 
mainly employed in the private sector, with very few finding their way into 
government service. It is accepted that the business sector, which is 
predominantly controlled by the private sector, requires a much higher level of 
technology and knowledge, which nationals do not have. For this reason, there is 
truly a need for foreign labour to keep the wheels of business and trade moving. 
 
 The large populations of resident foreigners will undoubtedly impose 
social and cultural consequences difficult to estimate and understand. It has 
been forecasted that Asians will continue to dominate the workforce at the 
expense of lesser-educated Arabs. The most that the GCC countries can do at 
the present is to increase the technological level of local graduates and realign 
their methods of teaching and the subjects taught in their local universities to 
make their youth more responsive to the demands of the private sector.  
 
Fergany theorizes that labour migration and unemployment are the failed 
results of past attempts to absorb labour from agriculture and the traditional 
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employment sector.149 The displaced labour has been absorbed by the public 
sector by design and the informal sector by the intensity of its needs. 
Governments discontinued guaranteed employment made structural changes 
after finding overcrowding, low productivity, and low earnings within informal 
labour markets. Labour migration seemed to peak before the second Gulf War, 
which had a large impact on the regional labour markets in the Arab world; 
unemployment rose to 15%, three times the world average.  
 
From a demographic perspective, unemployment affects youth the most. 
Fergany added, ―As evidenced by low labour productivity, the most pernicious 
form of unemployment, i.e. invisible underemployment, must also be quite high in 
the region‖.150 In fact, low labour productivity poses one of the main challenges to 
development in Arab countries. The WB reported that its 1999 data revealed that 
the GNP per worker in all Arab countries is less than that of the two developing 
countries of South Korea and Argentina. According to the 1993 UNIDO Global 
Report, Arab industrial productivity per worker declined from 32% to 19% in 
1990, not longer after the 1974 oil boom. 
 
Economic stagnation and little investment and growth since the 1980s 
combined with ineffective local labour markets and the absence of safety nets 
are the major factors leading to increasing unemployment and poverty in the 
                                                 
149 Nader Fergany, Aspects of Labor Migration and Unemployment, (Almishkat Center for 
Research, Egypt, 2001) http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume6/al-yousif.pdf (accessed 
3 September 2008) 
150Ibid., 3rd par. 
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Arab world. According to the author, low labour productivity can be attributed to 
inefficiencies in the educational systems and a lack of training and incentive 
systems. National incentive systems should demonstrate to citizens that those 
who finish college could gain profitable employment. After considering the 
widespread unemployment and serious poverty in their home countries, the 
prospect of emigration to their wealthy Arab neighbours appears the only choice 
for many foreign workers. However, these workers must also consider the 
unattractive labour markets and living conditions in the countries of destination, 
particularly the GCC countries.  
 
The chain of events that resulted from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 
resulted in the massive displacement of Arab workers. Underemployment, the 
underutilization of available labour, is often treated in a reductive fashion, mostly 
restricting it to open unemployment, the inability of available labour to find any 
employment. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait. These displaced workers were 
again unemployed and had to return to their countries of origin, further increasing 
unemployment and poverty.  
 
Expatriates in Arab countries are subjected to a system of 
discrimination151  according to nationality and position that is believed to decrease 
their loyalty and productivity. Most Arab foreign workers, particularly Egyptians, 
Yemenis, Jordanians, and Palestinians, work only at the  semi-skilled level within 
                                                 
151 Indeed, Arab countries of destination are infamous in international circles concerned 
with protecting rights of migrant workers. The treatment of women in the domestic 
service sector in some host countries is the most notorious example. 
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their respective specialties. Whereas some Jordanians and Palestinians are 
skilled workers and educated professionals, most Yemenis are unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers, and most Egyptians migrants act as skilled manual 
labourers to advisors and leaders. According to Fergamy, ―Labor migration 
quickly became a feature of the socio-economic structure of countries of origin 
and resulted in consequences . . . with magnitude of the phenomenon on one 
hand, and the political economy context . . . on the other‖.152 
 
Many foreign workers succeed in securing financial stability for 
themselves and in contributing to the economy of their home countries to some 
degree, but do not significantly contribute to innovation, capital accommodation, 
or economic growth in their countries and societies. Moreover, their home 
countries often become dependent on their remittances as an easy source of 
funds. Foreign workers‘ contribution to their home economies is related to 
macroeconomic factors such as GDP, foreign exchange earnings, and import 
expenses. Fergamy found that remittances are often unstable and infrequent and 
that the policy and procedural requirements of the workers‘ home countries do 
not take advantage of their economic and social potential on the macro level, 
instead engaging in exchange-rate speculation and dollar salting and increasing 
their dependence on imports. Receiving remittances also encourages 
unproductive behaviour within home countries by creating the perception that 
there is no need to work. 
                                                 
152 A methodological defect of many migration studies has been to take migration out of 
the socioeconomic context in which it took place, especially in identifying impacts 
(Fergany, 14th par.). 
 131 
 
4.1B The Social Aspect: Health 
 
     The state of the health of a country‘s population can be measured in a variety 
of ways. Globalization has undoubtedly had positive effects on the health care 
systems in certain GCC countries, but globalization does not necessary lead  to 
better health care systems. The state of the health care system depends on 
government policy on human development, education, and other social concerns  
associated with health care. Jiyad proposed using the human development index 
(HDI) as a yardstick to determine the health status of a country.153 According to 
the author, the HDI has three components, namely ―life expectancy, representing 
a long and healthy life; educational attainment, representing knowledge; and real 
GDP (in purchasing power dollars), representing a decent standard of living‖.154 
The HDI measures the median achievements of a country in basic human 
capabilities and indicates whether citizens lead long and active lives, are 
educated, and enjoy a high standard of living.  
 
 Jiyad added that the gender-related development index (GDI) is another 
parameter that can be used to determine the level of human development and 
health. The GDI not only also serves as yardstick to measure average national 
                                                 
153 Ahmed M. Jiyad , Human Development Paradigm Under Globalization Environment: 
The Arab Gulf,  The Fourth Nordic conference on Middle Eastern Studies: The Middle 
East in a Globalizing World (16 August 1998) http://www.smi.uib.no/pao/jiyad.html 
(accessed 4 September, 2008). 
154 To construct the HDI, fixed minimum and maximum values are established for each of 
the three indicators and a general formula is devised to compute the indicators‘ indices. 
HDI is calculated by dividing the sum of these three indices by three. (Jiyad, 1998, 
Human development, part 2, 6th par.). 
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gains in terms of basic human capabilities but also considers gender inequality in 
achievement; the greater the gender-related difference, the lower a country's GDI 
in relation to its HDI. The gender empowerment measure (GEM) determines 
whether women and men can actively participate in economic and political 
decision-making. It must be kept in mind that women in GCC countries are 
considered second-class citizens. Whilst the GDI assesses the basic capacities 
of women, the GEM assesses whether they can use those capacities to 
maximize their opportunities.  
 
 Regarding current economic trends in the GCC countries, Jiyad warned, 
―The comparative levels of HDIs and their progress during these years since 
1990 show some discomforting trends after an impressive progress attained by 
all countries during the 1970s and 1980s.‖155 The author further revealed that the 
current trend in incremental HDI improvement is alarming for the GCC countries 
and even worse for Iraq and Yemen. He further revealed that ―progress and 
deprivation in human development (measured as the periodic difference in the 
value of HDI multiplied by 100) ranged from negative (-5.8 percentage point) for 
Iraq to a negligible level (0.3 percentage point) for Oman, and to approximately 
13 percentage points in the UAE and Yemen‖. 156 This trend can be seen in 
figure 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
155 Jiyad 1998, Part three … Globalization…The capability‖… 5th par. 
156 Ibid., 20th par. 
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Figure 4.1 periodic patterns in HDI 1970-1994 
 
 
 
 
 
      As can be seen in the graph, since 1993 the percentage annual change in 
the HDI of all GCC countries except the UAE has been decreasing. HDI growth 
in 1992 ranged from 0.6% for Kuwait to 7.2% for Bahrain, an indication that 
amongst the GCC countries, the Bahrainis were the most productive. In 1994, all 
the GCC countries had less than 1% growth from the previous year. The HDI 
data suggests that the unemployment of GCC citizens in their own countries is 
on the rise and that an unemployment plateau was reached at 0.8%, as shown 
by the HDI curve for the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar. It is quite possible that the 
reason for the plateau is the fact that GCC citizens, although desiring to be 
employed and productive, do not have the level of competency and knowledge 
required for the jobs that they were seeking to fill. This also explains the 
downward trend of the HDI from 1992 to 1993.  
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Although jobs are available, GCC citizens cannot take advantage of 
employment opportunities because they are not qualified to fill the jobs offered. 
Based on the data, it appears that despite the advent of globalization and the 
increase in FDI into the GCC countries, health care is a neglected sector. Other 
measures besides the HDI should be considered to determine the true state of 
health care in the GCC countries. According to Jiyad, these countries have 
incorporated the HDI and the national performance gap (NPG) measures to 
provide a true picture of human development.  
 
The three Arab countries of Iraq, the UAE, and Yemen are amongst the 78 
developing countries for which the human poverty index (HPI), a yardstick that 
measures what percentage of the population is affected by human poverty, was 
compiled. The HPI reveals the national degree of deprivation in terms of five 
variables: ―people expected to die before age 40; adults who are illiterate; people 
without access to health services; people without access to safe water; and 
underweight children under five‖.157 The other measure used to chart the 
performance of a country is the NPG, which assesses the number of children 
who have completed at least Grade 5. As presented in the graph, the countries 
with a negative NPG were Oman with and NPG of –3 and Kuwait, Iraq, and 
                                                 
157 The HPI was constructed for 78 developing countries only, including 12 Arab 
countries: Jordan (Rank 8), UAE (14), Libya (21), Syria (24), Tunisia (31), Algeria (37), 
Iraq (39), Egypt (44), Morocco (55), Sudan (57), Mauritania (65), and Yemen (66). The 
methodology of constructing HPI is different from other indices of HDR. Though HPI is 
composed of five variables the last three are composed into one variable (P3) by taking 
a simple average of them, then (P3) and the first two variables (P1) and (P2) are 
introduced into the formula to arrive at HPI. (The capability,16th par.). 
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Saudi Arabia with an NPG of –19. Those with a positive NPG were the UAE and 
Yemen.  
 
Jiyad stated that there are many interesting facts and figures that require 
much attention: ―Though the GCC countries had . . . similar levels of income, 
they demonstrated very divergent levels of educational performance and a less 
divergent life expectancy index. In fact, the income factor contributed to lifting the 
HDI level upwards in these countries‖.158 He argued that the inputs that the GCC 
countries need for human development, health care, and education are nurses, 
doctors, and teachers, who are expatriates and not nationals. Furthermore, he 
revealed that total government spending for public and social services in the 
Arab states (excluding Iraq due to the unavailability of data) had only slightly 
increased from US$81.4 billion in 1985 to US$82.7 billion in 1995. They 
decreased their spending on public services by 27.2%, which in absolute figures 
was a decrease from US$22.2 billion to US$17.8 billion. Funding for social 
services, including health care services, decreased 10.9% or from US$8.9 billion 
to US$7.5 million.  
 
Overall, the GCC governments‘ total expenditures on services decreased 
21.6%. This decrease in spending on the welfare of their people is an indication 
that these governments are more interested in spending their oil revenues on 
further developing their economies by importing more foreign labour at the 
expense of the health and well-being of their citizens. The decrease in 
                                                 
158 Jiyad 1998, Part three … Globalization…The capability‖…20th par. 
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government spending is also a result of reduced oil revenues due to price 
fluctuations in the international market and supply competition from other non-
GCC counties, which significant problems due to the dependence on oil revenue.  
 
The data shows that the health care sector of the GCC countries, despite 
globalization, is a neglected sector, with its development  at a standstill. To reap 
the benefits of globalization and minimize its effect on their cultures and 
economies, the GCC countries must develop a continuous human development 
program, especially because ―the dynamism, speed, and scale of globalization 
processes could very well marginalise countries . . .  and generate processes of 
social exclusion and polarisation even in countries benefiting, on the macro level, 
from globalization‖.159 The statement implies that the health of their people is not 
much of a concern to the GCC rulers, especially when they face dwindling oil 
reserves. 
 
Yemen provides an enlightening example of the present state of health 
care services in Arab countries. In 1994, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) identified two factors that have 
influenced the current state of health services in Yemen.160 The first factor is the 
weak government, which still shows fatigue symptoms from rapid expansion over 
                                                 
159 Ibid., Conclusion, 1st par. 
160 International Bank for Rural Reconstruction, Republic of Yemen: Health Sector   
Review, World Bank, 
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1994/01/01
/000009265_3970128110824/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf  (accessed 5 September 
2008).   
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the last twenty years, and is now facing budgetary constraints similar to those 
faced by the GCC countries due to limited oil revenues. This factor has led 
Yemen to decrease spending on social services, especially health care services, 
even though the government should recognize that if its citizens suffer from poor 
health, they cannot face the challenges of globalization by increasing their 
productivity to increase the GDP and HDI. The second factor is an expanding 
private sector primarily financed by the revenues extracted from a very weak 
economy and only catering to the health needs of those who can afford to pay for 
services. The IBRD revealed that as in many developing countries, the health 
care system in Yemen is predominantly curative, with little or no emphasis on 
preventive medicine, which has a strong negative impact on the large population 
of Yemeni poor and rural inhabitants.  
 
The IRBD explained that the public health care in Yemen is offered at 
three different levels, the first level being primary health care (PHC), which is 
supported by the secondary and tertiary levels of referral care. The PHC starts at 
the village level, where the health unit is not operated by doctors but rather by 
paramedic staff. The village unit is supported by PHC centres, most of which are  
entirely managed by only one physician but do offer laboratory and X-ray 
facilities. Patients who cannot be properly serviced by a PHC unit are referred to 
a district hospital, which represents the secondary level, for further diagnosis and 
curative treatment. A number of hospitals, but not all, provide support for regional 
immunization and disease control programs. The third level or tertiary hospitals 
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are in charge of specialized care and double as teaching hospitals for the 
medical staff of the two medical universities in the country. Private health care 
practitioners, who offer mainly curative health services, are concentrated in urban 
areas. Private clinics are well equipped and may have up to 50-bed capacity, but 
charge substantial fees from their patients. 
 
The basic challenge is making health care services available and 
accessible to the poor. The Yemeni government has given priority development 
to PHCs and the preventive and promotive phases of health care service, 
although PHC services are currently primarily curative. This move is expected to 
improve health care for the poor. The investment would require expansion of 
PHC services to areas not previously covered and improvement of services in 
the existing areas of coverage. Before deciding to expand services to other 
areas, the government considered upgrading services in existing service areas, 
but decided that expanding was the priority due to social reasons, an action that 
requires additional staff, funding, and medications at current cost. 
 
Although the Yemeni health care system needs much improvement, the 
government is attempting to aid its poor in the face of globalization. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) considers Yemen the fourth most malnourished 
country in the world; although the country produces  a sufficient quantity of food, 
its people lack basic information regarding infant and child nutrition.   
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4.1C The Social Aspect: Education 
 
The executive summary GCC Countries and the World: Scenarios 2025 
described the current state of the educational sector in the GCC countries and 
their plans for the future in the face of rapid globalization.161 The GCC countries 
should not solely depend on their vast oil reserves because not only is the price 
of oil on the world market volatile, a factor that has exhausted their reserves 
during difficult fiscal times, but also because the supply of oil is finite. In its 
attempt to diversify away from its traditional source of revenue, the region is 
faced with a major obstacle: Their nationals lack the necessary knowledge and 
training to meet international standards and manage their countries‘ operations. 
Moreover, these countries are producing very few innovations from research and 
development, and are therefore importing the services of expatriates to provide 
the needed technology.  
 
The way in which the region reforms its educational system will be  a 
determinant of whether it can survive and develop an innovation-based approach 
that minimizes oil dependency. Regional stability gives the GCC countries the 
opportunity to invest heavily in education. It follows that the educational sector 
was neglected in the past. As a result, the GCC countries suffer from a shortage 
of trained nationals who have the necessary knowledge to continue the economic 
                                                 
161 Section 2. Executive Summary, In The GCC Countries and the World: Scenarios 
2025. n.d. 
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success they have achieved from exploiting their finite oil reserves. This is the 
reason for the existence of expatriates in most GCC countries, the proportion of 
which can reach as high as 80% of the total population.  
 
The forecasts given by the newspaper The Middle East for 2007 to 2025 
clearly indicate that the development of the educational sector will be required for 
the GCC to remain competitive in the face of rapid globalization: ―The GCC 
countries face the challenge that their collective oil reserves, whilst vast, will not 
last forever. In attempting to diversify away from oil, the GCC countries face a 
major problem in that their existing skill base for workers is low by world 
standards and relatively little research, development and innovations are 
occurring in the region‖.162 The article revealed that it was only in 2008 that the 
GCC countries began to realize that their nationals‘ lack of education and skills 
will be a stumbling block to their efforts to limit foreign labour and dependency on 
oil reserves.  
 
Enhancing the medical education courses offered in Arabian Gulf 
University is a small but important step towards GCC sovereignty in medical 
health care for its people. Dr. M. Browner, a medical doctor by profession and 
currently Senior Associate Vice President of the AAMC Division of Medical 
Education of Arabian Gulf University in the Kingdom of Bahrain, explained;  
 
                                                 
162 The Middle East. 2008 May. WEF looks to 2025, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2742/is_389/ai_n25428149 (accessed 4 
September 2008).  
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“Medical education crosses political, religious, and ideological 
boundaries; the issues in creating educational programs to prepare physicians .  . 
. are universal and . . . offer a place in the global dialogue where we can come 
together around common issues‖. 163 He stated that the medical school‘s  primary 
aim is educating future doctors in the Gulf.  
 
Dr. Browner reported that the medical school, located in Manama in the 
Kingdom of Bahrain and governed by the GCC Council, had 35 full-time faculty 
and 700 students in 2003. Currently, the GCC Council is developing a five-year 
strategic plan for medical schools in the Gulf region to make their graduates 
more globally and technologically competitive. The medical students hail from all 
six GCC countries as well as Iraq, Iran, and India. Dr. Browner revealed that 
globalization has had economic and political effects on medical students and 
academic medicine via the lowering of trade barriers, the rapid diffusion of 
cultural values, the Internet, and the higher population movement related to travel 
and immigration. Expertise, services, and goods find their way across national 
borders in a multitude of ways. In medicine and social health services, global 
outreach efforts have prioritized the well-being of populations across the world, 
as was exemplified during the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 
pandemonium. US health care analysts have recently placed high priority on the 
international arena of medicine, giving new hope and light to the GCC‘s delivery 
problems and challenges as well as providing potential solutions. The presence 
                                                 
163 M. Browner, Viewpoint: Crossing Boundaries with International Medical Education, 
AAMC Reporter (n.d.) http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/dec03/viewpoint.htm 
(accessed 4 September 2008). 
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of medical schools in the Gulf abiding by international standards is a small but 
important leap forward to the GCC countries‘ goal of producing world-class and 
skilled national professionals who can fill positions now filled by expatriates.   
      
 Darim Albassam, Chief Adviser to the UNDP, warned, ―I believe that 
education in our region seems to lack vision and is in a state of disarray at a time 
when global transition is at its utmost‖. 164 According to Albassam, a resolution 
was passed during a UNESCO forum to overhaul the GCC educational system. 
The resolution according the UN consultant hails from an Arab summit in Riyadh. 
The resolution calls on member states to analyze their educational systems to 
make them more responsive to the realities of globalization, which will aid their 
planning. According to Albassam, lagging educational standards in the Arab 
region should be rectified by a regional approach that covers all aspects of the 
educational system and is fully responsive to the challenges of globalization. 
Albassam argued that educational policymakers should focus on the 
development of new ideas and innovations based on central beliefs, values, 
morals, and the ethnic heritage that binds the Arab world. Education should be 
geared towards balancing global and local values with national and international 
cultures. The overhaul should result in an educational system modern in its 
approach yet based on the cultural values and aspirations that differentiate the 
Arab world from the other developed countries.  
                                                 
164 Darim Albassam, Globalization and Education, (UNESCO Forum on Higher 
Education, Research and Knowledge, March 2007) 
http://www.unesco.org/education/hed/forum/programme.pdf (accessed 4 September 
2008). 
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On the issue of education and globalization, Albassam asserted that 
globalization has implications for both national and regional stability. He believes 
that only those countries and regions that take action based on a strong vision, 
strategic thinking, and a full determination to challenge oncoming threats will 
succeed and maintain a peaceful economic co-existence with the international 
community of nations. He argues that the Arab group of nations should address 
the challenges of globalization to education to not only develop plans for success 
but also to analyze their underlying relationships with the societies and cultures 
that they want to  protect and cherish. 
 
  For the GCC countries, globalization may mean increased competition in 
supplying oil, as many countries are discovering their own oil fields as a result of 
technology brought about by innovation related to globalization. It may also mean 
the exhaustion of  GCC states‘ oil fields, a situation for which they are not ready 
because they have no alternative sources of revenue. 
 
In order to develop a knowledgeable citizenry that can adjust easily to 
changes brought about by globalization, the GCC countries‘ approaches to 
learning must be modified. Learning methods in the age of globalization, 
according to Albassam, should move towards non-algorithmic thinking and an 
acceptance of complexity using what is known as problem-based learning (PBL). 
Using PBL, students develop the capacity to solve problems based on critical 
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analysis of the problem itself. PBL is an approach that has proven successful at 
all levels of education and in all professional settings, but is very complex. To 
solve problems requires much inquiry and the gathering of correct and incorrect 
information before selecting the most relevant information. The solution is 
changing and tentative, as well as complex. In PBL-based learning, the teacher 
is the cognitive coach and not the knowledge holder or disseminator, as in the 
old system. Students, on the other hand, are problem solvers and decision 
makers, not passive learners. In PBL learning, teachers and students share 
information so that students can personally construct their own knowledge base.  
 
Educators and leaders are now aware of the importance of increased 
education and knowledge in successfully maintaining national operations. The 
forces of globalization have opened their eyes and minds to the fact that 
expatriates and technology cannot perform all national functions. To guarantee 
national sovereignty and guard against the contamination of their cultural values 
and heritage, the GCC states must provide additional and improved education to 
their citizenry to limit the need for the participation of foreign technocrats in their 
economies. 
4.2A The Cultural Aspect: Media and the             
Transformation of Information 
 
In 2007, Yasser Abdelrahim reported that with the aid of Arab television 
and the Internet, Arabs can now resist the influence of Western media and view 
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worldwide developments in the context of a pan-Arab worldview165. In 1990, the 
Arab media regrouped to develop a new technological paradigm that empowered 
the entire Arab media. Amongst the pan-Arab media that compete for the 
attention of Arabs,166 Al-Jazeera and Al-Jazeera.net, its online version, have had 
the most influence in reshaping the manner in which media analysts and 
academics approach important issues related to news reporting and media 
objectivity, bias, and neutrality, with their development away from the usual 
blurred concept of objectivity that had characterized the Arab media since its 
inception. The gradual expansion of Arab television programs in 1990 resulted 
from global changes in the trans-national media and in the production of news. 
After the media emerged in the nineteenth century in the form of news agencies, 
rapid developments in communication technology made possible the flow of 
news from the West that reinforced Western worldviews. The pan-Arab television 
stations MBC, ART, Orbit, and ESC emerged in response to American media 
domination, particularly that of CNN, to provide alternatives to Western cultural 
productions unsuited to the Arab region. 
 
Although Pan-Arab television stations engage in modern television 
programming, their content fulfils the needs of Arab viewers. Although Arab 
television stations have more press freedom than do print newspapers, their 
affiliation with Arab governments puts constraints on their coverage and poses 
                                                 
165 Yasser Abdul Elmakarem Abdelrahim, Arab Media and Neo-Objectivity: Aljazeera 
Online News, (Global Media Journal: Mediterranean Edition 2, no. 2, 2007), pp.45-58 
http://globalmedia.emu.edu.tr/fall2007/issues/6.%20Abdelrahim.pdf (accessed 2 
September 2008). 
166 Ibid,. 
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the possibility of strict censorship from the government. Strict laws control 
television broadcasting in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Law No. 13 of 1979 and Law 
No. 223 of 1989 gave the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU), which 
operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Information, monopoly control 
over Egyptian broadcasting; challenges to this monopoly that were made in 1990 
were rejected by the Egyptian government.  
 
Likewise, Article no. 39, which outlines Saudi legislation on the media, 
requires that all forms of media use courteous language according to state 
regulations and contribute to the education and unity of citizens. ―[Expression] 
Information, publication, and all other media shall employ courteous language 
and the state's regulations, and they shall contribute to the education of the 
nation and the bolstering of its unity. All acts that foster sedition or division or 
harm the state's security and its public relations or detract from man's dignity and 
rights shall be prohibited. The statutes shall define all that.‖.167 The author 
reported that in 1995, Orbit Communications, a Saudi-owned entity, signed a 
deal with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) that allows the BBC to 
provide Arabic newscasts for Orbit‘s main channel in the Middle East. According 
to the author, the aim of the BBC is to offer Arabic news coverage whilst enjoying 
freedom of the press and editorial independence, which contradicts the Saudi 
government‘s policy on the censorship of controversial issues. In April 1996, the 
BBC broadcast a story on human rights abuses in the Kingdom that showed 
footage of a criminal being beheaded. The broadcast resulted in a disagreement 
                                                 
167 Basic Law of Saudi Arabia, Rights and Duties, Article 39, Chapter 5. 
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between the BBC and Orbit owners and Saudi investors‘ withdrawal of their 
investment in Orbit over the issue of editorial independence.   
 
After receiving a US$137-million investment from Qatar Emir Sheikh 
Hamad bin-Khalifa Al-Thani, Al-Jazeera was set to broadcast from Qatar and be 
self-sustaining for five years of operation on June 27, 1995. Al-Jazeera claimed it 
would be difficult to be self-sustaining for five years due to the fact that the 
station was not able to receive revenue from advertisers. Al-Jazeera‘s failure to 
attract investors has been due to its hard stance on the issue of editorial 
independence and its criticism of Arab governments. The author claimed that the 
Al-Jazeera-Qatar relationship was based on a ―media-state tolerance‖ that is 
satisfying for both parties in the sense that at the domestic level, governmental 
affiliation with Al-Jazeera was a move towards democracy and press freedom. 
The Emir wants to show his people that he is pro-democracy and appreciates 
press freedom despite the fact that he limits democracy and freedom of the 
press. Al-Jazeera cannot publicly support Qatari political dissidents, despite 
being known to privately support them, because the Emir practically owns the 
broadcast television media. On the diplomatic international front, the global fame 
of Al-Jazeera has made tiny Qatar a giant Arab power. Qatar‘s perception as an 
Arab superpower due to its ties with Al-Jazeera has endured the diplomatic 
clashes that resulted from Al-Jazeera‘s activist stance in reporting. 
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The author concluded that Al-Jazeera‘s unprecedented growth over a very 
short period was unexpected. Its media bureau controls a 51% share in viewer -
ship amongst the 150 television channels in the Middle East. The founder of Al-
Jazeera was named one of the most influential persons in 2004 by Time 
Magazine. These facts show that the Arab people appreciate globalization for 
bringing them objective news reporting that allows them to learn the truth behind 
important developments in the world. 
 
There are different ways in which information and criticism can be 
expressed. According to Kraidy,168 the presentation of political cartoons to relate 
a message, a very common practice in Egypt, may be applicable to other Arab 
media. In Egypt, political cartoons often focus on topics such as the legitimacy of 
governmental actions and the distribution of power, thus serving as an 
expressive form of media catering to the development of public perception. This 
form of media, which can subvert established channels of authority, requires little 
education but much cultural knowledge for easy assimilation. The author  
explained that political cartoons are very popular in Egypt because they deal with 
local issues such as freedom of speech, the status of women in the public eye, 
governmental corruption, and garbage problems. These cartoon presentations 
normally appear on the editorial page and can be easily understood if one is 
familiar with traditional Egyptian culture.  
                                                 
168 Marwan D. Kraidy, Public Media in the Arab World: Exploring the Gap between 
Reality and Ideals, (Center for Social Media, 23 February 2007)     
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/arab_public_media.pdf (accessed 1 
September 2008). 
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Other forms of media expression popular amongst youth are the wartime 
Web blogs produced in Lebanon and the racing videos  produced in Saudi 
Arabia. These radical alternatives to common media expressions show the 
symbiotic relationship between creativity and activism. The opinions and 
information provided by the young journalists have become stepping-stones to 
radical views, as the consumption of online media has been linked to taking 
political action. The blogging network that emerged during the 2006 Israel-
Hezbollah War focused on stories not covered by the news media, such as youth 
going out, having fun, and living normal lives instead of radical political 
messages. 
 
The youth-produced videos of Saudi Arabia provide an intrinsic non-
commercial and publicly accessible expression of youth rebellion that contrasts 
with the commercialized youth personalities and actions created by mainstream 
media. The forces of self-expression and the likelihood of acceptance of youth-
generated videos and other media expressions is an important consideration for 
the future of Arab public media. The Arab media should recognize that because 
viewers can now develop their own content, the relationship between viewers 
and the public is participatory rather than hierarchical. The author added that 
public media should provide different representations of the self and others. The 
emergence of alternative media challenges the present relationship between the 
state and public, but despite this challenge, they operate within the structure of 
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the nation and state. Kraidy concluded, ―These media contribute to the 
emergence of new identities, to the indigenization and localization of the media 
content and to the emergence of multiple publics rather than the assumption of 
one singular Arab public, often described as the ‗Arab street‘‖.169  
 
In 2002, Walters and Walters170 revealed that the UAE was trying to carve 
a future out of its desert by developing an ―Internet city‖ along the main road from 
Dubai to Abu Dhabi. This effort has been met with contrasting reactions from the 
Emiratis; although they are eager to benefit from the Internet, they fear that it will  
cause irreversible damage to their culture. Emirati policymakers are having a 
difficult time dealing with the competing forces of religion and culture on the one 
hand and modernity and globalization on the other.  
 
In an effort to attract US investors, H.H. Sheikh Mohammed Rashid Bin Al-
Maktoum manned a display and information booth at Comdex 2000 in Las 
Vegas. He aimed to attract technology investors and their business to Dubai‘s 
Internet city. 
 
―H.H. Sheikh Mohammed Rashid Bin Al Maktoum manned a booth at 
Comdex 2000 in Las Vegas. The display was designed to attract techies and 
                                                 
169 Marwan D. Kraidy 5th par. 
170 Timothy Walters and Lynne Walters, Cyberspace and the United Arab Emirates: 
Searching for Tunes in the Air, (August 2002) 
http://nmit.wordpress.com/2008/09/06/cyberspace-and-the-united-arab-emirates-
searching-for-tunes-in-the-air/ (accessed 2 September 2008). 
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their businesses to Dubai Internet City. Watching His Highness promote his 
sand- dune-to-city marvel, one glib observer noted that the royal was trying 
to ―pull a [Las Vegas mobster and founding father] Bugsy Siegel in the 
middle of the Dubai desert‖ by building a community based on technology, 
instead of one based on gambling (Gartner, 2000)‖.171  
 
According to the authors, the Sheikh is trying to move away from oil 
dependence by investing heavily in aviation, tourism, re-export commerce, and 
now telecommunications. Except for oil, the UAE has no other natural resources 
to develop when its oil wells are exhausted. The government has invested 
billions of dirhams in information technology (IT) training and equipment to build 
a strong foundation for the future. However, IT development offers both promises 
as well as challenges; whilst IT promises great financial rewards, it can 
undermine the traditional Emirati culture.  
 
The Emirati government‘s ability to develop policies that maximize the 
benefits of cyberspace and minimize its effects on culture will determine if the 
desert will wither or bloom. The government realizes that computer networks can 
help individuals build a cumulative community of rights, which the Sheikh regards 
as dangerous. Whilst Emirati society is controlled by laws, Islam, and its culture, 
its media is considered relatively free. Federal Law 15 of 1988 requires 
                                                 
171 Ibid., 
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publications to be approved and licensed by the Education Ministry, which 
selects the subjects to be reported.  
 
Journalists are expected to censor themselves on sensitive subjects, such 
as the ruling family, Islam and its teachings, national security and policies, 
government policies from business to media censorship, religion and worship 
practices, and diplomatic relations with neighbouring states. The UAE Minster of 
Information, a son of Sheikh Zayed, has encouraged the media to ―criticize 
freely‖, although there is no evidence that journalists have complied, particularly 
with respect to the Emirati rulers and their extended families.  
 
The UAE is not different from other societies in establishing limits to open 
communication. According to the authors, UAE law allows the government to limit 
access to information to protect the nation‘s interests in areas such as national 
security, health care, public order, and moral restraint. The difference lies in the 
eyes of the beholder. The Abu Dhabi-based newspaper Al-Ittihad encourages 
GCC residents to adopt a modern concept of cultural freedom whilst making 
responsible decisions guided by Islam.  
 
Internet access is a subject of heated debate throughout the Gulf region, 
with many opposed to allowing the public to access the Internet. Lawmakers in 
Kuwait have denounced the Internet as threat to the local culture, morals, and 
religious beliefs that guide the daily lives of their constituents. This stance is fully 
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supported by other GCC states, which prefer a slow, paternalistic approach to 
allowing public access to the Internet. This viewpoint is not foreign to Saudi 
Arabia; according to Saleh Abdulrahman al-'Adhel, the head of the King Abdul-
Aziz City for Science and Technology, the Internet is an important innovation for 
relaying and disseminating information in real time but poses the danger of 
polluting Islamic culture and values. The perception of the Internet as a potential 
destroyer of culture and mind pollutant has delayed its acceptance in Saudi 
Arabia. Using innovative software, Saudi Arabia filters Internet access to prevent 
citizens from accessing offensive materials and ideas. However, such filtering 
only motivates Saudis to gain access to the censored information.  
 
Despite globalization, a uniform regulatory scheme for the Internet may 
not be possible because each country has its own cultural and legal 
requirements. Every culture has the right to express itself. The argument on 
eroding values has two faces: decentralization and values. The acceptance of IT-
related communication favours power decentralization and the distribution of 
information to all, including the women living cloistered lives in many GCC 
countries. Women account for 36% of Internet subscribers in the UAE.  
 
On the other hand, globalization raises the possibility of homogenized 
values. Due to this concern, the GCC countries maintain a cautious stand on the 
democratization of information access and the spread of Internet technology. 
GCC policymakers agree with policymakers around the world that protecting 
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children from harmful content, maintaining religious values, guarding local 
cultures, preserving national security, discouraging terrorists, and silencing 
racists are important Internet considerations. However, they also believe that 
intricately woven community standards based on Islam must be protected, which 
is the reason for their paternalistic approach. Few GCC officials will admit that 
blocking unwelcome political information is one of their prime concerns in 
imposing Internet control.  
 
In the Gulf countries, the effect of pornography on national, cultural, and 
religious values is always the foremost consideration. Other prime concerns are 
anti-Islamic information and Western norms that do not conform with the ideals of 
Islam, especially those relating to women and culture. Saudi Arabia has the 
strictest policies limiting the nature and scope of material provided by Internet 
service providers (ISPs): ―The ISPs should refrain from carrying out any activities 
violating the social, cultural, political, media, economic, and religious values of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia‖ (.172  
 
Official representatives of ISP companies have also addressed the need 
to protect cultural values, as revealed by the authors in Yemen. Teleyemen, the 
monopolized ISP of Yemen, told Human Rights Watch that it is under orders to 
limit Internet access to information that is contrary to social, religious, and cultural 
standards. Similar to Saudi Arabia, Yemen uses software that can effectively 
                                                 
172 Darby Patterson, The Internet and Security, Government Technology Magazine: 
Regulatory Policies 5th par. 
http://www.thefutureschannel.com/article_archive/Internet_and_security.php  
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filter information that can cause irreparable damage to its cultural identity. The 
Qatari ambassador to the UN is optimistic that the high level of censorship of 
undesirable and corrupt material will encourage public decency: ―Prohibition, in 
this respect, therefore, is not deprivation but enrichment; not suppression but 
discipline; and not limitation but expansion‖.173  
 
The UAE closely monitors its citizens with the ostensible aim of protecting 
them. The country has the technology necessary to not only filter and block 
Internet content but also eavesdrop on Internet users. Dial-up Internet users 
cannot directly access the Internet. Typically, they must first dial the proxy server 
owned by Etisalat, the only ISP offered by the government telephone monopoly, 
which denies access to websites that have been banned or display objectionable 
content per proxy check. Etisalat‘s usage terms and conditions allow it to 
terminate a subscription if it finds that a consumer is using it for engaging in 
criminal activity, such as gambling, or any activity contrary to the social, cultural, 
political, economic, or religious beliefs of the country. If one ventures into sites 
banned by Etisalat, the following message is shown: ―Emirates Internet denies 
access to this site. For more information on Emirates Internet services click 
here‖. 174  However, when one clicks on the link indicated, one is taken to the 
Emirates Internet and multimedia homepage, which gives no explanation 
regarding why the requested website was blocked.  
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  The UAE authorities claim that the purpose of blocking websites is to 
prevent access to sexually illicit and pornographic material. A senior official of the 
Ministry of Information and Culture stated in an interview with Human Rights 
Watch that there are no restrictions on political expression, socially related 
material, and economic news. The official claims that the UAE does not censor 
political ideas, especially those from Israel, but does censor pornography. 
Etisalat normally reviews websites about which users have complained because 
they contain pornography and sexually explicit material. If Etisalat find basis for 
the complaint after a review, then it blocks the website.  
 
The Etisalat official added that the company cannot block all objectionable 
website because its filtering system is not foolproof. One can access 
pornographic materials by connecting through other ISP‘s other than Etisalat. 
UAE authorities claim that they do not have the capacity to track all Internet 
users, only those using the Etisalat proxy server. The rich can always circumvent 
censorship by accessing a satellite or server that is hundreds of times faster than 
is Etisalat. Normally, these circumnavigators are the youth whom the UAE 
government wants to protect. The authors further added that whereas 
pornography is an Internet-related threat to the teachings of Islam that will lead to 
the weakening of the Islamic faith, the English language used on the Internet can 
be considered a more potent threat, as it will eventually weaken the Arabic 
language in the long run. If Arabic is weakened, then Islam will also weaken as a 
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religion because Arabic is the language of Islam, and the Internet is dominated 
by the imperialist English language.   
 
At the 19 January 2002 meeting of the Session of the Islamic Commission 
for Economic, Cultural, and Social Affairs in Jeddah, Dr. Abdelouahed Belkeziz, 
the Secretary General of the OIC, urged the attendees to fight against the 
―cultural warfare‖ being waged against Islam.175 Because complete censorship 
cannot be imposed, the citizens who have the means, skills, and expertise to go 
online will surely be efficient catalysts for change. This is so because the Internet 
can distort time, distance, beliefs, and perceptions in a convergence of language 
and real-time video. The Internet can make information gathering an addictive 
and destructive hobby if one has no restraint. 
 
      The control measures and intervention imposed by their governments 
have prompted some Arab news entities to move their headquarters from the 
Arab peninsula to other friendly states. However, even though the media have 
moved their headquarters, those who can afford it tend to rely on satellite news 
for their information. The increasing number of Internet users who can afford 
alternate ISPs other than those controlled by the UAE government has 
complicated government. Because of the availability of alternative ISPs, the 
government cannot impose censorship as it desires to do so. No entity, including 
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the strictest government, can prevent anyone who has the means and the 
technology to access messages travelling through cyberspace.  
      At present, every GCC country has some form of international access 
point to the Internet. Many countries monopolize ISPs, but the degree of control 
varies amongst countries. At any one time, about 1,664,000 persons are online 
out of a combined GCC population of 13,735,754. The cyber cafés that have 
proliferated in the UAE charge customers US$1.75 to US$1.90 an hour for 
Internet access. In many GCC countries, free expression on the Internet is more 
tolerated than it is in the local print media. The Kuwaiti government even allows 
free expression in its print media despite laws against it. The Digital Freedom 
Network has found a way to provide access to censored material. The 
proliferation of online newspapers, radio, and broadcasts has encouraged 
citizens to access a variety of media. Conferences and meetings related to the 
information revolution dominate the event list as more and more Arabs seek to 
quench their thirst for information and Internet news. 
 
A UN study on the censorship of media in the Arab World described the 
inherent responsibility of providing objective and truthful reporting. The study also 
touched on the censorship laws and the penalties imposed when media violate 
the laws. Censorship is the direct effect of these laws and its end result is that 
the media cannot be accountable to the people by providing objective news, thus 
placing the people in a disadvantaged position, which is contrary to the 
objectives of both. According to the author, censorship comes in variety of forms, 
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including the direct suppression of truth; regulations on media ownership, the 
printing and dissemination of news, and entering the new profession as a 
journalist; extra-judicial forms of attacks on journalists; and blocking access to 
Internet information. 
 
      The author added that the Egyptian government claims that there is 
freedom of the press in the country because it allows opposition parties to 
publish their own newspapers side-by-side with the government-controlled 
newspapers. In reality, there is no freedom of the press due to censorship. This 
situation is common in the Arab region as far as media and media transformation 
is concerned. 
 
The largest and most important change amongst the six GCC countries in 
the 1990s was the Qatari Ministry of Information‘s abolition of strict media 
censorship in 1996. At the start of the 1990s, the laws enforced in six Gulf 
regions called for long imprisonment for vaguely worded columns criticizing the 
Sheikh, endangering national security, disseminating inaccurate information, 
harming morality, and endangering friendly relations with other countries.  
 
The UAE liberalized its media laws in 1998, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi 
Arabia followed cautiously, waiting until 2001 to partially liberalize their laws. 
Only Qatar completely lifted its restrictions in 1997 to allow reporting through the 
Al-Jazeera. Under strict restriction, media transformation is also restricted. Only 
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Qatar provided the opportunity for the media to transform to fulfil the Arab world‘s 
desire for objective information in Arabic and English. 
 
     London now serves as the centre of Arabic-language media. In 2003, 
Salamanda176 conducted an ethnographic study of London's Arab media 
institutions. Salamanda revealed that there were two contentions related to 
transnationalism and new technology in media presentation. First, it questioned 
the argument that global cultural forms endanger a cosmopolitan perception. 
Cosmopolitanism offers a global view of a certain culture and tradition akin to a 
specific family or race. By doing so, tele-presentation enables viewers to grasp 
the importance of preserving culture. The case of London‘s GCC-sponsored, 
pan-Arab media proved claims of cosmopolitanism as a result of telecasting the 
GCC culture and traditions is an overstatement and regional orientations more 
often than not remain important. In re-presenting the culture and traditions, 
transnational forms, structure, and technologies only the artist are familiar with 
are used to re-inscribe and reconstruct representations of local personalities 
representing the culture, thinking ways and social organization strata. ―The 
transnational character of Arab media—its London base—results not in 
increasing cosmopolitanism, but rather in the development of new notions of 
Arabism and new arenas for local disputes and rivalries‖.177 It supports a number 
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of more ambitious claims for the permission leading to discussion and debate on 
the culture itself by non-Arab televiewers.  
 
Ethnographic tele-presentation proves that satellite television has helped 
to strengthen rather than endanger the existing monarchy. This new televisual 
media is being harnessed by the Gulf monarchs to support and promote the non-
democratic power rivalry of the GCC states. According to the author, the new 
form of information transformation called ethnography is cherished and 
supported by the royal families of the GCC countries because it promotes cultural 
identity. 
4.2B The Cultural Aspect: Cultural Identity 
 
 
The dissertation of Neha Vora,178 a PhD student, discusses the issue of 
belongingness in the UAE and the manner in which distinctions are negotiated 
between locals and expatriates, constantly policed, and expressed in different 
narratives, practices, and relationships. The dissertation focuses on what 
fieldwork data reveals about forms of belonging in the UAE: how distinctions 
between local and expatriates are constantly negotiated, blurred, policed, and 
produced through a range of narratives, relations, and practices, and how these 
dynamics can inform anthropological and Diaspora studies more generally about 
the nature of modern citizenship and belonging.   
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Dubai, well known for its high level of development, booming tourist trade, 
shopping centres, and exploitation of foreign labour, is one of the most wealthy 
and prosperous emirates of the UAE. Unlike its neighbours, it is not rich in oil 
reserves, but is aggressively developing alternative forms of revenue, including 
tourism, real estate, tax-free zones, and service industries. As a tax-free haven 
strategically located near Asia, Europe, and other Middle Eastern countries, 
Dubai has historically been a trade centre, which is its main source of revenue. 
Its aggressive development of trade and tourism has resulted in an influx of 
foreigners, which at any one time averaged over 90% of the population.  
 
The Dubai government is constantly negotiating with the UAE as to its 
need for increased foreign labour The author revealed that Dubai lures tourists 
through offering freedom of religious expression, opportunities for property 
ownership, and tax-free incentives. On the other hand, the UAE government is 
also actively investing in the creation of an Emirati nation with a purely cultural 
heritage flavour and citizenship laws. 
 
The UAE government defines expatriates working in the country as guest 
workers rather than migrants to distinguish between locals as citizens and 
expatriates as non-citizens.179 According to Neha Vora, this differentiation 
subconsciously produces an Emirati national identity according to which citizens 
are considered purely Arab, erasing a history of inter-marriages, settlement, and, 
most of all, cosmopolitanism throughout the Indian Ocean region. Naha Vora 
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described, ―On the surface, this division between the categories of local and 
expatriate seems clear. The locals put on attire differently and speak Arabic and 
are entitled to welfare benefits. Expatriates who are mostly Asians are tied to 
their visas and are not entitled to political rights‖.  
 
During his fieldwork in Dubai, Neha Vora found that there is a sense of 
fluidity and strict business relationalism in the way in which expatriates are 
treated. In the strictest sense of the word, relationalism is bounded by the fact 
that the expatriates are in UAE simply to work; they have no right to be 
assimilated into UAE culture, wear citizens‘ attire, or speak their native language 
despite the fact that Dubai is a cosmopolitan city. According to Neha Vora, 
―Locals are homogenous; expatriates have carved out forms of belonging for 
themselves and their children, and are constantly being reproduced and 
reconfigured in state discourses, the press, and popular media‖.180  
 
Western media portray Dubai as achieving an economic boom not 
because of its citizens but because of foreign labour and expertise. This is the 
reason why the UAE, compared to most Middle Eastern countries, is portrayed 
as cosmopolitan, hyper-modern, and peaceful. The author reported that per her 
observations, UAE has one of the most exploitative and highly stratified societies 
in the world. Human rights societies describe the expatriates‘ working condition in 
UAE as a sort of modern day slavery. This focus on exploitation considers 
migrants solely as labour and ignores the cultural and social networks that they 
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have developed. Out  of 4 million people living in the UAE, about 1.3 million are 
from India. Although the Indians are rooted in the country through business, most 
consider the Indian population as temporary workers .The concept of citizenship 
and belongingness as influenced by the West amongst descendants of 
expatriates and migrants is not recognized here.  
 
The Saudi industrialist Abdulla Al-Zamil declared that ―globalization must 
not be allowed to lessen cultural identity in Arabia‖.181 According to the 
industrialist, leaders must ensure that the GCC countries keep pace with the 
rapidly changing world and the progress brought about by alliances and the 
merging of borders and country boundaries. However, leaders must also ensure 
that the cultural identities of countries are not lost. The author stated that in many 
countries, the traditional way of life is being neutralized by globalization, and 
citizens feel that something must be done to protect the eroding national and 
cultural identities. Globalization, democratic ideals, and a free-market economy 
are accepted in almost all countries in the world.  
 
The author continued that despite the conflict in Iraq, the democratic 
ideals of the Muslim countries are strong. Forty one of the 44 countries surveyed 
claimed that international trade and economically related contacts increased over 
the past five years, and 75% of the interviewed countries declared that children 
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must learn English to succeed in today‘s world. People normally consider foreign 
trade, global communication, and Westernization good for their lives, families, 
and country.  
 
Despite widespread support for globalization, people around the world still 
feel that their lives are getting worse. Thirty-four nations out of 44 see a widening 
gap between the rich and poor, the unaffordability of health care, and that people 
are aging without the savings needed for their old age.  
 
It is impossible to escape the cultural consequences of globalization. 
Holton182 claimed that the three cultural consequences related to globalization 
are: 
1. Homogenization, 
2. Polarization, 
3. Hybridization 
 
 The UAE view of expatriates as merely workers not entitled to any 
political and civil rights, as well as discrimination against descendants of mixed 
marriages, is polarization. This is more relevant to the UAE practice of setting 
aside expatriates because they are not Arabs. The Indians who are in their 
country for centuries are likewise ignored due to their perception that these 
people are merely modern day slaves. 
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Homogenization is a condition wherein the carrier of globalization reigns 
supreme to the country‘s citizens, thereby incorporating into their culture, the own 
culture of the globalization carrier. This can be clearly exemplified by the fact that 
Chinese youth are now Westernized as a result of foreign nationals and investors 
mingling in their everyday lives. Chinese youth have absorbed Western culture 
and set aside their own culture due to the perception that the former is superior. 
The author stated that global culture is swaying towards Western or American 
ways of doing things. The availability of alternative cultural alternatives and 
opposing the Western norms suggests that polarization gives a more convincing 
image of global cultural condition. The author emphasized that global 
interconnection through the Internet does not mean cultural acceptance. This is 
because culture is harder to standardize than are economic organization and 
technological advancement. The hybridization thesis suggests that cultures 
absorb and incorporate cultural beliefs and practices into their own ways of doing 
things. The hybridization effect is when a country and its citizens select the 
selected aspects of a certain culture that they perceive as desirable and 
incorporate them into their own culture. Examples of hybridization can be seen 
popular music and religious practices. 
 
 The cultural effects of globalization can be seen in the everyday lives of 
Emiratis in Dubai. Gloryb, a concerned Emirati who contributed his observations 
and sentiments to a blogging site, wrote that globalization carries with it positive 
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and negative impacts on the cultural identity of a nation. 183 One example is 
Dubai‘s tourist and economic boom compared to that of the other emirates. On 
the positive side, tourism and duty-free trading have brought tremendous wealth 
and development to the emirate. On the negative side, the blogger claimed that 
Western clothes and conversations that insult Islamic principles are now 
accepted. There are now co-educational facilities, which poison the mind of the 
youth with the ideals of globalization, something that is not accepted in the 
teaching and principles of Islam. People tend to be busy with their own lives and 
ignore the presence of others who need their assistance and care. Moreover, the 
crime rate has increased threefold, with thieves abounding.  
 
One can notice today, that very little respect is shown to fellow citizens 
and members of the family. Family time is limited and everyone is busy. Family 
members cannot eat together because they all have their own schedules. When 
children marry, they do not want to live with their parents nor in close vicinity to 
them. When children who study overseas return, they long for the same freedom 
that they had enjoyed in the West. Children have become accustomed to asking 
and getting material things, and now want the best of everything; they want to be 
served hand and foot whilst their parents work hard to get them what they want.  
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Older people, now considered a menace to society, are housed in homes 
for the aged. The younger generation does not want to spend time caring for their 
older parents because they feel that doing so is a burden. Some older people left 
in the streets must be taken by the authorities to hospice care. The author 
reported that some older people have no one to visit them and simply await their 
death. The traditional activities of boat building and falconry  have been 
forgotten. Songs and dances that have no following are now confined to theatres 
for tourists to enjoy. The camels and bedouins are kept in remote areas outside 
the city, forbidden to enter by municipality laws. Today‘s architecture is Western 
in style, the basjeel of the traditional Arabic structures having been abandoned. 
Traditional Arab food has been replaced and influenced by that of many ethnic 
groups residing in the UAE, and the art of using traditional Arabic medicine is 
fading. Arabic is being mixed with words from the West (English being the official 
business language) and South Asia. There are still Arabic cultures in the remote 
regions of UAE, and if they are to be retained, they must be documented and 
taught in schools as part of social history. There should be more Arabic 
architecture, and more local talent should be developed. Both English and Arabic 
should be taught side by side from kindergarten so that students will be bilingual. 
Globalization is needed for a viable economy but under a leadership that will not 
sacrifice the teaching of Islam. 
 
     The GCC is composed of different countries at different levels of 
economic, social, and political development. As such, the reaction of each 
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country to globalization may vary. Fawcett proposed regionalization as the 
solution by which each GCC country can resolve matters related to its 
development whilst maintaining its own cultural identity. 184 She argued, ―It would 
be naive to idealize about regionalism‘s prospects in the Middle East from . . . the 
year 2000. The experiences of the European Union and NAFTA . . . demonstrate 
however the advantages of successful and sustained regional efforts‖.185 With 
the onset of globalization and the condition of the global economy,  interaction 
with global institutions, practices, and accepted norms requires regional 
cooperation. As the GCC is composed of several countries with distinct norms 
and cultures, a regional approach is essential for safeguarding cultural identity. A 
GCC country cannot embrace globalization if its leaders see that it will polarize 
the population, which could lead to social dissatisfaction and less security for the 
country and region.  
 
Fawcett added that regional groupings can interact well and rapidly to 
modify the agenda and change the rules in the middle of the game. At the 
regional level, they can assert a regional identity for maintaining their social, 
economic, and cultural identities. Regionalism is like a double-edged sword, 
competing against as well as complementing globalization, but offers the option 
of maintaining one‘s own cultural identity. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5. The Strategic Future of the GCC Countries 
 
 
 
The GCC is strategically situated between East Asia and Europe, which 
endows it with the capacity to don the role of an external or frontier market for 
the financial institutions of North and East Africa, the Middle East, and the 
Indian sub-continent. Although more than two billion people inhabit it, this 
region has no global-level financial agency. The GCC should assume this role 
because of its good relations and cultural similarity with many of the nations in 
the region.186  
 
The GCC has considerable wealth for investment and for providing 
security to the financial markets in the region. Renowned financial institutions 
such as Cap Gemini and Merrill Lynch have stated that the number of wealthy 
private individuals is increasing, and will reach the 2 million mark by 2010.187 
These individuals together own assets worth US$1.4 trillion. This report 
predicted a 10% increase in such wealth per annum. There are several 
financial services centres operating in the GCC of whose services even 
international investors can take advantage. At present, investors from Kuwait, 
Dubai, and Qatar are utilizing the services provided by these financial 
                                                 
186 Dan Draper Constructing a Revolution, (Financial Times. Business. Investment 
Adviser. September 15, 2008), Section 1361 – 1593 
187 Aamir A. Rehman. Dubai & Co. 2007. pp. 72 – 73. McGraw-Hill Professional. 
 171 
institutions. Saudi Arabia has not yet opened its market to foreigners and 
permits only domestic investors to invest in the Saudi Arabian market.  
 
Although the GCC markets are at the nascent stage, they are forging 
ahead to establish basic infrastructure and regulatory institutions. In addition, 
these countries are concentrating on establishing trade facilities that adhere to 
international standards. Because the GCC states are at the learning stage, they 
require the help of experts in the field to meet international standards. 
Fortunately, they have an expatriate community that can ensure that they 
achieve this target. This expatriate community is comprised of people from 
around the world whose different skills are of great use to the GCC.188  
 
 
5.1 Effective Considerations for Defining the Future 
Strategic Importance of the GCC Countries 
 
 
The GCC‘s political objectives accord with its Arab and Muslim heritage, 
particularly its foreign policy, which aims to increase Arab unity in the region. At 
times, the GCC‘s objectives do not correspond with those of other political and 
economic powers. Islamic tradition and heritage were instrumental in the 
establishment of the present nation-states in the region. Amongst the many 
factors in the evolution of these nation-states, the Islamic spirit served as the 
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foundation upon which the principles and objectives of the modern Islamic 
nations were developed. 189  
 
Qatar is constructing the world‘s largest industrial plants for transforming 
gas into liquid to process its vast oil reserves. The corporate giants Exxon 
Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, and Chevron Texaco are collaborating with Qatar by 
providing the required technical support and investing US$20 billion into 
building these plants.190 In addition to this venture, five major US universities 
have established their branches in Qatar, including the world- renowned Weill 
Medical College of Cornell University and Texas A&M University.191  
 
 According to Brad Durham, the Managing Director of EPFR Global of 
Boston, the GCC states are not listed on the global market equity indexes, 
which are utilized for the allocation of assets at the global level by corporate 
giants. He stated that a change in this situation would benefit the GCC states, 
which would thereupon emerge as economic and industrial superpowers. In 
January 2006, MSCI Barra set up a separate GCC indexing service that 
provides US listings and exchange-listed funds for all six GCC members.192 
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 The mutual fund company T. Rowe Price holds 60% of its total assets in 
the Gulf states, which have been unaffected by the conflicts in Iraq, Iran, and 
Lebanon. Its vice president stated that because the GCC states have strong 
and stable economies in comparison to the rest of the region, investing in them 
is safe. Nevertheless, because GCC markets are characterized by frequent 
fluctuations, they are unsuitable for every type of business. For instance, in 
2005 the GCC stock market exhibited unprecedented growth, only to collapse 
the following year. In 2007, GCC stock prices increased due to a large increase 
in investment into GCC markets. At present, the GCC countries are competing 
with each other for tourists and foreign financial institutions. As such, working 
with these markets is difficult.193 
 
The GCC states have been offering excellent alternatives to investors 
during the recent economic crisis. Whereas the global asset management 
industry proved fatal to investors when the economic crisis occurred, investors 
found the GCC markets to be lucrative. The GCC markets, supported by the 
wealth accruing from oil and natural gas resources, provide global investors 
with a wide range of opportunities. The GCC financial markets have excellent 
and sophisticated regulatory mechanisms, comparable to the best in the world, 
that create the ideal environment for investment by foreign corporations and 
investors.194  
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5.2 International Political, Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Policies towards the GCC Countries  
 
The member states of the GCC are members of the Arab League, the 
OIC, and other international Islamic organisations, and as such, are an integral 
part of the Islamic world. The OIC, established in 1969, has its headquarters in 
Jeddah. Another important organization in the region is the Muslim World 
League, an NGO with headquarters in Mecca, whose foremost objective is to 
promote unity amongst Islamic nations. Likewise, the GCC undertakes a variety 
of efforts to fortify Arab unity and promote Arab aspirations, a goal clearly stated 
in the preamble to the GCC Charter. 195 As such,  it supports the Charter of the 
Arab League and takes a keen interest in Arab nationalism and other Islamic 
objectives.  
 
Throughout the history of Islam, the foreign and economic policies of Arab 
nations have revolved around religion. In modern democracies, the separation 
between religion and state prohibits religious institutions from interfering with the 
functioning of the state, a characteristic notably absent in Islamic nations, whose 
organizations and institutions do not permit separation between religious and 
state policies. 196 Therefore, every aspect of Muslim life is influenced by Islam, 
which plays a major role in the state as well as society, in which most decision-
making is based on Islamic principles.  
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Thus, in most Islamic countries, two forces work in tandem and often 
come together during the decision-making process to determine the political 
agenda. These forces are state power and the religious leaders, such as imams 
and other religious scholars, who act as the principal decision-making entities in 
Islamic countries. Under the Sunni Islamic ideology, even the ruler of the country 
can be disobeyed and impeached if he has seriously breached Islamic principles. 
The Shia sect of Islam was revolutionized by a new concept proposed by 
Khomeini. Under this concept, the top echelon of Islam, the Faqih, rules the state 
in accordance with Islam.197  
 
The early Islamic community was ruled by the Prophet Muhammad, and 
his rules and principles are still adhered to by modern Islamic regimes. The state 
uses religion to serve its purposes, and its opponents often employ the tenets of 
Islam to challenge the government. This practice has increased as the entire 
world has undergone the process of globalization. Many Islamic states, whose 
religion and politics are interwoven, cannot withstand the challenges posed by 
globalization. During the 1970s, an oil boom in the Gulf states made the GCC 
states so wealthy that there their governments no longer needed to levy taxes on 
their citizens. As the GCC states became very powerful due to their booming 
economies, their entire decision-making process concentrated on ways to spend 
their oil incomes.198 
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The GCC states have initiated several political reforms, the nature and 
context of which differ amongst them. Some of the reasons behind these 
changes are internal developments, such as economic hardships and popular 
demands for establishing a new political order. Moreover, several new leaders 
who demand reform have made their presence felt on the political firmament, as 
has been seen in Qatar and Bahrain. In addition, several external factors have 
had considerable influence in engendering change. For example, the entire Arab 
world was compelled to adopt new policies when it came under severe pressure 
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the US.199 
 
The GCC states flourished during the 1970s on account of their large oil 
resources and comparatively small populations. However, this scenario has 
changed for the worse due to a population explosion that has not coincided  with 
rising oil prices. Governmental education and employment programs have 
created a neo-middle class whose number has significantly increased and whose 
youth demand employment at a fixed monthly income and an opportunity to 
participate in national politics. 200 These changes have posed a serious threat to 
stability and order in the Gulf countries. In order to cope with this situation, the 
GCC had undertaken several measures  principally aimed at mitigating economic 
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problems, amongst which the most important is to reduce governmental 
expenditures to the maximum extent possible. Other measures aim to increase 
government revenues. These measures resulted in a public outcry that slowed 
their implementation in all the GCC states except for Saudi Arabia, which 
strongly endeavoured to implement these measures.  
 
In 1994, the government of Saudi Arabia reduced its budget by 19% and 
by an additional 6% in 1995,201 and either terminated or reduced its subsidies of 
several consumer products. For instance, the Saudi government decreased 
subsidies on widely used consumer products such as gasoline and electricity 
whilst simultaneously increasing fees for work permits and visas for foreigners. 
Furthermore, the Saudi government reduced subsidies for agriculture. Although 
its income from oil in 1995 was between US$3.7 and US$4 billion, which was 
higher than expected, the Saudi government was unable to address its economic 
problems. Even though this additional income proved useful in repaying foreign 
debts and in making good the losses sustained by local contractors and farmers, 
it has been unable to control expenditures and anticipates that it will spend a 
major portion of its income on military and civilian purchases.202 
 
 Because other GCC states do not share this situation, they have not 
initiated any measures to reduce costs. For instance, Qatar‘s budget deficit for 
the fiscal year 1995-1996 was over US$1 billion whilst its annual budget was 
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US$3.5 billion. Similarly, Kuwait‘s budget deficit of US$3.83 billion for the fiscal 
year 1996-1997 was 28% of its total annual budget. In 1995, Oman increased its 
oil production to reduce its estimated budgetary deficit, and Bahrain was only 
able to reduce its budgetary deficit in 1996 because Saudi Arabia consented to 
transfer Bahrain‘s oil-based revenues derived from an off-shore oil field jointly 
owned by Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.203 
 
The GCC states are taking measures to guarantee human rights within 
their borders. According to Yusuf Al-Jabir, Director of the GCC Department at the 
Foreign Ministry of Qatar, Allah accords human rights to every human being 
without discrimination that are common to all the nations in the world and deeply 
engraved in all religions or faiths. The GCC states respect these human rights 
and are deeply concerned with respecting them within their borders. They are 
also concerned with democratic principles, particularly that their economic and 
political objectives are based on the principles of democracy. The GCC states 
provide funding to international human rights organizations and various summits 
and conferences on human rights, an action that clearly demonstrates that they 
attach great importance to human rights.204 
 
Moreover, the GCC states have signed several international treaties 
pertaining to human rights and have established several government-sponsored 
bodies and NGOs to monitor human rights. In addition, the GCC states make 
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continued efforts to ensure respect for human rights and the avoidance of their 
breach in any manner. To do so, they continuously revise legislation that affords 
protection to human rights.205  
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has expressed its 
willingness to cooperate with the GCC states if they want to develop nuclear 
energy for their domestic needs. The IAEA is ready to provide the necessary 
technological support as well as the required materials, but only if the states 
intend to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and their proposed nuclear 
programs comply with international standards and requirements.206 The GCC 
states responded that they would use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes, 
a stance they reiterated during the Jabir Summit in RiyadhAt present, only the 
most developed nations have nuclear capability,207 which makes them very 
powerful by endowing them with the capability of controlling other nations. 
Therefore, the GCC had to adopt the Jabir Summit resolution if it wishes to 
maintain its regional power balance. Most Arab countries, with the exception of 
Egypt, have ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but to date, none has 
attempted to develop nuclear technology.  
 
The resolution that the GCC states arrived at the Jabir Summit clearly 
indicates the importance that they attach to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
This fact endows the Jabir Summit with great significance, as it encouraged 
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these countries to depart from their original stand to show a keen interest in 
nuclear power solely for peaceful purposes.208 This change in Arab perception 
regarding nuclear power has surprised the countries of the developed world, 
most of which had not attached much importance to this resolution, and some of 
which had even ignored it. The GCC states, forced to adopt this resolution in 
order to establish their global standing, now must  implement its principles to 
counter the power of the more powerful countries of the developed world. 
Undoubtedly, acquiring nuclear power will render the GCC states even more 
powerful, adding to their oil and gas resources, strong economies, and 
geographically strategic positions. If they implement the resolution and develop 
nuclear power, they will bring about a regional balance in a region where Iran 
and Israel are demanding nuclear technology. If the GCC states acquire nuclear 
power, they could bring peace to the entire region and mitigate Iran and Israel‘s 
craving for weapons of mass destruction. However, their procurement of nuclear 
technology must be approved by the international community and used only for 
peaceful purposes.209  
 
5.3 The Current GCC Voting Structure and Agenda  
 
 
The GCC was formed in 1981 by the Arab nations of Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. It is a regional organization whose 
member states are enormously wealthy due to their vast oil resources and 
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whose populations are very small in comparison to their oil wealth. Recognizing 
that the non-member states in the region are politically unstable and 
economically weak, these wealthy states formed the GCC to protect 
themselves from the unstable conditions in the region and compensate for their 
individual lack of military capabilities.210   
 
GCC regional coordination began on the 25 May 1981 (21st Rajab 1401 
AH in the Arabic calendar), the day on which the rulers of the six major Arab 
nations met to create a framework for coordination per Article 4 of the GCC 
Charter, which calls for integration and internal coordination amongst the 
member states in all areas to achieve regional unity. The preamble of the 
Charter emphasizes certain important issues, such as the special relations, 
common qualities, and similar systems to be established in the member states 
in accordance with the principles of Islam to achieve the primary objectives of 
the Arab nations.211  The creation of the GCC was not a sudden action by the 
member states; rather, it was a historic move that reflected the social and 
cultural reality of the Arab world. The six member states have common 
characteristics, cultural practices, and religious beliefs, and their people have 
strong emotional and kinship relations with each other.  
 
Moreover, they share a strategic location. The GCC region stretches 
from the sea to the desert, along which it provides opportunities for contact, 
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communication, and interaction amongst the citizens of its member states. As 
these citizens adhere to similar values and morals, the GCC reflects age-old 
realities in the region and the evolution of these realities over time whilst 
serving as a practical answer to the threats and challenges posed to its stability 
and security. It also encourages the economic development of the region. The 
citizens of the region now consider that their aspirations have been fulfilled 
through the formation of the GCC, which ultimately reflects Arab unity and 
integrity in accordance with the spirit of Islam.212  
 
 The fundamental objectives of the GCC include the formation and 
establishment of standard regulations and controls in the areas of economics, 
finance, trade, customs, tourism, legislation, and administration. The member 
countries must foster scientific and technical cooperation amongst themselves in 
various industries, mining, agriculture, and water- and animal-resource 
management. They must also encourage cooperation in the private sector and 
strengthen the ties amongst their citizens.213  
 
5.3A Organizational Structure 
 
 Within the GCC, the heads of the member states constitute the Supreme 
Council, the highest GCC authority. The Council has a rotating presidency that 
follows the Arabic alphabetical order of the countries‘ names and holds one 
                                                 
212 Ibid 
213 Ibid. 
 183 
regular session every year, although the member states may request an 
extraordinary session if necessary. In the case of more than one request, the 
sessions are convened in sequence per state. During its 19th Summit, held in 
1998 in Abu Dhabi, the Supreme Council decided that it would hold a 
consultative meeting between two summits. In order to declare a meeting of the 
Supreme Council official or valid, two-thirds of the member states must be in 
attendance. Each member state is granted one vote, and the unanimous 
approval of the attending members is necessary for ratifying resolutions on 
serious and substantive matters. In the case of resolutions of a procedural 
nature, a majority of member states must express their approval.214  
 
5.3B Consultative Commission 
 The Consultative Commission consists of thirty GCC citizens, five of 
whom are from each member state. These representatives are selected on the 
basis of their experience and qualifications to serve for a period of three years. 
The principal task of the Consultative Commission is to study the matters 
referred to it by the Supreme Council.  
 
5.3C Commission for the Settlement of Disputes  
 The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes is established by the 
Supreme Council for every dispute amongst the states. It works on an ad-hoc 
basis and its functionality depends on the nature of the dispute.  
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5.3D Ministerial Council  
 The Ministerial Council is a branch of the Supreme Council, which is 
formed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to act on their behalf. Other ministers 
can also form the Ministerial Council. The member state that had presided over 
the previous ordinary session of the Supreme Council is authorized to hold the 
presidency of the Council. The member state presiding over the next meeting of 
the Supreme Council is also eligible for assuming the presidency of the 
Ministerial Council. Although it meets every three months, the member states can 
request an extraordinary meeting of the Ministerial Council whenever necessary. 
Such requests must be supported by another member state, and two-thirds of the 
member states must declare a meeting of the Ministerial Council valid.215 
 
 The Ministerial Council has wide jurisdiction: It can propose policy matters, 
give recommendations for existing policies, and coordinate activities in several 
areas. The resolutions passed by the Ministerial Committees are transmitted to 
the Ministerial Council, which then refers them to the Supreme Council along with 
its recommendations and suggestions. The other duties of the Ministerial Council 
include the preparation of Supreme Council meeting agendas and arrangement 
of its meetings. The voting procedure of the Ministerial Council is similar to that of 
the Supreme Council.216 
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5.3E Secretariat-General 
 As primary leader of the GCC, the Secretariat-General ensures the 
cooperation, coordination, and integration of plans and programs amongst the 
member states. To do so, he prepares periodic reports on GCC functions as well 
as other reports and studies when required by the Supreme Council or the 
Ministerial Council, ensures the proper implementation of resolutions, and 
arranges Ministerial Council meetings and agendas. The Supreme Council 
appoints the Secretariat-General for a period of three years, a term that can be 
renewed only once for another three years. The Secretariat-General is assisted 
by three Assistant Secretariat-Generals, who address issues pertaining to 
politics, economics, and the military. The Assistant Secretariats-General, the 
delegated authorities of the GCC to Brussels, are nominated by the Secretariat-
General and appointed by the Ministerial Council for a period of three years, 
which can be renewed.217  
 
 The Secretariat-General also appoints the Directors-General of the 
Secretariat-General and other office staff. The Secretariat-General‘s 
administrative structure concerns several areas, including political, economic, 
military, social, environmental, legal, financial, and administrative affairs and the 
offices of the Secretariat-General, the Finance and Patent Bureau, the 
Administrative Development Unit, the Internal Auditing Unit, and the Information 
Centre.  
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5.4 Relations amongst the GCC countries, Global 
Superpowers, and Regional Blocs  
 
Scholars and academicians have approached the subject of GCC 
politics only in terms of foreign and regional power factors. They have 
approached the GCC‘s political interests mainly as they pertain to geopolitics 
and oil resource security. It is important to keep in the mind that the GCC states 
are members of the Arab League and signatories to several institutions 
affiliated with the Arab League. Moreover, they are members of the OIC and 
the Muslim World League in Mecca, whose objective is to promote unity 
amongst Islamic countries.218  
 
 Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam, and the holy places of Mecca 
and Medina are located within its borders. As a sub-regional organization in the 
Arab world, the GCC was formed with the general objective of promoting Arab 
unity as specified by the Charter of the Arab League, promoting the aspirations 
of the Arabs in the region, and adopting and implementing efforts to fortify Arab 
nationalism and the cause of Islam. The oil boom enriched the GCC states, in 
which power and wealth are controlled by governments that concentrate on 
spending their enormous oil-based revenues.  
 
Such revenues lead the GCC governments to differ from Western 
governments. The relationship between the state and society in the GCC states 
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is unique in that there is no necessity for their governments to levy taxes on 
their people; the governments are wealthy enough to create and sustain 
bureaucratic institutions that distribute the fruits of the economy to society. Oil 
revenues reach the state directly without any intermediate intervention by the 
local economy, and the interests of the people are directly fulfilled by the state. 
Power and strength are vested in the state and the ruling families, whose 
citizens are not required to pay taxes for state services. There is no scope for 
domestic competitors, local constituencies, or state bargains with local 
constituencies, as there is with representative forms of government. The aim of 
the GCC governments is to provide their citizens with material benefits in 
exchange for their loyalty towards the state and ruling family. The governments 
enjoy autonomy from society, which enables them to proceed with their goals 
with no interference. As the governments are not accountable to any 
constituency, the relationship between them and society is always 
unidirectional.219 
 
 The GCC states face several challenges to their security. Having 
acquired conventional and non-conventional weapons, they are very concerned 
with the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region and the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons by countries such as Israel, Pakistan, and India. Other 
challenges include the conflict between Israel and Palestine and the increasing 
strength of Israel in the region due to its acquisition of sophisticated weapons 
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from the US. Developments in Afghanistan and Central Asia, as well as 
intensifying Islamic radicalism, also pose serious threats to the GCC.220  
 
The six GCC states are small in comparison to the other nations in the 
region. Furthermore, they are vulnerable to external threats and internal 
challenges to the extant rulers. Their oil reserves, their main source of wealth, 
face depletion with the passage of time, which  poses a major challenge to their 
cooperation. Their policies are founded on the twin issues of regime survival and 
state security. State security can be achieved by balancing the various influential 
factors with the opportunities available to the states and the threats that they 
have to face at the domestic, regional, and international level. Their policymaking 
is also dependent on security arrangements with other nations.  
 
The GCC states have been successful in establishing regional integration, 
but have failed to create a common foreign and security policy. Their partnership 
with the EU, their largest trading partner at the international level, enables them 
to balance and counter the influence of American power over the region. 
Although the EU and the GCC have been proceeding towards the creation of an 
FTA, their progress has been slow and has suffered from numerous delays. In 
reaction, the GCC has adopted certain measures to hasten the process and has 
ratified the 2003 GCC Customs Union Agreement.221 
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 The Clinton and Bush Administrations maintained a similar foreign policy 
towards the Middle East, which called for complete democratization in the region 
in order to ensure free access to oil resources for American companies. The 
Bush policy proposed forceful implementation of democracy in the Middle East. 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq was part of the Bush Administration‘s vision of 
Americanization in the region. Clinton had proposed reforms in education, law, 
economics, politics, and ideology in the Middle East that would have required 
decades to implement. Pollack, an advisor to the Clinton regime, had refused to 
allow rival approaches towards the Middle East that would have increased the 
conflict between Arab nations and the US; as the former have not yet crossed the 
pre-revolutionary stage, rival approaches would almost certainly have incited 
Arab protest against the US.222  
 
5.5 Modernization of GCC Institutions to Increase 
Cooperation and Economic Integration    
 
 
 The GCC states have a population of nearly 35.1 million, of which only 
60% is composed of natives and the remaining 40% composed of foreign 
workers and asylum seekers. Economic analysts forecast that a common 
market would increase the power of the GCC in its negotiations with other 
international bodies and improve the economies of the GCC states.223 The 
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GCC states incur considerable expenditures in strengthening their economies 
and developing their infrastructure. Their governments invest hundreds of 
billions of dollars to create employment opportunities for the younger 
generation. Moreover, they are seeking ways to help customers if their oil 
resources are exhausted, and are already encouraging their customers to 
develop and use alternative energy sources.  
 
To promote domestic tourism, the GCC states are constructing luxurious 
hotels comparable to the best in the world and developing tourist areas as 
tax-free centers for international trade. They are relaxing earlier trade 
restrictions and lifting restrictions relating to foreign ownership to attract 
foreign companies. The GCC states are developing their industries and 
improving their technology. Because industries require low-cost energy 
resources, they are establishing such industries with the technology 
necessary to optimally increase production.224 These measures have 
encouraged a large number of foreign companies to establish branches in the 
GCC states. In the past, international investors had been reluctant to invest 
their money in these states because of their various trade and tax restrictions, 
but now find them lucrative markets for their products.225  
 
 With its duty-free shopping and tax-free trading, Dubai has emerged as 
a regional trade hub. Its airport acts as a critical trade hub in the new Silk 
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Road that links China, India, and North Africa with Europe. Having few oil and 
natural gas resources, Dubai‘s main source of revenue is the Jebel Ali Free 
Zone. Abu Dhabi, the richest of the emirates, has emerged as the UAE‘s 
cultural destination. It houses regional branches of the Guggenheim and 
Louvre museums and is building new theaters for the performing arts.226  
 
The Islamic region is comprised of three major areas encompassing 
forty-seven nations: the GCC states, the non-GCC states of the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region, and non-MENA states.227 According to The 
Banker, a journal that reports on commercial banks, the top five hundred 
Islamic financial institutions in these forty-seven countries have sharia-
compliant assets worth US$500.5 billion. A large portion of this aggregate 
total is owned by financial institutions based of the six GCC states; their share 
comprises 35.6% or US$178.1 billion of the total. Amongst these financial 
institutions, Saudi institutions hold a major portion—nearly 39% of the GCC‘s 
total sharia assets—followed by Kuwait with 21.16%, the UAE with 19.85%, 
Bahrain with 14.74%, and Qatar with 5.31% (Oman‘s percentage was not 
available). In the MENA region, Iranian financial institutions play a dominant 
role, holding 87.44%, estimated at US$154.6 billion, of the US$176.82 billion 
aggregate total of non-GCC assets, and nearly 31% of the total global 
aggregate. Lebanon follows with 7.78%, Egypt with 2.18%, and Jordan with 
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1.49% of MENA assets. Outside of the MENA region, Malaysia has a 
dominant position with 40.72% of total of non-MENA sharia assets.228  
 
 The six states of the GCC aim to establish a common market with an 
economy of US$715 billion. According to Abdulraham al-Attiyah, the 
Secretary General of the GCC, the existence of this common market would 
ensure regional economic cooperation amongst the GCC members and the 
economic  prosperity of their citizens. He described the formation of this 
common market as an historic event in the twenty-one year cooperation 
amongst the GCC states. This common market would ensure the free 
movement of capital and people amongst the nations and allow their people 
the freedom to live and work in the country of their choice. He added that the 
common market would encourage investments and common trade, which 
would strengthen the economic position of the member states. Moreover, this 
common market would represent them in agreements with other international 
organizations such as the EU.229   
   
 Although foreign investors are precluded from investing in the Saudi 
stock market, the Saudi government is inviting FDI for building six special 
economic sites within the vicinity of heavy industries, such as petrochemicals, 
shipping, oil refining, and steel. The Saudi government has established 
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multinational information technology centers within the nation. However, the 
conservative culture of Saudi Arabia is unsuited to international tourism 
because of the numerous restrictions on tourists. For instance, women are 
not allowed to wear shorts or denim jeans in public places and must always 
conform to a dress code that complies with the tenets of Islamic culture. 
However, the not-inconsiderable Islamic tourism provides substantial foreign 
exchange to Saudi Arabia, which houses the holy pilgrimage centers of 
Mecca and Medina.230 
 
Oil is abundant within and synonymous with the GCC states, and their 
economies depend on the production and export of oil. As such, the entire 
region‘s economy has been dependent on the energy sector for decades. At 
present, these states are implementing changes to their traditional approach, 
and this will bring about an economic revolution. These states have begun to 
invest large amounts in the areas of construction and transport with the 
collaboration of foreign investors. Foreign investors are investing large 
amounts on various projects in these states, and the entire region has 
become a haven for investment opportunities.231  
 
 Still, the chief sources of revenue in these countries remain oil and gas. 
The earnings from this sector are deployed for the development of other 
sectors. Oil is required by every nation in the world, and its price has been 
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increasing. The year 2008 witnessed a steep increase in the price of oil, 
reaching US$145 a barrel, whereas it was US$30 a barrel in 2002. The GCC 
governments are investing the revenue that they have earned from high oil 
prices into development projects. Their plan was to reach the US$1 trillion 
mark by the end of 2008. If this target is achieved, then the economy of the 
GCC will be larger than that of South Korea and equal to that of India. This 
steep increase has prompted an investment boom in recent years. The net 
worth of present projects in the Gulf region is expected to be around 
US$1trillion. These projects are incomplete at the moment and only a small 
proportion, namely around 16%, pertain to the energy sector.232  
 
The GCC is investing a major portion of its economic resources in 
construction projects, allocating more than 66% for this purpose. The 
construction work has been subdivided into parts to bring about its speedy 
completion. Much of the construction is of multi-story buildings for office and 
shopping purposes. Dubai has the largest shopping malls in the world, which, 
having become major tourist attractions, have rendered Dubai a major tourist 
destination in the region.  
 
              The GCC has modified its economic policy, and its new economic 
order is evidenced by the extent of its non-oil trade with neighboring 
countries.233 According to Anil Wadhwa, the Indian ambassador to Oman, the 
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non-oil trade between India and Oman reached an all-time high of GBP 2 billion 
at the end of 2008. This figure was US$1.8 billion in 2007, double the total 
trade in 2006. India and Oman have already undertaken joint projects in the 
areas of infrastructure development, real estate, and other construction sectors. 
These sectors have proved to be very important in developing relations 
between these two economies.234  
 
As the situation in the Gulf changes, a  number of foreign companies 
have expressed interest in investing in the region. Even the index fund advisors 
(IFAs) are scrutinizing the economic conditions in the region in order to advise 
their clients to invest in the GCC. Research studies indicate that nearly 84% of 
the IFAs are of the opinion that investing in GCC markets would be profitable 
for their clients. The new economic order of the GCC has proven to be 
especially advantageous to the financial services sector. The GCC is gradually 
becoming more dynamic, which is a positive sign for investors. Despite these 
efforts, the GCC financial market is still considered to be in its nascent stage. In 
the recent past, native Gulf investors migrated to other financial markets, 
including the New York, London, Geneva, and Tokyo markets, instead of 
investing in GCC markets. However, this trend has reversed; domestic 
investors now prefer GCC markets to other markets. These investors consider 
investment in the GCC to be safe and can invest in several sectors.  
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With the cooperation of the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Qatar 
Financial Center conducted a survey with regard to the GCC‘s market position. 
The survey revealed that the demand for financial services within the GCC is 
growing beyond all expectations. On the basis of survey recommendations, the 
Report on Asset Management in the Middle East was drafted, which states that 
GCC markets require the experience of global financial institutions and the 
advice of senior and top-level Western financial managers. An important fact 
revealed by the survey was that nearly 84% of the financial services institutions 
plan to expand their services to cover the entire Middle East region. A majority 
of the participants in the survey stated that they felt secure because of the vast 
wealth of the region and of private individuals. Some 69% of the respondents 
were encouraged by the liberalization of the GCC markets and their efficient 
governance and regulatory systems.235 
 
 The GCC realizes that the development of financial services is not the 
only determinant of its success, and has therefore initiated other important 
developments and projects. The best example is that of Kuwait, which has 
great liquidity in the GCC stock markets. The Kuwaiti markets are open to 
foreign investors and place no restrictions upon their investments. Oil exports 
provide nearly 50% of Kuwait‘s national income, which is diverted to 
development activities in other sectors. The major beneficiary of the oil boom is 
the Kuwaiti banking sector. The country‘s telecommunications sector is very 
technologically advanced. Its mobile telephone network, considered one of 
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most sophisticated in the world, covers 90% of its population, which was 
extended to the entire population at the end of 2008.236 
  
Kuwait has also undertaken the construction of large-scale projects, 
including that of the Madinatal-Hareer or the City of Silk, a real estate project 
that is the largest project of its kind in the entire Middle East, with an estimated 
cost of US$77 billion. The real estate sector is the second largest source of 
revenue for Kuwait, recording property transactions of US$1.1 billion in April 
2007 and experiencing an average growth of 85%. The reasons for this 
extraordinary growth are the population explosion and the limited land available 
for use. As the demand for housing increases due to increases in the Kuwaiti 
population, Kuwaitis are changing their perceptions about housing, with the 
younger generation desiring to live independently of their parents and other 
relatives. In the past, families lived communally, but demographic changes 
have encouraged the younger generation to live independently.237  
 
 The other rapidly growing industry in Kuwait is the transport industry, in 
which it has invested hundreds of billions of dollars. Kuwait has one of the 
world‘s largest and most comprehensive and advanced transport systems,238 
which includes seven airports. As the regional destination for commerce, 
Kuwait requires such a well-planned transport infrastructure. Being situated 
between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq, Kuwait acts as a commercial hub for the 
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financial institutions and markets of these three nations. As home to the largest 
shipping industry in the Persian Gulf, Kuwait has upgraded its seaports to 
accommodate larger cargo vessels. The traffic at these seaports is always 
brisk, and in some areas has recently doubled.  
 
 All six GCC states are developing rapidly in all aspects. As all have a 
young and numerous workforce, there is no dearth of educated and skilled 
youth in the region. Increased investment in infrastructure will create 
endogenous growth and a more diversified economy. The success and growth 
of the Kuwait Stock Exchange has attracted foreign direct investments, which 
has increased liquidity. The first exchange traded fund (ETF) investment, made 
in July 2008 in the Kuwait Stock Exchange, is considered a model of liquidity 
and greater transparency. Due to these characteristics, the ETF is considered 
the standard of investment, and prospective investors look for the ETF mark 
before investing. As such, ETF investment in the Kuwait stock market was a 
landmark event.239 In addition, ETFs attract a larger number of investors 
because they enable investors across the world to access the market in which 
they have invested. This renders markets more trustworthy for investments and 
provides the same standards as do other international markets. It is anticipated 
that other ETFs will enter the GCC markets because of the interest being 
displayed by foreign investors.240  
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The GCC states, including their businesses, banks, and government 
agencies, are investing large amounts in Asian markets. Dubai is concentrating 
its investments in Pakistan, where it plans to invest US$2 billion. The other 
countries of interest to investors are China, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 
Some investors have shown interest in state-sponsored national projects in 
Jordan, Egypt, and North Africa. The poorer states in the Middle East region 
have been ignored by the GCC. Persia, Mesopotamia, the Maghreb, Syria, and 
Egypt were once the centers of civilization, but the GCC states have no interest 
in them.241  
 
In order to overcome this problem and attract investment, Egypt is 
changing its economic policies. Spreading the GCC economic boom would help 
the region prosper, and the growth of the Egyptian economy would be of great 
significance to the region. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Egypt has recently recorded a 5.2% growth in its economy and its economic 
reforms have gained international acclaim. It reforms in real estate, finance, 
and law have resulted in the emergence of a new class of Egyptian business 
tigers and allowed the middle class to purchase homes. 
 
There is lack of consensus amongst the member states of the GCC with 
regard to several issues. For instance, the member states have differences 
regarding the provision of funds for the security of the region, particularly the 
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physical implementation of security projects. In addition, they have different 
foreign policies and political agendas. For instance, Kuwait insists upon the 
presence of US and UK troops on its soil, whereas the Saudi government is 
against the deployment of foreign troops on its soil. In fact, it has categorically 
refused to allow foreign troops into its territory,242 instead aiming to increase its 
own armed troops, which it plans to double to 250,000 in the next five years. If 
this is achieved, then military adjustments within the GCC would need to take 
on new dimensions in order to maintain balance within the GCC.  
 
In such a situation, the GCC nations would have to depend on the 
support of the Western countries for arms supply and planning. At present, the 
US and UK ground troops are ready to leave Kuwait and Saudi Arabia has 
clarified its stance regarding foreign troops on its territory. Therefore, the 
ground troops must leave the Gulf region. However, the naval forces of the US 
and the UK will remain in the Gulf. These countries, the US and the UK, would 
significantly strengthen their involvement in the naval forces. The US has 
already stationed an aircraft carrier and a Marine amphibious unit in the Gulf, 
and it plans to extend its operational zone to Bahrain and, if possible, Saudi 
Arabia.243  
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The Iraq-Iran War influenced all the nations in the region to a significant 
extent. Although the GCC states suffered the effects of a protracted war, they 
were successful in ensuring that their cooperation in the economic field 
remained unaffected. Their cooperation was reinforced by the founders of the 
GCC, who called for the containment of the Islamic Revolution, as doing so 
would enhance social and economic relations and cooperation amongst the 
states in the region. They realize that in order to survive the depletion of their 
oil resources, economic cooperation is essential.244  
 
The Iraq-Iran war affected the economic policies of the GCC states to a 
considerable extent. For instance, the major projects of constructing an oil 
refinery in Oman and a joint pipeline were terminated. There were several 
rounds of negotiations for these projects by the concerned governments. Oil 
revenues declined due to the fear of war spreading throughout the region. 
Economic cooperation schemes were initiated to cope with the situation, 
although some have argued that the war was not the primary factor in the 
formation of such cooperative ties. The economic cooperative schemes 
included the establishment of the Gulf organization for investments, the 
removal of internal customs and taxes, and the creation of common external 
tax regimes.245  
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 The GCC states did not adopt these economic reforms until its sixth 
summit meeting because their leaders doubted the viability of these new 
economic policies. Their chief preoccupation was the outcome of the war on 
their economies and projects. In addition to the war, these states were under 
the threat of internal revolution. Thus, they had to protect themselves from this 
threat and cooperate with each other to enhance their internal security. The 
GCC states were successful in this effort, successfully stopping a Bahraini plot 
in which Islamic terrorists made several attempts to overthrow the government 
and indulged in a number of acts of terrorism. These terrorist attacks were 
sponsored and supported by Iran, which had emerged as the mastermind 
behind the export of Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism to other 
states.246  
 
 Saudi Arabia entered into four security arrangements and proposed a 
draft multilateral security agreement with the other GCC states, with the 
exception of Kuwait. All these efforts were aimed at protecting the six GCC 
states from internal revolution after the war had ended. They exchanged riot 
control equipment; shared information provided by their intelligence bureaus; 
demonstrated training techniques; and imposed severe restrictions on the 
issuance of visas, travel between states, and the publication of news.  
 
The six GCC states have different demographic, social, economic, and 
political problems that could lead to political fragility and instability in the Gulf 
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region. It is therefore not surprising that there is a well-founded fear that Islamic 
fundamentalists and terrorists could take advantage of their situation. In order 
to counter the possibility of exploitation in the name of Islam, these six states 
have implemented several deterrents, such as detection, detainment, and 
punishment polices regarding terrorists. These operations, launched during the 
first five years of GCC functioning, have proved to be effective in controlling 
political violence and acts of terrorism.247  
                                                 
247 Ibid,. 
 204 
Chapter 6 
 
6. Conclusions -The Middle East in the New World Order 
 
 The notion of a new world order, pioneered into the glossary of 
international politics with the decline of communism in Eastern Europe, was 
powerfully raised by President George Bush in response to the Gulf crisis. 
Hence, the closing stages of the Cold War and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 
August 1991 represent the historical beginning for the concept. This indicates at 
least two breadths in its significance, namely, the termination of an international 
order settled on by the tussle for dominance between the United States and the 
Soviet Union; and the commencement of U.S. foreign policy principles on the 
basis of U.S. hegemony in the global order.  
 
 However, political movements in the Middle East after the Gulf War can be 
examined from three levels of analysis frameworks of the international system, 
the regional or subordinate system, and the local or domestic system. The 
current remarkable global transformations in the international system deeply 
affected the regional system of the Middle East and decisively influenced its 
politics.   
 
 The final stages of the cold war in 1989 paved the way for a U.S. leading 
unipolar global system in the 1990s. The political collapse of the USSR 
strengthened that upshot. Related with this, U.S. foreign policy necessitated to 
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readjust from one adjusted to the global movements and aspirations of the Soviet 
Union to one with fresh descriptions of security and political motives.248  
 
 The long-term prospect of the international system is possibly to be one of 
a regionally anchored multipolarity, for instance, Germany in Europe, Japan and 
China in Asia, and Russia in Eurasia. Such super powers‘ motives are probable 
to contend in third regions, for instance, the United States and Russia in the 
Middle East and Japan and China in Southeast Asia. Hence, the present-day 
unipolarity of the global system embodies a possible midway stage from 
bipolarity to a likely regionally founded multipolarity.249     
 
 Not astonishingly, a midway unipolarity in the global system has collided 
on the international subordinate system of the Middle East, indicating a 
comparable state of changeover there, too. The regional system of the Middle 
East was distinct in its association to the global system for the historical strength 
of superpower intervention and for the less-reliant character of that intervention. 
The high degree of domestic clashes, such as the Palestinian concern, Lebanon 
and the Gulf accompanied with geopolitical and energy reserve features, at all 
times gained strong superpower intervention. Rarely, nevertheless, were the 
superpowers proficient to identify foreign policy of the Middle East.250 Such an 
invasive mechanism mandated by external superpowers on regional players 
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might be distinguishing attribute of most regional systems across the globe; 
however, the Middle East already had escaped this domineering type of 
association. The termination of superpower bipolarity in the global system leads 
to the possibility for greater influence of the superpower. In the nonexistence of a 
regional player to execute one power off in opposition to another, the solitary 
superpower has turned out to be more important.   
 
 The unipolar nature of this interfering system might have an alleviating 
effect if U.S. foreign policy sustains its activity in the region, and if that policy is 
believed to be seeking an impartial resolution to the Palestinian dilemma or other 
equally particular problems. In simple terms, the U.S. attempt to parlay the 
military triumph of the allied federation of the Gulf War into a political one is a 
conditional issue.251 If U.S. policy falls short to be unbiased, then U.S. supremacy 
will collapse, and the system will probably revert to the more provincial interests 
of the states even while the United States sustains its regionally committed 
security and economic aid, particularly to Israel and Egypt. Unipolar interference 
is hence a provisional status.  
 
 More particularly, foreign policy of the U.S. in the Middle East already 
concentrated on rejecting the region to the USSR, assuring right to use and 
exploit its oil reserves, upholding the security of Israel, and using the pathways of 
sea and air routes that traverse the sea. With the weakening of the Russian 
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intimidation in the region, the most significant issue at present is oil, even though 
the security of Israel is still a relevant issue.   
 
 Throughout the Cold War, Israel was perceived as not just a liability but a 
strategic advantage point. In the aftermath of the Cold War, this ceased to be the 
case, as shown in the Gulf War. Even though Israel experienced missile attack, it 
was significant that it stay a non-combatant in order not to incapacitate the 
alliance of Arab states made parallel with the United States. The pathways of sea 
and air communication were an essential guarantee as component of secured 
ties between the US and Egypt. The highlight on oil in US policy led to the 
defence of the Gulf region with military protection rather than the expansion of 
important political ambassadorial terms for the region. Nevertheless, the strength 
and stability of the Middle East is of main significance and post-Gulf War US 
policy did determine a number of objectives: a defence command in that ―sub 
region, arms control, the Palestinian question, and economic development.‖252    
       
 The Palestinian crisis appears to be the Gordian knot that must be 
severed to attain regional strength and stability, guarantee of the defence of 
Israel, a resolution to arms production, and probable economic reallocation and 
redistribution in the region. Thus, a peace agreement must be precedence in 
present-day U.S. policy.         
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6.1 Middle East and Gulf Interdependencies 
 There was always a predisposition on the division of US policy to detach 
the political sector of the Gulf from those of the entire Middle East. Expressive of 
this has been the Gulf-oriented character of US policy. It is the oil of the Gulf and 
the safety of responsive states that have been the centre of US policy.    
 
 Even though the United States believed that the Gulf took action 
autonomously of the Middle East, there are, in reality, five aspects that reject this 
principle. The primary concern, which is often taken for granted, is the regional 
foreign policy objectives of Gulf and non-Gulf Arab countries and the 
materialization of a regional multipolar, possibly Egyptian, hegemonic scheme. In 
the case in point of the Gulf States, the progressing exhilaration of the Gulf War 
should not forget the reality that Saudi and other leadership in the Gulf relied for 
their authority on advocating the Palestinian movement as an Arab basis and 
reclaiming Jerusalem as an Islamic justification.253 Toward this objective, money 
surges outward in vast quantities from Saudi Arabia to Islamic organizations all 
over the Arab and Islamic world.  
 
 More significant is the Egyptian belief of its accepted hegemonic 
leadership position in the Middle East including the Gulf. In the latter instance, its 
convincing military position in Desert Storm embraced the guarantee of a 
regional joint security function in the Gulf, which hitherto has been rejected in 
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support of the United States. The wider indication is that currently there is a force 
at work in the Middle East circling around the surfacing of a multi-polar regional 
global system wherein Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia are contemporary players, 
but wherein Iran and later on Iraq will be important actors.      
 
 A second regional aspect is that the states of the Gulf are reliant upon 
legitimate premises of political authority, which is similar with the entire region. 
Two interrelated subordinate issues bind in with political authority. One of these 
is the unsettled character of the Palestinian concern. Before August 1990, the 
states of the Gulf addressed this issue mainly through public speaking and 
encompassing financial backing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). 
A further concern is that thousands of Palestinians were received for their 
proficient and competent skills as workers and employees in both the private and 
public sectors within the Gulf area. When the PLO accepted Saddam Hussein, 
these ties were cut off with an as yet anonymous possibility for insecurity. The 
Palestinians were afterwards driven out from the Gulf together with highly 
competent and highly skilled Jordanian labourers.254 In the short run, antagonistic 
sentiment in the states of the Gulf has approved of these decisions and actions, 
but they might contribute to the decline of authority in the long run.    
 
 In addition to the diplomatic features of the authority issue and its 
possibility for Gulf state insecurity, there has been a further associated aspect of 
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economic allocations to the nonpetroleum-generating nations in the form of 
transfers of funds by Jordanians and Palestinians. The abrupt cutting off of these 
transfers after the Gulf War is conveying a destructive impact on the economies 
of Jordan and the Occupied Territories, elevating the potentialities for insecurities 
there as well.255 
 
 The more expansive regional framework impacts the Gulf in a fourth 
manner: US power forecasts and the necessity to sustain productive relations 
with main Middle Eastern states so as to obtain air and sea passageways lest of 
a critical build-up. Egypt is perhaps the single most vital country in the Middle 
East in this consideration. Its massive size and geopolitical sites in northeast 
Africa and the eastern Mediterranean establish it a tactical air route, and its 
power over the Suez Canal guarantees its essentiality with respect to sea 
routes.256       
 
 A further aspect links to military self-assured presence and prepositioning. 
With regard to the former, the political sector of the Middle East is predisposed to 
rule out this alternative. The experience of colonialism and the power of 
nationalism prevent all apart from the most so-called self-assured presence, such 
as the sea plane headquarters of the US Navy erected in Bahrain in the pre-Gulf 
War. In the joviality of the sudden post-Gulf War Middle East there was a 
discussion of such a self-assured presence, but this ebbed even while hearsays 
                                                 
255 Ibid,.  
256 Ibid, p. 130. 
 
 211 
continued of an underground US military presence in the eastern region of Saudi 
Arabia. Historically, underground pre-positioning as a most likely less challenging 
policy than self-assured presence proved unworkable in the Middle East. One 
case in point is the much debated Ras Bannas military headquarters in Southern 
Egypt in the eighties. The single underground pre-positioning likely thus far was 
in Israel, but the employment of such objects in a regional disagreement would 
have a political accountability similar to that of potential Israeli involvement in 
Desert Storm. Underground pre-positioning in Turkey and, to a progressively 
more restricted extent, Egypt is politically more practicable. The newly settled on 
bilateral agreements with Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait and comparable contracts 
with other Gulf States are notable for their public nature and bear prospective 
destabilizing baggage.257       
 
 Associated to the abovementioned is the replacement for a type of self-
assured presence and nonviolent endeavour through sporadic operations and 
collective manoeuvres. Egypt, once again, is descriptive in this consideration. 
Generally, sporadic operation of US forces in Egypt took place that were in 
principle outside of the authority of Egypt, as contingent- sized divisions 
consigned as UN ceasefire supervisory divisions in the Sinai. Moreover, the 
collective manoeuvres of Operation Bright Star were conducted in almost 
secrecy with the aid of the local Egyptian media, out of esteem for Egyptian local 
political sentiments. Gulf leadership, even though not disturbed by the concern of 
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a free press as the case for Egypt, can still feel politically defenceless. Kuwait 
has allowed significant collective manoeuvres, such as those that took place in 
the heat of 1992.258  
  
6.2  Regional Defence Command for the Gulf 
 Consideration to a home-grown and joint regional collective defence 
seems to be a missing link between the national safety interests of the United 
States and defence assistance as a way of enhancing military potency. The 
current policy of considerable levels of defence assistance and US force 
engagements indicates an extent of redundancy. The former appears to reject 
the indispensability for the latter. This letdown to deal with the potentialities of 
regional defence agreements rather than US force assures additionally 
demonstrates that the United States is not backing up regional self-governance.     
  
 At an Arab summit convention in Syria in 1991, a Damascus Declaration 
was released that appealed for Egypt and Syria to take in defence 
accountabilities in the Gulf. Since that event, nonetheless, this native Arab 
approach was secretly discarded in support of a popular US function in Gulf 
defence, which consequently was complemented by a Saudi resolution to 
increase its force levels and become progressively more independent. The 
justification for the obvious desertion of an Egyptian and Syrian role in the Gulf 
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likely manifests a traditional Saudi Arabian anxiety of Egyptian supremacy. It is 
better to accept a US pledge that could technically be tripped back over the 
horizon than an Egyptian pledge with its assistant political dominance and 
assistant intimidating republican non-monarchical philosophies.259          
  
6.3 Subordinate Systems Relations 
 There are far-reaching changes at work contained in the regional system. 
The most wide-ranging change is that Islamism was appended to its elementary 
Arabism. Islam, the more homogenizing occurrence, abridged the estrangement 
of two of its marginal states, Iran and Turkey. In the case of the latter, growing 
local religious attitude made the nation amenable to Islamic cultural influences 
and prompted Turkish policy to more and more reflect of itself as a mediator 
between the Middle East and the West. This was bolstered by a Turkish 
awareness that its prospects for European Community affiliation was almost 
certainly weakening. This sentiment as well played as a limitation on Turkish 
policy in the latest Gulf War.260        
 
 The experience of Iran was more intense. ―Whether in Lebanon in the 
front ranks against Israel or in the Gulf where Islamic solidarity was used to 
ameliorate Arab Gulf state fears even while its Shiism acted in the opposite 
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direction, Iran had now joined the core grouping of Middle East states.‖261 In the 
centre, the International Islamic Conference Organization, which is composed of 
all Islamic nations in the world, made possible Egypt‘s readmission into the state 
system of the Arabs, and Saudi financial assistances to Islamic groups in other 
nations flourish. Most significantly, the Israeli invasion of the places of worship of 
Jerusalem awakened Islamic sentiment in all states of the Middle East and 
organizations on the Palestinian concern.      
 
 The Gulf War, and the particular Arab alliance progressed to fulfil it, 
persists to have diplomatic rebound although the rebound may be weakening in 
energy, and previous alignments may be resurfacing as fresh ones emerge. 
Among the previous alignments are Saudi provisos regarding Syrian and 
Egyptian aspirations, which have consequently rejected those countries an 
imperative defence force contribution in the Gulf. Furthermore, Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia cooperated with Syria in reinstating diplomatic attachments with Iran. Iran 
as a vital Gulf War patron is addressed so as to hamper its possibility for Gulf 
hegemony. Lebanon resurfaced and was secured through its re-establishment as 
a sphere of influence of Syria; this led to the resolution of the disagreement in 
Lebanon, with the omission of the Israeli occupation of the southern portion of 
the country.262     
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 A foremost contradiction is that even while the management of the PLO 
and Intifada were in disorder, the Palestinian dilemma was activated by the US 
diplomatic proposal that tried to enlarge upon the spectacle of a military triumph 
in driving out Iraq from Kuwait in the Gulf War. However, Iraq still maintains a 
significant conservative fighting force and Saddam Hussein retains his power. 
There is a possibility US domestic political concern of precisely what the war 
attained. Hence, the connection concern of the Palestinians that was rejected by 
the United States throughout the war is being dealt with: to secure the region for 
defence and safety reasons, to expand for US domestic political justifications the 
claims of victory in the Gulf War, and to moderate the wartime Arab supporters of 
the United States. Therefore, the new alignments, particularly of Egyptian, Syrian 
and intra-Arab coalition, are maintained by the challenging peace initiative. 
 
 In the perspective of the abovementioned, Iraq‘s defeat fell short to amend 
regional global relationships and hence could not oblige its determination on the 
Gulf and Palestinian concern. With two omissions, the US headed allied success 
brought back Middle Eastern associations to their pre-Gulf War status. The 
omissions are Iran and Israel; they are the champions in the Gulf War in that their 
similar opponent, Iraq, has been defeated at negligible lost to themselves. Yet 
while they can be recipients, the inactivity of Israel‘s settlement policy lingers a 
destabilizing force, nevertheless, and Iran‘s Gulf policy is unknowable. Mutually 
destabilizing could be the dominance of more deep-seated regimes in chief Arab 
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nations and their probable acquisition of the ―missile guide systems and smart 
weapons technology that are present in the international arms market.‖263                
  
6.4 Military Disadvantage 
 In 1981, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was founded which includes 
the monarchies of the Arab Gulf of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Oman. Even though the GCC acquired too much 
controversy, border conflicts have plagued members; the GCC has been 
powerless to provide for affiliated states‘ defence with no outside support; 
procedures toward economic integration have consumed much more time than 
the concerned individuals of the Gulf had estimated; it has been confirmed to be 
the most resilient and successful of the Arab regional alliances that surfaced in 
the 1980s.264       
 
 In its inauguration in May 1981, the GCC did not particularly determine 
military security as one of the reasons for regional cooperation. Due to its military 
disadvantages, the council take on that strategy so as to evade raising 
apprehension among its ruthless neighbours. However, South Yemen was 
evidently a menace to Oman and, in the concluding phase of 1981, a coup d‘état 
occurred in Bahrain. In the opening of 1982, the defence ministers of the member 
states conducted their initial multilateral convention. Those episodes were 
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accomplished in the establishment of a Military Committee within the secretariat 
of the GCC.265 Hence, the security issue emerged to the front position as an 
outcome of external and internal matters alike.       
   
 In aiming toward a coherent and integrated command system, the GCC 
started working on a collaborative strike force by the middle of the eighties. At the 
latter part of October, the Peninsula Shield collaborative exercises in the western 
part of Abu Dhabi predicted the Gulf States‘ own rapid deployment force (RDF). 
In 1984, the GCC made public a contract among its constituents to form an RDF. 
That same year, the Peninsula Shield II collaborative exercises in north-eastern 
Saudi Arabia integrated parachute landings for the purposes of rapid 
deployment. Nonetheless, the predicaments of the 1980s persist to trouble the 
GCC in the advent of the 1990s.266        
 
 Primarily, the centralized forces of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the 
Union Defence Force, are outdone by rivalling military divisions of the seven 
emirates. The dispersed command orientation, manifesting suspicions among the 
component political units, does not allow the UAE to completely enhance its 
military prospect. Moreover, the military forces of Qatar, UAE and Bahrain are 
mainly prearranged to play an in-house policing function. Specifically, Qatar and 
Bahrain have extremely restricted military capacities; their inputs within the GCC 
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are representational.267 Also, deficiency in manpower afflicts all of the members 
of the GCC in sending their armed forces.   
 
 At its centre, the formula of GCC security lies with Saudi Arabia. 
Nevertheless, that nation does not possess military competences to single-
handedly safeguard the Gulf. Whereas the Saudis have laboured to conquer 
regionalism, the aristocrat family is cautious of the possible threat to its own 
preservation and survival from a massive experienced military force. This is a 
logical concern provided that the military‘s proclivity for challenging to remove 
from power monarchies in the Middle East. Furthermore, the belief about the 
security umbrella of the Saudis differs inside the GCC. While Qatar and Bahrain 
depend on the Saudi air-resistance scheme, the UAE has a critical concern 
regarding the satisfactoriness of the Saudi shield. Moreover, not merely did the 
GCC fell short to play a successful role in frustrating the tanker war in Iran, Saudi 
Arabia itself experienced serious damages. For instance, in 1984, a Saudi oil 
tanker named the Al Ahood, was destroyed by an Iraqi missile while it was about 
to abandon the Iranian oil station at the opening of the Gulf. That same year, a 
super tanker from Saudi was aimed at by unknown planes off the coast of 
Saudi.268    
 
 At a convention in May 1984 in Riyadh, the GCC expressed disapproval of 
Iranian assaults against their oil tankers. In that instance, the GCC contested 
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direct American intervention and raised the concern at the Arab League and 
United Nations. Nevertheless, throughout the 1987-88, at the advising of the 
government of Kuwait, the U.S. Joint Task Force Middle East accompanied 
reflagged oil tankers of Kuwait against the attacks from Iran. Moreover, at some 
stage in 1990-91 turmoil, the GCC created an official appeal to the Bush 
administration to be involved or intervene in opposition to the hostilities of the 
Iraqis.269             
 
 After the 1991 Operation Desert Storm, the prosperous Arab sheikdoms 
forcefully set out on a shopping binge for technologically advanced and high-end 
weapons. The proceeds earned from the exportation of oil will allow the chief 
members of the GCC to purchase more and more weapons in spite of their 
pressing cash-flow setbacks. The Saudi administration, in 1993, released $35 
billion which comprises 66.7 percent of its budget, for defence. Even though King 
Fahd made public a roughly 20 percent cut in the 1994 budget of the country, the 
decision accomplished little to lessen Saudi Arabia‘s relative allocation of military 
disbursements. Although confronting a $780 million debit, the government of 
Oman allocated $1.5 billion in 1994 which comprises 30 percent of the nation‘s 
resources, for defence.270   
 
 Despite of the weapons acquisitions, the RDF of GCC is basically 
symbolic. It is on no account an effective tool for either prevention or defence. It 
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is not astonishing that Kuwait settled on to unilaterally fortifies its defensive outer 
limits after the Operation Desert Storm in 1991. In 1993, the government of 
Kuwait proclaimed plans to establish a security channel along its border with Iraq 
determined by the 1992 U.N. Border Commission. Nevertheless, Kuwait will 
necessitate more that a channel for self-defence if reclamation of territory is 
reawakened in the future.271         
     
 ―Despite the thorny issue of Palestinian self-rule, the security dangers to 
 the GCC in recent years have not emanated from the non-Muslim 
 countries, near or distant.‖272 
 
Paradoxically, it was because of the Kuwaiti resistance that the GCC failed to 
concur on a joint defence agreement in 1984. Hence, a regional force was 
established with no corresponding security paradigm.    
 In spite of the problematic issue of Palestinian autonomy, the security 
perils to the GCC in the recent decade have not originated from the non-Islamic 
countries, near or remote. Instead, the intimidation has shifted from the council‘s 
two most influential and determined Muslim neighbours, Iraq and Iran. The 
situation is intensified by a stream of public opinion against Western incursion in 
the Middle East that perceives the dominant political regimes with contempt. 
Incapable to unilaterally put an end to military defiance from either neighbour, the 
GCC is confronted with an important dilemma. Pledged to ―serve Arab and 
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Islamic causes,‖273 the organization discovers it politically revolting to accept 
assistance from the militarily commanding, non-Muslim West. The problem is 
specifically severe for Saudi Arabia, the foundation of the GCC, as guardian of 
the two holiest places of pilgrimage in Islam. As a matter of fact, in King Fahd in 
October 1986 declared himself guardian of the Two Holy Mosques in the threat 
of the Islamic Puritanism advocated by the administration of Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini in Iran.274        
  
6.5 Political Incongruity of Western Security 
 Whereas extents of bilateral military associations by individual nations 
have been present throughout time with Western powers, there is hardly any 
agreement over joint ties to major powers. Since British removal in 1971 from the 
Persian Gulf, there has been a transition to depend on the United States for 
defence aid. On the one hand, with the earliest military establishment in the Gulf, 
Oman has traditionally been the most accommodating of defence collaboration 
with the West. On the contrary, favouring a nonaligned disposition, Kuwait has 
historically preferred a halfway policy in relation to the major powers. 
Nevertheless, Iranian assaults on its oil tankers in the eighties and the Iraqi 
invasion in 1990 compelled Kuwait to rethink its posture concerning Western 
security protection.275   
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 Even though the Operation Desert Shield in 1990 is attributed with 
safeguarding Saudi Arabia, some intellectuals perceive the 1990-91 Gulf War as 
a proof to the letdown of America‘s protracted prevention in safeguarding Kuwait. 
An effective prevention deserves the integration of a plausible disciplinary threat 
in instances of policy failure. While a ‗trip-wire‘ protection would improve 
prevention, an RDF is fundamental if prevention falls short. The logistics of rapid 
deployment are enhanced thru the prepositioning of armaments and forces. The 
Riyadh Declaration in 1991 by the GCC nations sustained by the Bush 
government‘s post-Desert-Storm paradigm for a lasting security agreement 
between the United States and Arab coalition members that are opposed to 
Iraq.276 The scheme involved conditions for collective military exercises and a 
prolonged dedication of US naval forces in the Gulf.    
 Syria and Egypt have articulated reluctances regarding different security 
agreements in the Middle East. Throughout the 1990 Operation Desert Storm, for 
instance, Syria intimidated to embargo the US-headed anti-Iraq alliance if Israel 
turned out to be included in the operation. Even Saudi Arabia was anxious about 
the involvement of Israel aggravating Islamic radicalism in support of Saddam 
Hussein. Prior to that, in 1988, President Mubarak presented an offer to supply 
additional military advisers and gears to the sheikhdoms of the Gulf, but only in 
compensation for petro-dollar ventures in the arms industry of Egypt. Nonexistent 
satisfactory financial agreements, Cairo consequently demonstrated limited 
predisposition to send substantial population of ground troops to Saudi Arabia.277  
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 Nonetheless, the Egyptian administration concurred to sustain its forces in 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait under the agreement with the GCC and Syria in March 
1991. Though, that security polity in the post-Desert-Storm was overturned by 
the Mubarak regime two months later with the extraction of thousands of 
Egyptian troops assigned in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.278      
 
 The change of direction in Egyptian policy could be credited to, primarily, 
antipathy over the GCC‘S hesitance to put into effect the Pan-Arab security 
agreement. Historically, not merely Iran and Iraq, but as well Egypt and Syria 
have demonstrated regional political goals; hesitant to station Syrian and 
Egyptian forces on their homeland, the GCC preferred for the ‗over the horizon‘ 
security agreements with the United States. Second, conflict developed over 
reparation for Egypt‘s involvement in the anti-Iraqi coalition. The circumstance 
was aggravated by the failure of Kuwait to award renovation contracts to 
companies in Egypt. Third, the government of Egypt was anxious about potential 
Iranian involvement in a regional security command, specifically since Iran was 
not an affiliate of the anti-Iraqi alliance. Moreover, Egypt believed Iranian 
participation as a defiance to Egypt‘s restored political power over Arab security 
matters.         
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 ―The GCC is not strong enough to defend its members from either Iran or 
Iraq, and entertaining the notion of dual containments is, at best, wishful 
thinking.‖ 279   
 
 In any instance, the GCC is not adequately well-built to protect its 
members from either Iraq or Iran, and thinking about the concept of ‗dual 
containment‘ is merely a wishful thinking. Moreover, the monarchies of the Gulf 
are unstable concerning their political prospect with a Pan-Arab agreement 
where military could depend with nations outside the sheikhdoms. Also, while the 
US protection indemnity is militarily more promising, it is politically expensive for 
the continuing stability of the Gulf administrations.       
 
6.6 The Future of Regional and Sub regional 
Organization in the Middle East 
 
 The future of regional and sub regional organization in the Middle East 
cannot be separated from an examination of the structure that is theoretically be 
regulated. The Gulf Crisis experienced an overwhelming blow to the constitution 
of the regional system, emphasizing its intense deficiencies. The disapproval in 
which the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) was embraced, the incapability of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to guarantee the protection of its members, and 
the immobility of the supreme regional institution, the League of Arab States 
(LAS), provide expressive substantiation of the failure of the organization and its 
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system. Observing this mediocre performance, regional players have previously 
started to form new associations among themselves and with outside players. 
The most critical concern about the organization of contemporary Middle East is, 
hence, future-focused: What features are more probable to define the region‘s 
future organization at both the regional and sub regional levels?  
 
 An investigation of this issue demands consideration of the developments 
that started to occur in the months after the Gulf War. Specific inclination is made 
here to the renewed Middle East peace procedure, initiated in 1991. Bilateral 
agreements are now occurring between Israel and Arab nations whose territories 
it occupy, and multilateral discussions on issues of primary concern for the region 
are as well being embraced. Participants to these discussions include nations 
from outside the region.      
 
 These new dealings will perhaps have a say in the moulding of new 
structures. New players have inched their way into the Arab system or have been 
requested to participate in it. The future constitution of the system at both the 
regional and sub regional levels will substantially be the outcome of issues 
presented in the new dealings and of requirements designed by regional and 
extra regional players.      
 
 In deliberating the possible prospective regional and sub regional 
organization of the Middle East, one can carry on with two stages. Primarily, one 
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can address the two challenges that formed the Middle East‘s present-day 
dynamics, namely, the Gulf Crisis and the peace procedures in the Middle East. 
And secondly, one can turn to the concerns and requirements confronted by the 
system. Future players are recognized, and the presentation of current Arab 
establishments evaluated. If the latter cannot be carried out it will have to be 
addressed by novel structures. It is anticipated that this mechanism will tolerate 
the potential novel countenance of the Arab system at both the regional and sub 
regional levels to be more or less outlined.      
  
6.7 Challenges to the Middle East Cooperation System 
 Whether the outburst of the Gulf Crisis in 1990 led to shortages in the 
Arab system or from a decision made by the administration of Iraq and forced 
upon the whole Arab world is questionable. Indications of progress in cooperation 
and relations among Arab nations before the crisis can be mentioned. Among 
these are the regulation of open disagreement, the alleviation of inter-Arab 
differences and conflicts, and the putting together of a mounting Arab agreement 
on the Iraq-Iran War as well as the Arab-Israeli conflict.   
    
 Nevertheless, considering the crisis as the result of the shortages of the 
system also are present. A number of planned and scheduled Arab summits 
were not realized or convened. Inter-Arab military clashes had not been 
completely settled. The Syrian-Iraqi conflict still opposed all attempts at 
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negotiation and had discovered additional room in a war by substitute in 
Lebanon.   
 
 In any instance, the 1990 Baghdad Summit had been the site of an 
animated debate between moderates and extremists. In the end, the former gave 
way and approved to create decisions in medium borrowed from the Iraqi 
president‘s speech. They had favoured to give way on the various concerns 
under debate rather than shoot up inter-Arab conflicts.280 By opposition, Iraq‘s 
bearing indicated its inclination for confrontation. When it attacked Kuwait, 
Baghdad took response on this inclination.        
 
 The Gulf Crisis divided the Arab system into two nearly equivalent parts. A 
joint approach was temporarily pursued. The Council of the League of Arab 
States, on August 3, conducted an emergency conference at the ministerial level. 
Simultaneously, foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) held 
their own convention. A mini-summit was to be assembled in Riyadh the next 
day, but it did not happen. A numerous other bilateral and multilateral 
conventions occurred until a summit convention was held in August 9 and 10 in 
Cairo, but nothing benefitted. Undoubtedly, in the period between the 
conventions of August 3 and August 10, the population of countries advocating 
arguments against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and appealing for the extraction 
of Iraqi troops was reduced from fourteen to twelve. Protests, nonparticipation, 
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and reservations had elevated.281 The Arab summit not merely fell short to find 
an answer to the predicament but as well accomplished the divergence within the 
Arab system.     
 
 In the face of the limitation of regional organizations, and provided with the 
premeditated significance of the Gulf sub region, the global system assumed 
responsibility over the management and mitigation of the crisis; Iraq‘s occupation 
of Kuwait foreshadowed a complete upheaval within the Arab system, one bound 
for effecting a fundamental transformation in its membership. It is simply natural 
that the endeavoured revolution‘s military disappointment would establish novel 
political facts that would have been complicated to incorporate within previous 
institutional paradigms. These facts are now prompting new domestic 
discussions and demands among Arab political personalities.       
  
6.8 Economic, Social and Environmental Concerns 
 Multilateral mediations under the backing of the United States and Russia 
employ a task force headed by the European Community (EC) that concentrates 
on concerns of economic cooperation. These also involve social and 
environmental matters.  
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6.8A Economic Cooperation 
 Several of Israeli intellectuals have been anxious for some years with 
matters associated to economic cooperation in the Middle East. But at present 
the concern is as well explicitly dealt with on the Arab side. Some assume that if 
peace were attained, countries of the region would obtain benefits and 
advantages through superior economies of magnitude, specialization and 
competition. This would be realized through progressively more effectual regional 
coordination of economic dealings sustaining, rather than replacing for, greater 
assimilation with the global economy.282 The insights introduced by intellectuals 
hang about throughout the peace negotiations point to potential future dealings 
and the arrangements that could develop to control them. They can be 
categorized into the following: 
 
 Trade: It has been suggested that a free trade in the Middle East be 
 established, at least for industrial products. Such a project would probably 
 begin with Israel, Jordan and Palestine. The idea rests on the reasonable 
 assumption than an expanded market will promote development in the 
 region. However, even setting aside political considerations, this would not 
 guarantee success. The record of Arab experiments with free trade areas 
 and common markets is more sufficient cause for scepticism.283  
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 Basic Infrastructure: Ideas are raised in the fields of land transportation 
 to connect the Maghreb to the Mashrek countries and the Gulf through 
 Egypt, Palestine and Israel; rail transportation, specifically the 
 rehabilitation of the Egypt-Gaza-Palestine line and its extension; solar 
 energy generation, storage, and use by setting up a project at the juncture 
 of the borders of Palestine, Israel and Egypt; electric power generation 
 and distribution by implementing existing plans for connecting grids in 
 Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Turkey and by including Israel in the prospective 
 network.284  
 
Currently, there are no institutions in which such insights could be broadly 
analyzed, and probably responded upon, by nations of the region. The UN 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) could be adjusted 
to function in this regard.    
  
6.8B Development of Water Resources 
 Cooperation between Arab and non-Arab nations in the arena of water 
resources is oftentimes talked about as a progress that will define the future of 
the Middle East. Insights range from suggestions for different kinds of bilateral 
cooperation to multilateral programs. Cases in point of the latter are the 
implementation of a water agreement that would cover water allocation, the use 
and management of natural water reserves and international aquifers, and the 
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expansion of a regional water right. Frameworks with a broader geographical 
coverage are constructing ‗peace pipelines‘ and escalating regional precipitation 
by sea are merging in the eastern Mediterranean. Parties to such agreements 
would be Arab and non-Arab alike. The institutions necessary for accomplishing 
such programs could be bilateral or multilateral, regional or sub regional; but the 
repercussion is that they would cease to be entirely Arab.    
  
6.8C The Environment 
 Recommendations for the conservation of the environment cross the 
Mediterranean, the Gulf of Aqaba, and nations in midway. Concerning the 
Mediterranean, schemes within the Mediterranean Action Programme are 
regarded as sufficient, but the construction of an Eastern Mediterranean regional 
centre for the lessening of water and marine pollution including Libya, Egypt, 
Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey is as well suggested. 285 
 
 Furthermore, recommendations have been created for the Gulf of Aqaba; 
these involve a regional and environmental influence and regional natural source 
of influence encompassing the coastal states. In each instance, through 
definition, the proposed institutions would not be entirely Arab. On the bilateral 
stage, recommendations are created for establishing Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-
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Jordanian institutions to carry out research and development on and sectors to 
formulate schemes for the safeguard of the region of the Dead Sea.286       
  
6.8D Human Resources 
 There have traditionally been appeals for policies to govern the 
transaction of manpower and to offer security to overseas labour in the Middle 
East. Present recommendations are meant to include all overseas labourers in 
the region, counting Palestinians employed in Israel. Establishing regional 
centres for technical and vocational preparation has been proposed. In this 
arena, as well, successful institutions might not be solely Arab.287  
  
6.8E Identities Issues 
 The presence of the Arab system has been elaborated by the specific 
trends of interaction among nations sharing a common cultural identity. The Arab 
system has been illustrated as not merely regional but as well national and 
distinguished by a great degree of cultural, linguistic and social integration. 
These attributes may have been present in other regional systems but dissimilar 
to the degree attained in the Middle East. Cultural aspects were the roots of the 
Arab system. Without these, the system would not have existed at all.   
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 Nevertheless, in an expanded regional system, the circumstance is 
dissimilar. Directly associated to cultural issues are ideological aspects; both 
kinds of issues are hard to pin down; thus, examining them is more complicated 
than determining security and economic mechanisms and players. As a matter of 
fact, they are ‗identitive‘ matters; specifically, they mark the conduct and 
behaviour of players. In the recently surfacing Middle East context, ideological 
and cultural matters can be predicted to wield influence on Arab responses to 
different other issues.             
  
6.8F Ideological Issues 
 The developing Middle East system will mainly be influenced by the 
interaction of ideologies differentiating its constituents. Three issues appear to 
shape main focal points of ideological union and pressure: ―the secular-
confessional issue; the issue of democracy; and the issue of socialization to 
norms of interaction.‖288        
  
6.8F1 Secularism versus Confessionalism 
 The issue of whether a nation is to be mobilized and organized along 
secular or confessional patterns is one that impacts every country of the Middle 
East, even recognizably secular political structures such as Turkey. Israel is a 
case in point, since religion was founded for the formation of the state. In other 
                                                 
288 Roberson, B.A. The Middle East and Europe: The Power Deficit. (London: Routledge, 
1998) p. 196.  
 234 
states, the degree of confessionalism varies tremendously, with Iran and Saudi 
Arabia on one end of the scale and Turkey, trailed by Syria, Egypt and Lebanon, 
on the other end. Such nations as Egypt and Turkey can be merged as an 
outcome of their adjacent locations on the scale, yet others may not. Iran and 
Saudi Arabia are alienated by sectarian regards and severe conflict over a 
number of ideological issues.289 The split between the secular and confessional 
has been a persistent issue throughout the life span of the Arab system. It will 
currently be aimed at a broader regional coverage. As it accomplished with the 
previous system, it will almost certainly weaken the cohesiveness of the recently 
extended one.        
  
6.8F2 Democracy 
 For this analysis, the concept democracy embraces notions of pluralism 
and competitive elections. To cite an idiom applied elsewhere, it can be mention 
that a definite democratic discrepancy is present in every country of the region. 
However, here, also, dissimilarities exist. Constraints on pluralism are less 
suppressing in Jordan, Egypt and Turkey and most stern in Qatar, Oman and 
Saudi Arabia. Competitive elections are carried out in Israel, Turkey and Iran and 
are unheard of in Syria and nations of the Arab peninsula.290 
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 These various domestic systems and mechanisms will automatically 
impact interactions associated to military, economic and environmental aspects. 
Concerning pluralism, the various attitudes toward democracy should be 
predicted to weaken the cohesiveness of every new-fangled regional system.         
  
6.8F3 Socialization to Standards of Interaction 
 The complexity of predicting how players will be situated on this matter is 
corresponded merely by the essentiality of socialization as a task of every 
political system. The positioning will be identified by the conclusive agreements 
influencing territorial and other substantive concerns. Thus far, we can predict 
that Iran, kept out from discussions over the prospect of the region, is probable to 
oppose the new norms. It is in the character of agreements to compensate 
players in a different way. Hence, the performance of Arab nations will be in 
proportion to the interest that, with regard to their individual beliefs, the novel 
standards will accomplish for them. The complexity will be intensified if the 
impartiality of such standards is assumed differently in each nation.     
 
 Similar ideological point of reference bolsters the assimilation of any 
political system. The divergences of outlooks toward secularism and democracy 
in the Middle East are apparent. To conquer the evident disintegrative possibility, 
differences should be mitigated. This can merely be achieved if incidences that 
are still happening, such as the peace process, direct a mass of players to 
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assume the novel Arab system addresses their demands and advances their 
interests.    
  
6.8G Cultural Issues 
 These involve the concerns of cultural identity and the creation of cultural 
goods. Arabs bestowed their name to the regional system as it has survived ever 
since the Second World War. This was disliked, with no impact, by cultural and 
ethnic minorities subsisting within the restrictions of the system. In a broadened 
system, minorities will perhaps prefer strengthening of the Arab identity of the 
system. Toiling in a common path will be the Israeli, Iranian and Turkish 
components of the Middle East system. The existence of extra-regional players 
in the system will further weaken the Arab nature of the Middle East.    
 
 However, provided with their population and their historical and linguistic 
associations, the Arabs can mark the system with their culture. Inter-Arab 
connections can be the foundations of a unique Arab subsystem that can 
influence the conduct and performance of its affiliated units with regard to 
economic, security, environmental and other concerns. Relations among Iranian, 
Turkish and Arab civilizations can enhance all partakers and further improve their 
shared entities. This is closely linked to the manner ideological concerns are 
handled and to the creation of cultural goods.     
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 The perpetuation of a unique Arab identity will be impacted by the 
capability and proficiency to create cultural goods. Competition is extreme in 
cultural territories of all regional systems. Regional players confront the massive 
productive capabilities of focal players in the global system. However, there is a 
particular requirement for Arab goods.          
 
6.9 Rethinking the Gulf Cooperation Council 
 Progressively more, the security concern has turned out to be major for 
the countries of the GCC. However, the joint military forces of the constituents 
are no contest for the prospective danger from either Iran or Iraq. The highly 
advanced arms and acquisitions since the Operation Desert Storm in 1991 will 
function no more than an emotional solace in the episode of an actual war.   
 
 Moreover, the Pan-Arab regional force envisioned in the Damascus 
Declaration has done trivially to guarantee the GCC leadership; provided with the 
doubts among the political heads, the dominions are anxious of depending on 
Syria and Egypt for their protection. These two Arab relatives have their personal 
economic and political interests for approving such an agreement. Moreover, the 
extra-regional security assurance from the United States preserved in the 
Riyadh.291 Declaration is by no means politically widespread in the Arab 
peninsula. This is an enduring issue for political authority.    
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 The rule of dual containment, particularly as it links to Iraq and Iran, is 
unrealistic. The thought of playing off one in opposition to the other in a scenario 
of balance of power is perilous. Aside from prohibiting them, there is a greater 
potential of restraining both of the intimidations in a regional collective-security 
framework. With concrete development concerning the Palestinian issue and 
decree of Syrian-Israeli territorial concerns, Israel could possibly be fragment of 
such a security administration. In order to rejuvenate itself as a successful 
organization, the GCC must spread out its membership to integrate the main 
players in the region. Apparently, in the process, it will be revolutionized from a 
Gulf to a Middle Eastern institution. In the perspective of the projected regional 
economic bloc at the Casablanca convention in 1994, it is not anymore an 
improbable idea.292 The multi-polarity among Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israel and 
the GCC, will be an alleviating influence for a regional collective-security 
paradigm.  
 
 The GCC does not confront the fate of NATO, where expansion seems to 
be indispensable to provide the coalition a confidence boost, unless a justification 
to bear on at all, in the dimension of the post-Cold War. The GCC is 
comparatively established with its present membership. They need to continue 
cooperating as general threats to their security is a continuing issue in an 
extremely tough region.  
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